Dever e universalismo moral em Hume: a normatividade sob uma perspectiva naturalista
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
Texto Completo: | http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/14645 |
Resumo: | The present thesis aims to propose the rescue of the concepts of duty and of universalism in the perspective of a naturalistic ethics from the contemporary reading of the moral works of David Hume. It follows the hypothesis that there is textual basis in Hume for the defense of a moral theory with pretension to universality from the idea of a shared human nature and the role of reason, next to the sensibility, in our moral judgments. We have a common structure that allows us to communicate our feelings and moral judgments through a standard language, however, the naturalization of moral concepts through the sensitivity has as a burden of the recognition of a certain contingency usually associated with empiricism. However, we argue that this contingency should not be an impediment to normativity. In this sense, there are already elements in the Humean moral for the defense of a duty that arises from the mutual expectations that we have. These expectations are based on our feelings, but also depend on our ability to reflect. The general structure of the text will be as follows: we will present some considerations of modern morality by showing that Hume must be comprehended like a defender of a harmonious view of reason and sensibility. Next, we will present the natural and artificial virtues that are perceptions of the mind and it concerns the character traits of moral agents. In this sense, moral judgments refer not to actions, but to character. The third chapter presents an analysis of the debate about the is-ought problem that reappears with MacIntyre. The aim is to question the classical interpretation of this passage and to show that Humean morality is compatible with the idea of moral duties and that its criticism concerned modern intuitionist rationalism and religious morals. Without further impediments to the establishment of a notion of duty, we will seek in the next chapter textual basis for the universalistic aspects of Hume's morality, mainly considering the idea of a shared human nature and a language that reflects our sensitivity. In the final chapter, we will point out some contemporary moral theories that present an idea of normativity based on the notion of “common point of view”, whose idea of duty refers to the human point of view that is sensitive, reflective, and capable of improvement. |
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Dever e universalismo moral em Hume: a normatividade sob uma perspectiva naturalistaDuty and moral universalism in Hume: normativity from a naturalistic perspectiveMoralDavid HumeDeverUniversalismoNaturalismoMoralDavid HumeDutyUniversalismNaturalismCNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIAThe present thesis aims to propose the rescue of the concepts of duty and of universalism in the perspective of a naturalistic ethics from the contemporary reading of the moral works of David Hume. It follows the hypothesis that there is textual basis in Hume for the defense of a moral theory with pretension to universality from the idea of a shared human nature and the role of reason, next to the sensibility, in our moral judgments. We have a common structure that allows us to communicate our feelings and moral judgments through a standard language, however, the naturalization of moral concepts through the sensitivity has as a burden of the recognition of a certain contingency usually associated with empiricism. However, we argue that this contingency should not be an impediment to normativity. In this sense, there are already elements in the Humean moral for the defense of a duty that arises from the mutual expectations that we have. These expectations are based on our feelings, but also depend on our ability to reflect. The general structure of the text will be as follows: we will present some considerations of modern morality by showing that Hume must be comprehended like a defender of a harmonious view of reason and sensibility. Next, we will present the natural and artificial virtues that are perceptions of the mind and it concerns the character traits of moral agents. In this sense, moral judgments refer not to actions, but to character. The third chapter presents an analysis of the debate about the is-ought problem that reappears with MacIntyre. The aim is to question the classical interpretation of this passage and to show that Humean morality is compatible with the idea of moral duties and that its criticism concerned modern intuitionist rationalism and religious morals. Without further impediments to the establishment of a notion of duty, we will seek in the next chapter textual basis for the universalistic aspects of Hume's morality, mainly considering the idea of a shared human nature and a language that reflects our sensitivity. In the final chapter, we will point out some contemporary moral theories that present an idea of normativity based on the notion of “common point of view”, whose idea of duty refers to the human point of view that is sensitive, reflective, and capable of improvement.Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPESA presente tese tem como objetivo propor o resgate dos conceitos de dever e de universalismo na perspectiva de uma ética naturalista, a partir da releitura contemporânea das obras morais de David Hume. Segue-se a hipótese de que há base textual em Hume para a defesa de uma teoria moral com pretensão à universalidade a partir da ideia de uma natureza humana compartilhada e do papel da razão, junto à sensibilidade, em nossos juízos morais. Possuímos uma estrutura comum que nos permite comunicar nossos sentimentos e juízos morais através de uma linguagem padrão, todavia, a naturalização de conceitos morais pela via da sensibilidade tem como ônus o reconhecimento de uma determinada contingência, geralmente associada ao empirismo. Contudo, defendemos que essa contingência não deve ser um impedimento à normatividade. Nesse sentido, encontram-se já na moral humeana elementos para a defesa de um dever que surge das mútuas expectativas que possuímos. Essas expectativas são calcadas em nossos sentimentos, mas dependem também de nossa capacidade reflexiva. A estrutura geral do texto será a seguinte: apresentaremos algumas considerações sobre a moral moderna, evidenciando que Hume deve ser visto como um defensor de uma visão harmônica entre a razão e a sensibilidade. A seguir, apresentaremos as virtudes naturais e artificiais que são percepções da mente e dizem respeito aos traços de caráter dos agentes morais. Nesse sentido, os juízos morais referem-se não às ações, mas ao caráter. O terceiro capítulo apresenta uma análise do debate sobre o is-ought problem, que ressurge com MacIntyre. O objetivo é questionar a interpretação clássica desta passagem e mostrar que a moral humeana é compatível