What is the argument for the natural ontological attitude?
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p175 |
Resumo: | Arthur Fine presented the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) as a third alternative between scientific realism and anti-realism by identifying a core position contained in both and rejecting any philosophical addition to this core. At first, Fine’s proposal was understood as offering a doxastic middle ground between believing in the truth of a theory and believing in its empirical adequacy. In this reading, NOA was widely disregarded after Alan Musgrave’s criticisms of it, which characterized Fine’s proposal as a form of realism. After that, NOA was reinterpreted as a local variety of realism focused in changing the attitude used to settle the scientific realism debate, by rejecting global philosophies with an approach external to science, and by considering only the scientific evidence with a contextualist mood. Although this reading clarifies how to understand NOA, there is still no consensus about what is Fine’s argument to support it. I organize the four main interpretations of Fine’s defense and point their main flaws. Finally, I develop some clarifications about NOA in order to solve the flaws of the preceding interpretations, defending that NOA is based upon a prevalence of the epistemic values actually used in scientific practice. |
id |
UFSC-5_dbe681ed4ca2f2d8d81a79e83610704c |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/59259 |
network_acronym_str |
UFSC-5 |
network_name_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
What is the argument for the natural ontological attitude?Qual o argumento para a Atitude Ontológica Natural?Arthur Fine presented the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) as a third alternative between scientific realism and anti-realism by identifying a core position contained in both and rejecting any philosophical addition to this core. At first, Fine’s proposal was understood as offering a doxastic middle ground between believing in the truth of a theory and believing in its empirical adequacy. In this reading, NOA was widely disregarded after Alan Musgrave’s criticisms of it, which characterized Fine’s proposal as a form of realism. After that, NOA was reinterpreted as a local variety of realism focused in changing the attitude used to settle the scientific realism debate, by rejecting global philosophies with an approach external to science, and by considering only the scientific evidence with a contextualist mood. Although this reading clarifies how to understand NOA, there is still no consensus about what is Fine’s argument to support it. I organize the four main interpretations of Fine’s defense and point their main flaws. Finally, I develop some clarifications about NOA in order to solve the flaws of the preceding interpretations, defending that NOA is based upon a prevalence of the epistemic values actually used in scientific practice.Arthur Fine defendeu a Atitude Ontológica Natural (NOA) como uma terceira alternativa entre realismo e anti-realismo científico, caracterizada pela adoção de uma posição central compartilhada por ambos, e pela rejeição de qualquer adição filosófica a esta posição central. Inicialmente, a NOA foi entendida como oferecendo uma meio-termo doxástico entre a atitude de crer na verdade de uma teoria e de crer em sua adequação empírica. Nesta interpretação, a NOA foi amplamente rejeitada devido a crítica de Alan Musgrave mostrando que a NOA seria uma forma de realismo. Posteriormente, a NOA foi reinterpretada como uma forma de realismo local focada em reavaliar a atitude adotada no debate sobre realismo, rejeitando filosofias globais com uma abordagem externa à ciência, e considerando contextualmente apenas a evidência científica. Embora esta interpretação esclareça o que seja a NOA, ainda não há consenso sobre qual o argumento de Fine para defender sua adoção. Organizo as quatro principais interpretações da defesa de Fine e suas principais dificuldades. Por fim, tento esclarecer como podemos entender a NOA de modo a resolver estas dificuldades, e defendo que a NOA esteja baseada em uma prevalência dos valores epistêmicos efetivamente utilizados na prática científica.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2019-08-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p17510.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p175Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 No. 2 (2019); 175-205Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (2019); 175-205Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 2 (2019); 175-2051808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p175/pdfCopyright (c) 2021 Bruno Malavolta e Silvainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilva, Bruno Malavolta e2019-12-16T17:16:29Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/59259Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-12-16T17:16:29Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
What is the argument for the natural ontological attitude? Qual o argumento para a Atitude Ontológica Natural? |
title |
What is the argument for the natural ontological attitude? |
spellingShingle |
What is the argument for the natural ontological attitude? Silva, Bruno Malavolta e |
title_short |
What is the argument for the natural ontological attitude? |
title_full |
What is the argument for the natural ontological attitude? |
title_fullStr |
What is the argument for the natural ontological attitude? |
title_full_unstemmed |
What is the argument for the natural ontological attitude? |
title_sort |
What is the argument for the natural ontological attitude? |
author |
Silva, Bruno Malavolta e |
author_facet |
Silva, Bruno Malavolta e |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Silva, Bruno Malavolta e |
description |
Arthur Fine presented the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) as a third alternative between scientific realism and anti-realism by identifying a core position contained in both and rejecting any philosophical addition to this core. At first, Fine’s proposal was understood as offering a doxastic middle ground between believing in the truth of a theory and believing in its empirical adequacy. In this reading, NOA was widely disregarded after Alan Musgrave’s criticisms of it, which characterized Fine’s proposal as a form of realism. After that, NOA was reinterpreted as a local variety of realism focused in changing the attitude used to settle the scientific realism debate, by rejecting global philosophies with an approach external to science, and by considering only the scientific evidence with a contextualist mood. Although this reading clarifies how to understand NOA, there is still no consensus about what is Fine’s argument to support it. I organize the four main interpretations of Fine’s defense and point their main flaws. Finally, I develop some clarifications about NOA in order to solve the flaws of the preceding interpretations, defending that NOA is based upon a prevalence of the epistemic values actually used in scientific practice. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-08-16 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p175 10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p175 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p175 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p175 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p175/pdf |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Bruno Malavolta e Silva info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Bruno Malavolta e Silva |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 No. 2 (2019); 175-205 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (2019); 175-205 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 2 (2019); 175-205 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435113794174976 |