Independence of the Board of Directors Reduces the Debt Financing Cost?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Outros Autores: | , , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng por |
Título da fonte: | Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
Texto Completo: | https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1853 |
Resumo: | Objective: Check the influence of board of directors independence on the cost of debt financing of companies listed in B3.Method: The cost of the debt was analyzed by calculating the ratio between the financial expenses and costly liability. For board independence, three variables were used: 1) percentage of independent members; 2) dummy who received 1 value when most board members were independent; and, 3) dummy that captured the existence of duality in the position of CEO and chairman of the board.Originality/relevance: In the literature, the results of previous studies are still divergent. Thus, this issue still presents shortcomings which require investigation. Furthermore, the investigations occurred, mainly, in North American companies, so the matter deserves attention in countries such as the Brazil.Results: The average cost of debt increased from 2012 to 2016. The average percentage of independent members did not exceed 25%, in less than 17% of the companies, independent members were the majority, and there was a reduction in the number of companies with duality in CEO and chairman positions. It was also found that only the percentage of independent members influenced to reduce the cost of debt. It is believed that the pressure exerted by the controlling shareholder and other internal directors may be reducing the positive impact of the independent directors.Theoretical/methodological contributions: The research contributes to strengthen the understanding of the theme in Brazilian scenario and broadens the existing discussion in the literature by addressing a factor influencing the cost of debt financing still little explored in Brazil. |
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Independence of the Board of Directors Reduces the Debt Financing Cost?Independência do Conselho de Administração Reduz o Custo de Financiamento da Dívida?Board of directors independence. Debt cost. Publicly traded companies. Debt to equity. Indebtedness.Independência do Conselho de Administração. Custo da Dívida. Capital de Terceiros. Endividamento.Objective: Check the influence of board of directors independence on the cost of debt financing of companies listed in B3.Method: The cost of the debt was analyzed by calculating the ratio between the financial expenses and costly liability. For board independence, three variables were used: 1) percentage of independent members; 2) dummy who received 1 value when most board members were independent; and, 3) dummy that captured the existence of duality in the position of CEO and chairman of the board.Originality/relevance: In the literature, the results of previous studies are still divergent. Thus, this issue still presents shortcomings which require investigation. Furthermore, the investigations occurred, mainly, in North American companies, so the matter deserves attention in countries such as the Brazil.Results: The average cost of debt increased from 2012 to 2016. The average percentage of independent members did not exceed 25%, in less than 17% of the companies, independent members were the majority, and there was a reduction in the number of companies with duality in CEO and chairman positions. It was also found that only the percentage of independent members influenced to reduce the cost of debt. It is believed that the pressure exerted by the controlling shareholder and other internal directors may be reducing the positive impact of the independent directors.Theoretical/methodological contributions: The research contributes to strengthen the understanding of the theme in Brazilian scenario and broadens the existing discussion in the literature by addressing a factor influencing the cost of debt financing still little explored in Brazil.Objetivo: Verificar a influência da independência do conselho de administração no custo de financiamento da dívida de companhias abertas listadas na B3.Método: O custo da dívida foi analisado pela razão entre as despesas financeiras e o passivo oneroso. Para independência do conselho, foram utilizadas três variáveis: 1) percentual de membros independentes; 2) dummy que recebeu valor 1 quando a maioria dos membros do conselho era independente; e 3) dummy que captou a existência de dualidade no cargo de CEO e de presidente do conselho.Originalidade/relevância: Na literatura, os resultados de estudos anteriores ainda são divergentes. Assim, esse assunto ainda apresenta lacunas que requerem investigações. Além disso, as investigações ocorreram, principalmente, em empresas norte-americanas, logo o assunto merece atenção em países como o Brasil.Resultados: O custo médio da dívida elevou-se de 2012 para 2016. O percentual médio de membros independentes não ultrapassou 25%, em menos de 17% das empresas, os membros independentes eram a maioria, e houve redução do número de empresas com dualidade nos cargos de CEO e de presidente do conselho. Constatou-se, também, que somente o percentual de membros independentes influenciava na redução do custo da dívida. Acredita-se que a pressão exercida pelo acionista controlador e por outros conselheiros internos pode estar reduzindo o impacto positivo dos conselheiros independentes.Contribuições teóricas/metodológicas: A pesquisa contribui para fortalecer o entendimento da temática no cenário brasileiro e amplia a discussão existente na literatura ao abordar um fator influenciador do custo da dívida ainda pouco explorado no Brasil.Contabilidade Gestão e Governança2020-04-29info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/185310.