Sorte moral e responsabilidade
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2015 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
Texto Completo: | http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9151 |
Resumo: | In the present work, we seek to elucidate the relations between the problem of moral luck and our assignments of responsibility. The problem of moral luck emerges from two dimensions of human life. On the one side, we are autonomous and rational beings, we have control over our actions and are moral agents. On the other side, we are vulnerable to every sort of external contingency that eliminates the complete control we have over our actions and their results. The contingency, also, has a significant weight on the formation of our character and personality. Therefore, the problem of moral luck takes a real importance: how can we assign responsibility to the agents, given that a lot of what configures a moral action are contingent elements? The research was elaborated based on Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel s articles on Moral luck. Williams, in his article, seeks to show that morality, as we conceive it, is (in fact) distant from our moral evaluations. Williams introduces the role of regret and recognizes the need to understand moral justification as retrospective. Nagel, in turn, finds the center of the moral luck problem in the control principle. In trying to understand how we assign responsibility to an agent for things beyond his control, Nagel defines four methods in which luck influences our moral judgements, and lists the kinds of moral luck: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal luck. Finally, we take a look at critiques pertinent to the moral luck and responsibility problem, both negating and accepting the influence of luck in moral responsibility. From the epistemic argument and Zimmerman s postulates to Walker s pure agency critique and Otsuka s strawsonian considerations about reactive attitudes. |
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Sorte moral e responsabilidadeMoral luck and responsibilitySorte moralResponsabilidadeJuízos moraisBernard WilliamsThomas NagelMoral luckResponsibilityMoral judgementsBernard WilliamsThomas NagelCNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIAIn the present work, we seek to elucidate the relations between the problem of moral luck and our assignments of responsibility. The problem of moral luck emerges from two dimensions of human life. On the one side, we are autonomous and rational beings, we have control over our actions and are moral agents. On the other side, we are vulnerable to every sort of external contingency that eliminates the complete control we have over our actions and their results. The contingency, also, has a significant weight on the formation of our character and personality. Therefore, the problem of moral luck takes a real importance: how can we assign responsibility to the agents, given that a lot of what configures a moral action are contingent elements? The research was elaborated based on Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel s articles on Moral luck. Williams, in his article, seeks to show that morality, as we conceive it, is (in fact) distant from our moral evaluations. Williams introduces the role of regret and recognizes the need to understand moral justification as retrospective. Nagel, in turn, finds the center of the moral luck problem in the control principle. In trying to understand how we assign responsibility to an agent for things beyond his control, Nagel defines four methods in which luck influences our moral judgements, and lists the kinds of moral luck: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal luck. Finally, we take a look at critiques pertinent to the moral luck and responsibility problem, both negating and accepting the influence of luck in moral responsibility. From the epistemic argument and Zimmerman s postulates to Walker s pure agency critique and Otsuka s strawsonian considerations about reactive attitudes.Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e TecnológicoNo presente trabalho, buscamos elucidar as relações entre o problema da sorte moral e nossas atribuições de responsabilidade. O problema da sorte moral emerge a partir de duas dimensões da vida humana. Por um lado, somos seres autônomos e racionais, temos o controle sobre nossas ações e somos agentes morais. Por outro, somos vulneráveis a toda espécie de contingência externa que elimina o controle total que temos de nossas ações e de seus resultados. A contingência, também, tem um peso significativo na formação de nosso caráter e personalidade. Por isso, o problema da sorte moral assume importância real: como podemos atribuir responsabilidade aos agentes, visto que muito do que configura uma ação moral são elementos contingentes? Elaboramos esta pesquisa a partir dos artigos Moral luck de Bernard Williams e Thomas Nagel. Williams, em seu artigo, busca mostrar que a moralidade, como a concebemos, mostra-se distante de nossas avaliações morais. Williams introduz o papel do arrependimento e reconhece a necessidade de entendermos a justificação moral como retrospectiva. Nagel, por sua vez, encontra no princípio do controle o centro do problema da sorte moral. Na tentativa de entender como atribuímos responsabilidade a uma agente por coisas além de seu controle, Nagel define quatro meios pelos quais a sorte influencia nossos juízos morais e elenca os tipos de sorte moral: sorte resultante, circunstancial, constitutiva e causal. Por fim, procuramos as críticas pertinentes ao problema da sorte moral e responsabilidade, as quais neguem ou aceitem a influência da sorte na responsabilidade moral, indo do argumento epistêmico e os postulados de Zimmerman à crítica da agência pura de Walker e as considerações strawsonianas de Otsuka sobre as atitudes reativas.Universidade Federal de Santa MariaBRFilosofiaUFSMPrograma de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaNapoli, Ricardo Bins dihttp://lattes.cnpq.br/0018710144049443Williges, Flaviohttp://lattes.cnpq.br/5467666371380781Azevedo, Marco Antonio Oliveira dehttp://lattes.cnpq.br/5012646823374838Silva, Paulo Henrique de Toledo da2016-03-242016-03-242015-04-28info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfapplication/pdfSILVA, Paulo Henrique de Toledo da. Moral luck and responsibility. 