Is Platonism life denying?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Revista Archai (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/8681 |
Resumo: | The Phaedo contains a number of passages which could lead to the interpretation that Platonism is a denial of life.Such an interpretation could only be maintained by reading these passages out of context and also by ignoring a number of elements from other Plato’s texts. The first step to solve this problem is to stress that such statements about how desirable is death always concern the philosopher, whose model is the dialogues’ character, Socrates. This character was meticulously constructed to be regarded as someone extraordinary; a character who has undergone a process of “initiation” in which he acquired a philosophical dýnamis, namely, the capacity to recognize the existence and the value of the highest objects of knowledge, and also the pleasure of their contemplation. Considering that “death” in the Phaedo means only the separation of body and soul, a process in which soul is not annihilated, then it means the continuity of the contemplative life, which during the corporeal existence was hampered by the limits imposed by the body. Hence, life after death means a life of continuous enjoyment of the greater good and pleasure. But beyond that line of argument, it must be determined how Plato, in his dialogues, addressed the issue of the bodily pleasures for both the philosopher as well as for the common man. And, in this case, it is clear that Platonism is not a denial of life, but rather the affirmation of life, both in bodily dimension and spiritual. |
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Is Platonism life denying?Seria o platonismo uma negação da vida?The Phaedo contains a number of passages which could lead to the interpretation that Platonism is a denial of life.Such an interpretation could only be maintained by reading these passages out of context and also by ignoring a number of elements from other Plato’s texts. The first step to solve this problem is to stress that such statements about how desirable is death always concern the philosopher, whose model is the dialogues’ character, Socrates. This character was meticulously constructed to be regarded as someone extraordinary; a character who has undergone a process of “initiation” in which he acquired a philosophical dýnamis, namely, the capacity to recognize the existence and the value of the highest objects of knowledge, and also the pleasure of their contemplation. Considering that “death” in the Phaedo means only the separation of body and soul, a process in which soul is not annihilated, then it means the continuity of the contemplative life, which during the corporeal existence was hampered by the limits imposed by the body. Hence, life after death means a life of continuous enjoyment of the greater good and pleasure. But beyond that line of argument, it must be determined how Plato, in his dialogues, addressed the issue of the bodily pleasures for both the philosopher as well as for the common man. And, in this case, it is clear that Platonism is not a denial of life, but rather the affirmation of life, both in bodily dimension and spiritual.O Fédon contém várias afirmações que poderiam levar à interpretação de que o platonismo seja uma doutrina comprometida com a negação da vida. Tal interpretação só pode ser sustentada retirando”‘se essas afirmações de contexto e ignorando”‘se uma série de elementos presentes em outros textos de Platão. Um primeiro passo para a solução do problema é reconhecer que todas as afirmações acerca do caráter desejável da morte são sempre relativas à figura do filósofo, cujo modelo é o Sócrates dos diálogos. Essa personagem foi meticulosamente construída para ser compreendida como extraordinária;é alguém que passou por um processo de “iniciação”, através do qual adquiriu a dýnamis filosófica que o tornou capaz de reconhecer a existência e o valor dos objetos mais altos do conhecimento, assim como o prazer que há na vida contemplativa. Considerando”‘se que “morte” no Fédon significa separação da alma e do corpo, sem que a alma seja com isso aniquilada, então ela significa a continuidade da vida contemplativa, a qual durante a existência corpórea foi tolhida pelos limites impostos pelo corpo e, portanto, trata”‘se de uma vida de fruição contínua do maior prazer. Porém, para além desse tipo de argumentação, cabe verificar como Platão, nos diálogos, tratou a questão da fruição dos prazeres corpóreos tanto para o filósofo quanto para o homem comum. Assim se poderá constatar que o platonismo não é uma negação da vida, mas antes a afirmação da vida, seja na dimensão corpórea, seja espiritual.Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil2016-04-29info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionDossierDossiêapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/868110.14195/1984-249X_17_4Revista Archai; No. 17 (2016): Revista Archai nº17 (maio, 2016); 95Archai Journal; n. 17 (2016): Revista Archai nº17 (maio, 2016); 951984-249X2179-496010.14195/1984-249X_17reponame:Revista Archai (Online)instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBporhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/8681/7361Motta, Guilherme Domingues dainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2018-06-08T13:30:09Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/8681Revistahttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archaiPUBhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/oai||archaijournal@unb.br|| cornelli@unb.br1984-249X1984-249Xopendoar:2018-06-08T13:30:09Revista Archai (Online) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Is Platonism life denying? Seria o platonismo uma negação da vida? |
title |
Is Platonism life denying? |
spellingShingle |
Is Platonism life denying? Motta, Guilherme Domingues da |
title_short |
Is Platonism life denying? |
title_full |
Is Platonism life denying? |
title_fullStr |
Is Platonism life denying? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Is Platonism life denying? |
title_sort |
Is Platonism life denying? |
author |
Motta, Guilherme Domingues da |
author_facet |
Motta, Guilherme Domingues da |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Motta, Guilherme Domingues da |
description |
The Phaedo contains a number of passages which could lead to the interpretation that Platonism is a denial of life.Such an interpretation could only be maintained by reading these passages out of context and also by ignoring a number of elements from other Plato’s texts. The first step to solve this problem is to stress that such statements about how desirable is death always concern the philosopher, whose model is the dialogues’ character, Socrates. This character was meticulously constructed to be regarded as someone extraordinary; a character who has undergone a process of “initiation” in which he acquired a philosophical dýnamis, namely, the capacity to recognize the existence and the value of the highest objects of knowledge, and also the pleasure of their contemplation. Considering that “death” in the Phaedo means only the separation of body and soul, a process in which soul is not annihilated, then it means the continuity of the contemplative life, which during the corporeal existence was hampered by the limits imposed by the body. Hence, life after death means a life of continuous enjoyment of the greater good and pleasure. But beyond that line of argument, it must be determined how Plato, in his dialogues, addressed the issue of the bodily pleasures for both the philosopher as well as for the common man. And, in this case, it is clear that Platonism is not a denial of life, but rather the affirmation of life, both in bodily dimension and spiritual. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-04-29 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Dossier Dossiê |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/8681 10.14195/1984-249X_17_4 |
url |
https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/8681 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.14195/1984-249X_17_4 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/8681/7361 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Archai; No. 17 (2016): Revista Archai nº17 (maio, 2016); 95 Archai Journal; n. 17 (2016): Revista Archai nº17 (maio, 2016); 95 1984-249X 2179-4960 10.14195/1984-249X_17 reponame:Revista Archai (Online) instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB) instacron:UNB |
instname_str |
Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
instacron_str |
UNB |
institution |
UNB |
reponame_str |
Revista Archai (Online) |
collection |
Revista Archai (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista Archai (Online) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||archaijournal@unb.br|| cornelli@unb.br |
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