Confiabilismo em Alvin Goldman

• Autor(a) principal: Rodrigues, Emanuele Abreu
• Data de Publicação: 2009
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9081
• topic: Conhecimento proposicional; Justificação; Confiabilismo; Processos confiáveis; Alvin Goldman; Propositional knowledge; Justified; Reliabilism; Truth worthiness; Alvin Goldman; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

We assume that the central focus of epistemology is propositional knowledge (S knows that P). However, since some true beliefs are true by accident, the central question raised by epistemologists is: What becomes a mere true belief into knowledge? There are several answers to this question, many of them conflicting with each other. Among the answers we find two perspectives that compete with each other as the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, namely, the internalist and externalist perspectives. For the epistemological externalism mind the external factors in the formation of belief. The research aims to discuss some issues that connect externalism a proper way of thinking about truth and what we do when we take a belief to be true. The theoretical discussion will use the externalist perspective of Alvin Goldman seeking a normative theory of justification, assuming that a belief is caused by a reliable process. Goldman, for example, states that the explanation of justified belief is necessary for knowledge and is closely related to it. Asserts that the term "justified" is an evaluative term and any correct definition or synonym for "justified" would also be an evaluative term. Thus, Goldman seeks a normative theory of justification for such a search to specify the conditions for substantive epistemic belief. However, he said conditions should be a non-epistemic, that is, necessary and sufficient conditions that do not involve any epistemic notions. Goldman complains that most of the time it is assumed that someone has a justified belief because that person knows that the belief is justified and know what is the justification. This means that justification is an argument or a set of reasons that can be given in favor of a belief, but it just tells us that the nature of justified belief with regard to what a person might say if asked to defend or justify belief. Instead, Goldman thinks that a belief is justified only by some process or property that makes it justified.