2015. 74 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2015.http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9151porinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSMinstname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)instacron:UFSM2022-06-14T18:59:41Zoai:repositorio.ufsm.br:1/9151Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/ONGhttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/oai/requestatendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.comopendoar:2022-06-14T18:59:41Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Sorte moral e responsabilidade Moral luck and responsibility |
title |
Sorte moral e responsabilidade |
spellingShingle |
Sorte moral e responsabilidade Silva, Paulo Henrique de Toledo da Sorte moral Responsabilidade Juízos morais Bernard Williams Thomas Nagel Moral luck Responsibility Moral judgements Bernard Williams Thomas Nagel CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
title_short |
Sorte moral e responsabilidade |
title_full |
Sorte moral e responsabilidade |
title_fullStr |
Sorte moral e responsabilidade |
title_full_unstemmed |
Sorte moral e responsabilidade |
title_sort |
Sorte moral e responsabilidade |
author |
Silva, Paulo Henrique de Toledo da |
author_facet |
Silva, Paulo Henrique de Toledo da |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Napoli, Ricardo Bins di http://lattes.cnpq.br/0018710144049443 Williges, Flavio http://lattes.cnpq.br/5467666371380781 Azevedo, Marco Antonio Oliveira de http://lattes.cnpq.br/5012646823374838 |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Silva, Paulo Henrique de Toledo da |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Sorte moral Responsabilidade Juízos morais Bernard Williams Thomas Nagel Moral luck Responsibility Moral judgements Bernard Williams Thomas Nagel CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
topic |
Sorte moral Responsabilidade Juízos morais Bernard Williams Thomas Nagel Moral luck Responsibility Moral judgements Bernard Williams Thomas Nagel CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
description |
In the present work, we seek to elucidate the relations between the problem of moral luck and our assignments of responsibility. The problem of moral luck emerges from two dimensions of human life. On the one side, we are autonomous and rational beings, we have control over our actions and are moral agents. On the other side, we are vulnerable to every sort of external contingency that eliminates the complete control we have over our actions and their results. The contingency, also, has a significant weight on the formation of our character and personality. Therefore, the problem of moral luck takes a real importance: how can we assign responsibility to the agents, given that a lot of what configures a moral action are contingent elements? The research was elaborated based on Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel s articles on Moral luck. Williams, in his article, seeks to show that morality, as we conceive it, is (in fact) distant from our moral evaluations. Williams introduces the role of regret and recognizes the need to understand moral justification as retrospective. Nagel, in turn, finds the center of the moral luck problem in the control principle. In trying to understand how we assign responsibility to an agent for things beyond his control, Nagel defines four methods in which luck influences our moral judgements, and lists the kinds of moral luck: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal luck. Finally, we take a look at critiques pertinent to the moral luck and responsibility problem, both negating and accepting the influence of luck in moral responsibility. From the epistemic argument and Zimmerman s postulates to Walker s pure agency critique and Otsuka s strawsonian considerations about reactive attitudes. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-04-28 2016-03-24 2016-03-24 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
format |
masterThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
SILVA, Paulo Henrique de Toledo da. Moral luck and responsibility. 2015. 74 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2015. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9151 |
identifier_str_mv |
SILVA, Paulo Henrique de Toledo da. Moral luck and responsibility. 2015. 74 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2015. |
url |
http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9151 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria BR Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria BR Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) instacron:UFSM |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
instacron_str |
UFSM |
institution |
UFSM |
reponame_str |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
collection |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
atendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.com |
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1805922113892122624 |