From Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation and back
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2003 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14843 |
Resumo: | Both Quine and Davidson put forth programs of empirical semantics satisfy-ing the conditions that characterize the so-called “standpoint of interpreta-tion.” Quine’s less ambitious program of radical translation rests upon two buttresses: causality and empathy. Davidson’s more ambitious program of radical interpretation replaces causality with truth and empathy with ration-ality. Although the replacement of causality with intersubjective truth seems to me to be a fully justified move, I nevertheless contend that it is more real-istic to develop the work of interpretation drawing upon Quine’s less ambi-tious requirement of empathy than upon Davidson’s view of human agency as rational agency. In order to substantiate this contention, I present an ar-gument to the effect that Davidson’s characterization of human agency as rational is not compatible with his other requirement that truth should pro-vide the essential link connecting speech with environment and action. |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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From Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation and backBoth Quine and Davidson put forth programs of empirical semantics satisfy-ing the conditions that characterize the so-called “standpoint of interpreta-tion.” Quine’s less ambitious program of radical translation rests upon two buttresses: causality and empathy. Davidson’s more ambitious program of radical interpretation replaces causality with truth and empathy with ration-ality. Although the replacement of causality with intersubjective truth seems to me to be a fully justified move, I nevertheless contend that it is more real-istic to develop the work of interpretation drawing upon Quine’s less ambi-tious requirement of empathy than upon Davidson’s view of human agency as rational agency. In order to substantiate this contention, I present an ar-gument to the effect that Davidson’s characterization of human agency as rational is not compatible with his other requirement that truth should pro-vide the essential link connecting speech with environment and action.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2003-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1484310.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 No. 1-2 (2003); 229-249Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 Núm. 1-2 (2003); 229-249Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 7 n. 1-2 (2003); 229-2491808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14843/13559Copyright (c) 2021 António Zilhãohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessZilhão, António2016-01-02T12:16:55Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14843Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:16:55Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
From Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation and back |
title |
From Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation and back |
spellingShingle |
From Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation and back Zilhão, António |
title_short |
From Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation and back |
title_full |
From Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation and back |
title_fullStr |
From Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation and back |
title_full_unstemmed |
From Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation and back |
title_sort |
From Radical Translation to Radical Interpretation and back |
author |
Zilhão, António |
author_facet |
Zilhão, António |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Zilhão, António |
description |
Both Quine and Davidson put forth programs of empirical semantics satisfy-ing the conditions that characterize the so-called “standpoint of interpreta-tion.” Quine’s less ambitious program of radical translation rests upon two buttresses: causality and empathy. Davidson’s more ambitious program of radical interpretation replaces causality with truth and empathy with ration-ality. Although the replacement of causality with intersubjective truth seems to me to be a fully justified move, I nevertheless contend that it is more real-istic to develop the work of interpretation drawing upon Quine’s less ambi-tious requirement of empathy than upon Davidson’s view of human agency as rational agency. In order to substantiate this contention, I present an ar-gument to the effect that Davidson’s characterization of human agency as rational is not compatible with his other requirement that truth should pro-vide the essential link connecting speech with environment and action. |
publishDate |
2003 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2003-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14843 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14843 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14843/13559 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 António Zilhão http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 António Zilhão http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 No. 1-2 (2003); 229-249 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 Núm. 1-2 (2003); 229-249 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 7 n. 1-2 (2003); 229-249 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435110249988096 |