Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bueno, Otávio
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n2p217
Resumo: In this paper, I examine Putnam’s nuanced views in the philosophy of mathematics, distinguishing three proposals: modalism (an interpretation of mathematics in terms of modal logic), quasi-empirical realism (that emphasizes the role and use of quasi-empirical methods in mathematics), and an indispensability view (that highlights the indispensable role of quantification over mathematical objects and the support such quantification provides for a realist interpretation of mathematics). I argue that, as he shifted through these views, Putnam aimed to preserve a semantic realist account of mathematics that avoids platonism. In the end, however, each of the proposals faces significant difficulties. A form of skepticism then emerges
id UFSC-5_e310cec5716ea1d8b9c63cbf2f4c5a43
oai_identifier_str oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/32342
network_acronym_str UFSC-5
network_name_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository_id_str
spelling Putnam and the Indispensability of MathematicsPutnam and the Indispensability of MathematicsIn this paper, I examine Putnam’s nuanced views in the philosophy of mathematics, distinguishing three proposals: modalism (an interpretation of mathematics in terms of modal logic), quasi-empirical realism (that emphasizes the role and use of quasi-empirical methods in mathematics), and an indispensability view (that highlights the indispensable role of quantification over mathematical objects and the support such quantification provides for a realist interpretation of mathematics). I argue that, as he shifted through these views, Putnam aimed to preserve a semantic realist account of mathematics that avoids platonism. In the end, however, each of the proposals faces significant difficulties. A form of skepticism then emergesNesse trabalho, examino as concepções sutis que Putnam desenvolveu em filosofia da matemática, distinguindo três propostas: o modalismo (uma interpretação da matemática em termos de lógica modal), o realismo quase-empírico (que enfatiza o papel e o uso de métodos quase-empíricos na matemática), e uma concepção indispensabilista (que salienta a função indispensável da quantificação sobre objetos matemáticos e o apoio proporcionado por tal quantificação para uma interpretação realista da matemática). Argumento que, ao longo dessas mudanças, Putnam buscou preservar um realismo semântico acerca da matemática que evite o platonismo. Ao final, todavia, cada uma das concepções propostas enfrenta dificuldades significativas. Uma forma de ceticismo então surge.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2013-08-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n2p21710.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n2p217Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 No. 2 (2013); 217-234Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 Núm. 2 (2013); 217-234Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 17 n. 2 (2013); 217-2341808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n2p217/26403Copyright (c) 2021 Otávio Buenoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBueno, Otávio2019-09-13T09:06:32Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/32342Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T09:06:32Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics
Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics
title Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics
spellingShingle Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics
Bueno, Otávio
title_short Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics
title_full Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics
title_fullStr Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics
title_full_unstemmed Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics
title_sort Putnam and the Indispensability of Mathematics
author Bueno, Otávio
author_facet Bueno, Otávio
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bueno, Otávio
description In this paper, I examine Putnam’s nuanced views in the philosophy of mathematics, distinguishing three proposals: modalism (an interpretation of mathematics in terms of modal logic), quasi-empirical realism (that emphasizes the role and use of quasi-empirical methods in mathematics), and an indispensability view (that highlights the indispensable role of quantification over mathematical objects and the support such quantification provides for a realist interpretation of mathematics). I argue that, as he shifted through these views, Putnam aimed to preserve a semantic realist account of mathematics that avoids platonism. In the end, however, each of the proposals faces significant difficulties. A form of skepticism then emerges
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-08-31
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n2p217
10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n2p217
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n2p217
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n2p217
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n2p217/26403
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Otávio Bueno
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Otávio Bueno
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 No. 2 (2013); 217-234
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 Núm. 2 (2013); 217-234
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 17 n. 2 (2013); 217-234
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
_version_ 1789435107586605056

Registros relacionados