Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Ramirio,Lucas Deleon
Data de Publicação: 2021
Outros Autores: Pereira,Wagner Roberto, de Alcântara,Juciara Nunes
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Gestão & Produção
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0104-530X2021000100204
Resumo: abstract: This study is based on the theory of transaction costs (TCT) to analyze the opportunistic behavior of suppliers in public purchases of agricultural products provided by the private sector. We argue that among the public purchasing modalities, the electronic auction, although using the principles of the reverse English auction and considered as a market structure governance driven by price, presents opportunistic behavior at the time of bidding by the seller, until the closing of the contract with the buyer. We analyzed the differences in price quotations and the closing price of 20 agricultural products purchased in electronic auction of public bidding processes in comparison to the bid prices and of references between the years 2014 to 2017 in the Federal Institute Sul de Minas - Campus Inconfidentes. The results show that there was a discount in the biddings between the years 2014 and 2017, since the repetition of bids in electronic auction forced the reduction of prices by the suppliers. However, it was possible to note opportunism by some agents, in the items in which the public agency under study did not fully specify the bidding product.
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spelling Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus InconfidentesOpportunismLimited rationalityElectronic biddingabstract: This study is based on the theory of transaction costs (TCT) to analyze the opportunistic behavior of suppliers in public purchases of agricultural products provided by the private sector. We argue that among the public purchasing modalities, the electronic auction, although using the principles of the reverse English auction and considered as a market structure governance driven by price, presents opportunistic behavior at the time of bidding by the seller, until the closing of the contract with the buyer. We analyzed the differences in price quotations and the closing price of 20 agricultural products purchased in electronic auction of public bidding processes in comparison to the bid prices and of references between the years 2014 to 2017 in the Federal Institute Sul de Minas - Campus Inconfidentes. The results show that there was a discount in the biddings between the years 2014 and 2017, since the repetition of bids in electronic auction forced the reduction of prices by the suppliers. However, it was possible to note opportunism by some agents, in the items in which the public agency under study did not fully specify the bidding product.Universidade Federal de São Carlos2021-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0104-530X2021000100204Gestão & Produção v.28 n.1 2021reponame:Gestão & Produçãoinstname:Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCAR)instacron:UFSCAR10.1590/1806-9649.2020v28e4832info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRamirio,Lucas DeleonPereira,Wagner Robertode Alcântara,Juciara Nuneseng2021-03-29T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0104-530X2021000100204Revistahttps://www.gestaoeproducao.com/PUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpgp@dep.ufscar.br||revistagestaoemanalise@unichristus.edu.br1806-96490104-530Xopendoar:2021-03-29T00:00Gestão & Produção - Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCAR)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes
title Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes
spellingShingle Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes
Ramirio,Lucas Deleon
Opportunism
Limited rationality
Electronic bidding
title_short Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes
title_full Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes
title_fullStr Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes
title_full_unstemmed Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes
title_sort Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes
author Ramirio,Lucas Deleon
author_facet Ramirio,Lucas Deleon
Pereira,Wagner Roberto
de Alcântara,Juciara Nunes
author_role author
author2 Pereira,Wagner Roberto
de Alcântara,Juciara Nunes
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ramirio,Lucas Deleon
Pereira,Wagner Roberto
de Alcântara,Juciara Nunes
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Opportunism
Limited rationality
Electronic bidding
topic Opportunism
Limited rationality
Electronic bidding
description abstract: This study is based on the theory of transaction costs (TCT) to analyze the opportunistic behavior of suppliers in public purchases of agricultural products provided by the private sector. We argue that among the public purchasing modalities, the electronic auction, although using the principles of the reverse English auction and considered as a market structure governance driven by price, presents opportunistic behavior at the time of bidding by the seller, until the closing of the contract with the buyer. We analyzed the differences in price quotations and the closing price of 20 agricultural products purchased in electronic auction of public bidding processes in comparison to the bid prices and of references between the years 2014 to 2017 in the Federal Institute Sul de Minas - Campus Inconfidentes. The results show that there was a discount in the biddings between the years 2014 and 2017, since the repetition of bids in electronic auction forced the reduction of prices by the suppliers. However, it was possible to note opportunism by some agents, in the items in which the public agency under study did not fully specify the bidding product.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0104-530X2021000100204
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0104-530X2021000100204
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/1806-9649.2020v28e4832
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de São Carlos
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de São Carlos
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Gestão & Produção v.28 n.1 2021
reponame:Gestão & Produção
instname:Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCAR)
instacron:UFSCAR
instname_str Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCAR)
instacron_str UFSCAR
institution UFSCAR
reponame_str Gestão & Produção
collection Gestão & Produção
repository.name.fl_str_mv Gestão & Produção - Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCAR)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv gp@dep.ufscar.br||revistagestaoemanalise@unichristus.edu.br
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