Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its Paraphrases

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Volf, Marina
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista Archai (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/41461
Resumo: The philosophical nature of the two versions of paraphrasing the Gorgias’ treatise On Non-Being — the skeptical version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an anonymous author — are discussed. The paper gives a comparative analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating Gorgias’ thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, which Gorgias considered, judging by the reports of his speech, and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms of philosophical issues. The work provides insights as to how Gorgias modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the Gorgias’ teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the paraphrasing versions impoverishes our understanding of the Gorgias’ teaching considerably, while the joint analysis of both versions demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues raised by Gorgias, in the philosophical and, particularly, the epistemological paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy.
id UNB-18_bd5e7529ffcedd628efc4c2134bcc321
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/41461
network_acronym_str UNB-18
network_name_str Revista Archai (Online)
repository_id_str
spelling Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its ParaphrasesGorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its ParaphrasesGorgiasParmenidesargumentationargumentative structureancient epistemologyGorgiasParmenidesargumentationargumentative structureancient epistemologyThe philosophical nature of the two versions of paraphrasing the Gorgias’ treatise On Non-Being — the skeptical version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an anonymous author — are discussed. The paper gives a comparative analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating Gorgias’ thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, which Gorgias considered, judging by the reports of his speech, and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms of philosophical issues. The work provides insights as to how Gorgias modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the Gorgias’ teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the paraphrasing versions impoverishes our understanding of the Gorgias’ teaching considerably, while the joint analysis of both versions demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues raised by Gorgias, in the philosophical and, particularly, the epistemological paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy. The philosophical nature of the two versions of paraphrasing the Gorgias’ treatise On Non-Being — the skeptical version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an anonymous author — are discussed. The paper gives a comparative analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating Gorgias’ thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, which Gorgias considered, judging by the reports of his speech, and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms of philosophical issues. The work provides insights as to how Gorgias modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the Gorgias’ teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the paraphrasing versions impoverishes our understanding of the Gorgias’ teaching considerably, while the joint analysis of both versions demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues raised by Gorgias, in the philosophical and, particularly, the epistemological paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy. Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil2021-12-17info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/4146110.14195/1984-249X_31_27Revista Archai; No. 31 (2021): Archai 31 (2021)Archai Journal; n. 31 (2021): Archai 31 (2021)1984-249X2179-496010.14195/1984-249X_31reponame:Revista Archai (Online)instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBenghttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/41461/32204Copyright (c) 2021 Marina Volfhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVolf, Marina2022-01-02T15:53:23Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/41461Revistahttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archaiPUBhttps://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/oai||archaijournal@unb.br|| cornelli@unb.br1984-249X1984-249Xopendoar:2022-01-02T15:53:23Revista Archai (Online) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its Paraphrases
Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its Paraphrases
title Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its Paraphrases
spellingShingle Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its Paraphrases
Volf, Marina
Gorgias
Parmenides
argumentation
argumentative structure
ancient epistemology
Gorgias
Parmenides
argumentation
argumentative structure
ancient epistemology
title_short Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its Paraphrases
title_full Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its Paraphrases
title_fullStr Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its Paraphrases
title_full_unstemmed Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its Paraphrases
title_sort Gorgias' Revising of Ancient Epistemology: on Non-Being by Gorgias and its Paraphrases
author Volf, Marina
author_facet Volf, Marina
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Volf, Marina
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Gorgias
Parmenides
argumentation
argumentative structure
ancient epistemology
Gorgias
Parmenides
argumentation
argumentative structure
ancient epistemology
topic Gorgias
Parmenides
argumentation
argumentative structure
ancient epistemology
Gorgias
Parmenides
argumentation
argumentative structure
ancient epistemology
description The philosophical nature of the two versions of paraphrasing the Gorgias’ treatise On Non-Being — the skeptical version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an anonymous author — are discussed. The paper gives a comparative analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating Gorgias’ thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, which Gorgias considered, judging by the reports of his speech, and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms of philosophical issues. The work provides insights as to how Gorgias modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the Gorgias’ teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the paraphrasing versions impoverishes our understanding of the Gorgias’ teaching considerably, while the joint analysis of both versions demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues raised by Gorgias, in the philosophical and, particularly, the epistemological paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-12-17
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/41461
10.14195/1984-249X_31_27
url https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/41461
identifier_str_mv 10.14195/1984-249X_31_27
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/archai/article/view/41461/32204
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Marina Volf
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Marina Volf
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cátedra UNESCO Archai (Universidade de Brasília); Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal; Annablume Editora, São Paulo, Brasil
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Archai; No. 31 (2021): Archai 31 (2021)
Archai Journal; n. 31 (2021): Archai 31 (2021)
1984-249X
2179-4960
10.14195/1984-249X_31
reponame:Revista Archai (Online)
instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron:UNB
instname_str Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron_str UNB
institution UNB
reponame_str Revista Archai (Online)
collection Revista Archai (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Archai (Online) - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||archaijournal@unb.br|| cornelli@unb.br
_version_ 1798319945709256704