Identifying Discretionary Actions Taken by Managers in Credit Unions: An Application of Benford's Law
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng por |
Título da fonte: | Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
Texto Completo: | https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2714 |
Resumo: | Objective: To investigate whether Benford’s Law can be a tool to improve the credit union supervision process performed by Brazil’s Central Bank. That is, we will determine whether its application will increase the bank’s assertiveness in identifying credit unions whose managers have taken discretionary actions which diverge from regulatory standards Method: Benford’s Law was applied to all singular Brazilian credit unions from 2006 to 2017 – which is a relevant timeframe due to regulatory changes - for Operating Income, Operating Expenses, Cash, and LPCSL (Loss Provisions for Client/Credit accounts which have Suspicious Liquidations) accounts over various timeframes. Relevance: The discussed evidence offers elements that can improve regulation mechanisms, and it can also indicate whether managers are using their discretionary power to influence singular credit union performance Results: Time is an important factor in the use of this tool. Applications applied over a long period of time do not capture discretionary actions taken by managers due to potential adjustments made to variations over time. An annual timeframe makes it possible to use this technique to capture potential discretionary actions taken in the examined accounts. In addition, this technique generates a consistent list of credit unions which require more intense surveillance and/or investigation. It also indicates that the norms revised in 2015 have helped reduce incentives to manage earnings and/or commit fraud in these organizations. Methodological Contributions: This study fills a gap in the credit union literature because there are few studies of discretionary actions in these organizations such as accounting choices, earnings management, fraud, or errors. Our findings may also indicate adjustments made by credit unions to comply with the sector standard due to the adoption of Resolutions No. 4,434 and No. 4,454. Benford’s Law is useful as a tool in selecting audit samples, and it can also improve the work of supervisory bodies. |
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Identifying Discretionary Actions Taken by Managers in Credit Unions: An Application of Benford's LawIdentificação de Ações Discricionárias do Gestor em Cooperativas de Crédito: Uma aplicação da Lei de BenfordContabilidade bancáriacooperativas de créditoregulaçãoações discricionáriasLei de BenfordBank AccountingCredit UnionsRegulationDiscretionary ActionsBenford’s Law.Objective: To investigate whether Benford’s Law can be a tool to improve the credit union supervision process performed by Brazil’s Central Bank. That is, we will determine whether its application will increase the bank’s assertiveness in identifying credit unions whose managers have taken discretionary actions which diverge from regulatory standards Method: Benford’s Law was applied to all singular Brazilian credit unions from 2006 to 2017 – which is a relevant timeframe due to regulatory changes - for Operating Income, Operating Expenses, Cash, and LPCSL (Loss Provisions for Client/Credit accounts which have Suspicious Liquidations) accounts over various timeframes. Relevance: The discussed evidence offers elements that can improve regulation mechanisms, and it can also indicate whether managers are using their discretionary power to influence singular credit union performance Results: Time is an important factor in the use of this tool. Applications applied over a long period of time do not capture discretionary actions taken by managers due to potential adjustments made to variations over time. An annual timeframe makes it possible to use this technique to capture potential discretionary actions taken in the examined accounts. In addition, this technique generates a consistent list of credit unions which require more intense surveillance and/or investigation. It also indicates that the norms revised in 2015 have helped reduce incentives to manage earnings and/or commit fraud in these organizations. Methodological Contributions: This study fills a gap in the credit union literature because there are few studies of discretionary actions in these organizations such as accounting choices, earnings management, fraud, or errors. Our findings may also indicate adjustments made by credit unions to comply with the sector standard due to the adoption of Resolutions No. 4,434 and No. 4,454. Benford’s Law is useful as a tool in selecting audit samples, and it can also improve the work of supervisory bodies.Objetivo: Investigar se a Lei de Benford poderia ser uma ferramenta que contribuiria para o aprimoramento do processo de supervisão das cooperativas pelo Banco Central do Brasil (BACEN). Isto é, se sua aplicação aumentaria a assertividade na identificação das cooperativas cujo gestor tem feito escolhas discricionárias que divergem do padrão regulatório. Método: A Lei de Benford foi aplicada a todas as cooperativas de crédito singulares do Brasil, no período 2006 a 2017 - janela com relevante mudança regulatória, para as contas de Receita Operacional, Despesa Operacional, Caixa e Perda Estimada para Clientes/Créditos de Liquidação Duvidosa em diferentes janelas de tempo. Relevância: As evidências discutidas oferecem elementos para aprimoramento de mecanismos de regulação, indicando a possibilidade de os gestores estarem utilizando de seu poder discricionário para influenciar os resultados das cooperativas de crédito singulares. Resultados: O tempo é um fator importante para o uso da ferramenta. Aplicações em períodos longos não capturam as discricionariedades dos gestores devido as potenciais acomodações das variações ao longo do tempo. A periodicidade anual permite à técnica capturar potenciais ações discricionárias nas contas estudadas. Além disso, a técnica se mostrou consistente para gerar uma lista de cooperativas que deveriam ter um processo de fiscalização e/ou averiguação mais intensa. Ainda, indica que os normativos editados em 2015 contribuíram para reduzir o incentivo ao gerenciamento de resultado e/ou fraude nessas organizações. Contribuições metodológicas: A pesquisa preenche a lacuna na literatura sobre cooperativas de crédito, dado que há poucos estudos sobre a prática de ações discricionárias nestas organizações incluindo escolhas