com a ideia de deveres morais, e que sua crítica diz respeito ao racionalismo intuicionista moderno e às morais religiosas. Sem maiores impeditivos para o estabelecimento de uma noção de dever, buscaremos evidenciar, no capítulo quatro, a base textual para os aspectos universalistas da moral de Hume, considerando principalmente a ideia de uma natureza humana compartilhada e de uma linguagem que reflete nossa sensibilidade. No capítulo final, apontaremos teorias morais contemporâneas que apresentam suas propostas normativas a partir da noção de “ponto de vista comum [common point of view]”, segundo a qual, a ideia de dever reporta-se ao ponto de vista humano, que é sensível, reflexivo e passível de aprimoramento.Universidade Federal de Santa MariaBrasilFilosofiaUFSMPrograma de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaCentro de Ciências Sociais e HumanasKrassuski, Jair Antôniohttp://lattes.cnpq.br/5559214547314711Gallina, Albertinho Luizhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/0750109262601371Hamm, Christian Viktorhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/5301026925485532Nunes, Cristina de Moraeshttp://lattes.cnpq.br/9393264083656916Zimmermann, Flávio Miguel de Oliveirahttp://lattes.cnpq.br/0046624577557228Portela, Bruno Martinez2018-10-23T19:19:43Z2018-10-23T19:19:43Z2017-08-17info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisapplication/pdfhttp://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/14645porAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSMinstname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)instacron:UFSM2018-10-23T19:19:43Zoai:repositorio.ufsm.br:1/14645Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/ONGhttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/oai/requestatendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.comopendoar:2018-10-23T19:19:43Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Dever e universalismo moral em Hume: a normatividade sob uma perspectiva naturalista Duty and moral universalism in Hume: normativity from a naturalistic perspective |
title |
Dever e universalismo moral em Hume: a normatividade sob uma perspectiva naturalista |
spellingShingle |
Dever e universalismo moral em Hume: a normatividade sob uma perspectiva naturalista Portela, Bruno Martinez Moral David Hume Dever Universalismo Naturalismo Moral David Hume Duty Universalism Naturalism CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
title_short |
Dever e universalismo moral em Hume: a normatividade sob uma perspectiva naturalista |
title_full |
Dever e universalismo moral em Hume: a normatividade sob uma perspectiva naturalista |
title_fullStr |
Dever e universalismo moral em Hume: a normatividade sob uma perspectiva naturalista |
title_full_unstemmed |
Dever e universalismo moral em Hume: a normatividade sob uma perspectiva naturalista |
title_sort |
Dever e universalismo moral em Hume: a normatividade sob uma perspectiva naturalista |
author |
Portela, Bruno Martinez |
author_facet |
Portela, Bruno Martinez |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Krassuski, Jair Antônio http://lattes.cnpq.br/5559214547314711 Gallina, Albertinho Luiz http://lattes.cnpq.br/0750109262601371 Hamm, Christian Viktor http://lattes.cnpq.br/5301026925485532 Nunes, Cristina de Moraes http://lattes.cnpq.br/9393264083656916 Zimmermann, Flávio Miguel de Oliveira http://lattes.cnpq.br/0046624577557228 |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Portela, Bruno Martinez |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Moral David Hume Dever Universalismo Naturalismo Moral David Hume Duty Universalism Naturalism CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
topic |
Moral David Hume Dever Universalismo Naturalismo Moral David Hume Duty Universalism Naturalism CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
description |
The present thesis aims to propose the rescue of the concepts of duty and of universalism in the perspective of a naturalistic ethics from the contemporary reading of the moral works of David Hume. It follows the hypothesis that there is textual basis in Hume for the defense of a moral theory with pretension to universality from the idea of a shared human nature and the role of reason, next to the sensibility, in our moral judgments. We have a common structure that allows us to communicate our feelings and moral judgments through a standard language, however, the naturalization of moral concepts through the sensitivity has as a burden of the recognition of a certain contingency usually associated with empiricism. However, we argue that this contingency should not be an impediment to normativity. In this sense, there are already elements in the Humean moral for the defense of a duty that arises from the mutual expectations that we have. These expectations are based on our feelings, but also depend on our ability to reflect. The general structure of the text will be as follows: we will present some considerations of modern morality by showing that Hume must be comprehended like a defender of a harmonious view of reason and sensibility. Next, we will present the natural and artificial virtues that are perceptions of the mind and it concerns the character traits of moral agents. In this sense, moral judgments refer not to actions, but to character. The third chapter presents an analysis of the debate about the is-ought problem that reappears with MacIntyre. The aim is to question the classical interpretation of this passage and to show that Humean morality is compatible with the idea of moral duties and that its criticism concerned modern intuitionist rationalism and religious morals. Without further impediments to the establishment of a notion of duty, we will seek in the next chapter textual basis for the universalistic aspects of Hume's morality, mainly considering the idea of a shared human nature and a language that reflects our sensitivity. In the final chapter, we will point out some contemporary moral theories that present an idea of normativity based on the notion of “common point of view”, whose idea of duty refers to the human point of view that is sensitive, reflective, and capable of improvement. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-08-17 2018-10-23T19:19:43Z 2018-10-23T19:19:43Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/14645 |
url |
http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/14645 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria Brasil Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria Brasil Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) instacron:UFSM |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
instacron_str |
UFSM |
institution |
UFSM |
reponame_str |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
collection |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
atendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.com |
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1805922037595635712 |