The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Jennings, David
Data de Publicação: 2023
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista Archai (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/48152
Resumo: The two most compelling accounts of the friend in Plato’s Lysis are that the neither good nor bad is friend of the good and that the akin is friend of the akin. In this paper I challenge a common interpretation that these accounts are the same, similar to, or compatible with one another. I argue instead that the two accounts are incompatible because they rely on opposing assumptions about the nature of desire and its relationship to need and about friendship and its orientation towards what benefits the one who loves. Although I do not offer a comprehensive interpretation of the dialogue, I argue that, given his main assumptions about the friendship, desire, and philosophy in the Lysis, Socrates could only endorse first of these accounts, that the neither good nor bad is a friend of the good, if indeed endorses any of them.
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spelling The akin vs. the good in Plato’s LysisPlatoLysisfriendshipfriendgoodakindesireneedphilosophyThe two most compelling accounts of the friend in Plato’s Lysis are that the neither good nor bad is friend of the good and that the akin is friend of the akin. In this paper I challenge a common interpretation that these accounts are the same, similar to, or compatible with one another. I argue instead that the two accounts are incompatible because they rely on opposing assumptions about the nature of desire and its relationship to need and about friendship and its orientation towards what benefits the one who loves. Although I do not offer a comprehensive interpretation of the dialogue, I argue that, given his main assumptions about the friendship, desire, and philosophy in the Lysis, Socrates could only endorse first of these accounts, that the neither good nor bad is a friend of the good, if indeed endorses any of them.Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil2023-01-23info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/4815210.14195/1984-249X_32_39Revista Archai; No. 32 (2022): Archai 32 (2022): Supplementum; e-03239Archai Journal; n. 32 (2022): Archai 32 (2022): Supplementum; e-032391984-249X2179-4960reponame:Revista Archai (Online)instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBenghttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/48152/36763Copyright (c) 2023 David Jenningshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Jennings, David2023-05-02T22:06:07Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/48152Revistahttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archaiPUBhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/oai||archaijournal@unb.br|| cornelli@unb.br1984-249X1984-249Xopendoar:2023-05-02T22:06:07Revista Archai (Online) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis
title The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis
spellingShingle The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis
Jennings, David
Plato
Lysis
friendship
friend
good
akin
desire
need
philosophy
title_short The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis
title_full The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis
title_fullStr The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis
title_full_unstemmed The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis
title_sort The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis
author Jennings, David
author_facet Jennings, David
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Jennings, David
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Plato
Lysis
friendship
friend
good
akin
desire
need
philosophy
topic Plato
Lysis
friendship
friend
good
akin
desire
need
philosophy
description The two most compelling accounts of the friend in Plato’s Lysis are that the neither good nor bad is friend of the good and that the akin is friend of the akin. In this paper I challenge a common interpretation that these accounts are the same, similar to, or compatible with one another. I argue instead that the two accounts are incompatible because they rely on opposing assumptions about the nature of desire and its relationship to need and about friendship and its orientation towards what benefits the one who loves. Although I do not offer a comprehensive interpretation of the dialogue, I argue that, given his main assumptions about the friendship, desire, and philosophy in the Lysis, Socrates could only endorse first of these accounts, that the neither good nor bad is a friend of the good, if indeed endorses any of them.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-01-23
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/48152
10.14195/1984-249X_32_39
url https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/48152
identifier_str_mv 10.14195/1984-249X_32_39
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/48152/36763
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 David Jennings
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 David Jennings
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Archai; No. 32 (2022): Archai 32 (2022): Supplementum; e-03239
Archai Journal; n. 32 (2022): Archai 32 (2022): Supplementum; e-03239
1984-249X
2179-4960
reponame:Revista Archai (Online)
instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron:UNB
instname_str Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron_str UNB
institution UNB
reponame_str Revista Archai (Online)
collection Revista Archai (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Archai (Online) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||archaijournal@unb.br|| cornelli@unb.br
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