contábeis, gerenciamento de resultados, fraude ou erros. As evidências encontradas podem ser um indício de ajuste das cooperativas de crédito ao padrão do setor em função da adoção das resoluções nº 4.434 e nº 4.454. A Lei de Benford também se mostra útil como ferramenta para seleção de amostras para auditorias, podendo aprimorar o trabalho dos órgãos de fiscalização.Contabilidade Gestão e Governança2021-12-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/271410.51341/1984-3925_2021v24n3a5Contabilidade Gestão e Governança; v. 24 n. 3 (2021); 331-3481984-39251984-3925reponame:Contabilidade, Gestão e Governançainstname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBengporhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2714/710https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2714/718Copyright (c) 2021 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governançainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTheodoro, RicardoBonacim, Carlos Alberto Grespande Moura Costa, Davi Rogério2022-09-22T08:38:06Zoai:oai.jamg.cloud:article/2714Revistahttp://www.revistacgg.org/index.php/contabilPUBhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/oaijamg.cgg@gmail.com1516-70111984-3925opendoar:2022-09-22T08:38:06Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Identifying Discretionary Actions Taken by Managers in Credit Unions: An Application of Benford's Law Identificação de Ações Discricionárias do Gestor em Cooperativas de Crédito: Uma aplicação da Lei de Benford |
title |
Identifying Discretionary Actions Taken by Managers in Credit Unions: An Application of Benford's Law |
spellingShingle |
Identifying Discretionary Actions Taken by Managers in Credit Unions: An Application of Benford's Law Theodoro, Ricardo Contabilidade bancária cooperativas de crédito regulação ações discricionárias Lei de Benford Bank Accounting Credit Unions Regulation Discretionary Actions Benford’s Law. |
title_short |
Identifying Discretionary Actions Taken by Managers in Credit Unions: An Application of Benford's Law |
title_full |
Identifying Discretionary Actions Taken by Managers in Credit Unions: An Application of Benford's Law |
title_fullStr |
Identifying Discretionary Actions Taken by Managers in Credit Unions: An Application of Benford's Law |
title_full_unstemmed |
Identifying Discretionary Actions Taken by Managers in Credit Unions: An Application of Benford's Law |
title_sort |
Identifying Discretionary Actions Taken by Managers in Credit Unions: An Application of Benford's Law |
author |
Theodoro, Ricardo |
author_facet |
Theodoro, Ricardo Bonacim, Carlos Alberto Grespan de Moura Costa, Davi Rogério |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Bonacim, Carlos Alberto Grespan de Moura Costa, Davi Rogério |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Theodoro, Ricardo Bonacim, Carlos Alberto Grespan de Moura Costa, Davi Rogério |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade bancária cooperativas de crédito regulação ações discricionárias Lei de Benford Bank Accounting Credit Unions Regulation Discretionary Actions Benford’s Law. |
topic |
Contabilidade bancária cooperativas de crédito regulação ações discricionárias Lei de Benford Bank Accounting Credit Unions Regulation Discretionary Actions Benford’s Law. |
description |
Objective: To investigate whether Benford’s Law can be a tool to improve the credit union supervision process performed by Brazil’s Central Bank. That is, we will determine whether its application will increase the bank’s assertiveness in identifying credit unions whose managers have taken discretionary actions which diverge from regulatory standards Method: Benford’s Law was applied to all singular Brazilian credit unions from 2006 to 2017 – which is a relevant timeframe due to regulatory changes - for Operating Income, Operating Expenses, Cash, and LPCSL (Loss Provisions for Client/Credit accounts which have Suspicious Liquidations) accounts over various timeframes. Relevance: The discussed evidence offers elements that can improve regulation mechanisms, and it can also indicate whether managers are using their discretionary power to influence singular credit union performance Results: Time is an important factor in the use of this tool. Applications applied over a long period of time do not capture discretionary actions taken by managers due to potential adjustments made to variations over time. An annual timeframe makes it possible to use this technique to capture potential discretionary actions taken in the examined accounts. In addition, this technique generates a consistent list of credit unions which require more intense surveillance and/or investigation. It also indicates that the norms revised in 2015 have helped reduce incentives to manage earnings and/or commit fraud in these organizations. Methodological Contributions: This study fills a gap in the credit union literature because there are few studies of discretionary actions in these organizations such as accounting choices, earnings management, fraud, or errors. Our findings may also indicate adjustments made by credit unions to comply with the sector standard due to the adoption of Resolutions No. 4,434 and No. 4,454. Benford’s Law is useful as a tool in selecting audit samples, and it can also improve the work of supervisory bodies. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-12-30 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2714 10.51341/1984-3925_2021v24n3a5 |
url |
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2714 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.51341/1984-3925_2021v24n3a5 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng por |
language |
eng por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2714/710 https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2714/718 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade Gestão e Governança |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade Gestão e Governança |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade Gestão e Governança; v. 24 n. 3 (2021); 331-348 1984-3925 1984-3925 reponame:Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB) instacron:UNB |
instname_str |
Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
instacron_str |
UNB |
institution |
UNB |
reponame_str |
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
collection |
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança - Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
jamg.cgg@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1798315268413325312 |