Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p189 |
Resumo: | In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language involves fully specifying its inferential characteristics within the logic. To do this, we examine a recent proposal by Berto (2014) for a paraconsistent rejection, which — according to him — avoids paradox, even when introduced into a language that contains self-reference and a transparent truth predicate. We will show that this proposal is inadequate because it is too incomplete. We argue that the reason it avoids trouble is that the inferential characteristics of the new operator are left (mostly) unspecified, exporting the task of specifying them to metaphysicians. Additionally, we show that when completing this proposal with some plausible rules for the rejection operator, paradoxes do arise. Finally, we draw some more general implications from the study of this example. |
id |
UFSC-5_d3aa575f446ab63316a168573f3e0b3c |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/58641 |
network_acronym_str |
UFSC-5 |
network_name_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Against a Metaphysical Understanding of RejectionIn this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language involves fully specifying its inferential characteristics within the logic. To do this, we examine a recent proposal by Berto (2014) for a paraconsistent rejection, which — according to him — avoids paradox, even when introduced into a language that contains self-reference and a transparent truth predicate. We will show that this proposal is inadequate because it is too incomplete. We argue that the reason it avoids trouble is that the inferential characteristics of the new operator are left (mostly) unspecified, exporting the task of specifying them to metaphysicians. Additionally, we show that when completing this proposal with some plausible rules for the rejection operator, paradoxes do arise. Finally, we draw some more general implications from the study of this example.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2018-08-22info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p18910.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p189Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 No. 1 (2018); 189-202Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 Núm. 1 (2018); 189-202Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 22 n. 1 (2018); 189-2021808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p189/pdfCopyright (c) 2021 Mariela Rubin, Ariel Rofféinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRubin, MarielaRoffé, Ariel2018-08-22T09:32:35Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/58641Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2018-08-22T09:32:35Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection |
title |
Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection |
spellingShingle |
Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection Rubin, Mariela |
title_short |
Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection |
title_full |
Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection |
title_fullStr |
Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection |
title_full_unstemmed |
Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection |
title_sort |
Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection |
author |
Rubin, Mariela |
author_facet |
Rubin, Mariela Roffé, Ariel |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Roffé, Ariel |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Rubin, Mariela Roffé, Ariel |
description |
In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language involves fully specifying its inferential characteristics within the logic. To do this, we examine a recent proposal by Berto (2014) for a paraconsistent rejection, which — according to him — avoids paradox, even when introduced into a language that contains self-reference and a transparent truth predicate. We will show that this proposal is inadequate because it is too incomplete. We argue that the reason it avoids trouble is that the inferential characteristics of the new operator are left (mostly) unspecified, exporting the task of specifying them to metaphysicians. Additionally, we show that when completing this proposal with some plausible rules for the rejection operator, paradoxes do arise. Finally, we draw some more general implications from the study of this example. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-08-22 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p189 10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p189 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p189 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p189 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n1p189/pdf |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Mariela Rubin, Ariel Roffé info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Mariela Rubin, Ariel Roffé |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 No. 1 (2018); 189-202 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 Núm. 1 (2018); 189-202 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 22 n. 1 (2018); 189-202 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435113780543488 |