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n1a1Contabilidade Gestão e Governança; v. 23 n. 1 (2020); 1-181984-39251984-3925reponame:Contabilidade, Gestão e Governançainstname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBengporhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1853/PDF_Enhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1853/PDF_PtCopyright (c) 2020 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governançainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMoura, Geovanne Dias deBonetti, Angela Paula MuchinskiMazzioni, SadyTeixeira, Silvio AparecidoDal Magro, Cristian Baú2021-09-23T10:42:22Zoai:oai.jamg.cloud:article/1853Revistahttp://www.revistacgg.org/index.php/contabilPUBhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/oaijamg.cgg@gmail.com1516-70111984-3925opendoar:2021-09-23T10:42:22Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Independence of the Board of Directors Reduces the Debt Financing Cost? Independência do Conselho de Administração Reduz o Custo de Financiamento da Dívida? |
title |
Independence of the Board of Directors Reduces the Debt Financing Cost? |
spellingShingle |
Independence of the Board of Directors Reduces the Debt Financing Cost? Moura, Geovanne Dias de Board of directors independence. Debt cost. Publicly traded companies. Debt to equity. Indebtedness. Independência do Conselho de Administração. Custo da Dívida. Capital de Terceiros. Endividamento. |
title_short |
Independence of the Board of Directors Reduces the Debt Financing Cost? |
title_full |
Independence of the Board of Directors Reduces the Debt Financing Cost? |
title_fullStr |
Independence of the Board of Directors Reduces the Debt Financing Cost? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Independence of the Board of Directors Reduces the Debt Financing Cost? |
title_sort |
Independence of the Board of Directors Reduces the Debt Financing Cost? |
author |
Moura, Geovanne Dias de |
author_facet |
Moura, Geovanne Dias de Bonetti, Angela Paula Muchinski Mazzioni, Sady Teixeira, Silvio Aparecido Dal Magro, Cristian Baú |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Bonetti, Angela Paula Muchinski Mazzioni, Sady Teixeira, Silvio Aparecido Dal Magro, Cristian Baú |
author2_role |
author author author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Moura, Geovanne Dias de Bonetti, Angela Paula Muchinski Mazzioni, Sady Teixeira, Silvio Aparecido Dal Magro, Cristian Baú |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Board of directors independence. Debt cost. Publicly traded companies. Debt to equity. Indebtedness. Independência do Conselho de Administração. Custo da Dívida. Capital de Terceiros. Endividamento. |
topic |
Board of directors independence. Debt cost. Publicly traded companies. Debt to equity. Indebtedness. Independência do Conselho de Administração. Custo da Dívida. Capital de Terceiros. Endividamento. |
description |
Objective: Check the influence of board of directors independence on the cost of debt financing of companies listed in B3.Method: The cost of the debt was analyzed by calculating the ratio between the financial expenses and costly liability. For board independence, three variables were used: 1) percentage of independent members; 2) dummy who received 1 value when most board members were independent; and, 3) dummy that captured the existence of duality in the position of CEO and chairman of the board.Originality/relevance: In the literature, the results of previous studies are still divergent. Thus, this issue still presents shortcomings which require investigation. Furthermore, the investigations occurred, mainly, in North American companies, so the matter deserves attention in countries such as the Brazil.Results: The average cost of debt increased from 2012 to 2016. The average percentage of independent members did not exceed 25%, in less than 17% of the companies, independent members were the majority, and there was a reduction in the number of companies with duality in CEO and chairman positions. It was also found that only the percentage of independent members influenced to reduce the cost of debt. It is believed that the pressure exerted by the controlling shareholder and other internal directors may be reducing the positive impact of the independent directors.Theoretical/methodological contributions: The research contributes to strengthen the understanding of the theme in Brazilian scenario and broadens the existing discussion in the literature by addressing a factor influencing the cost of debt financing still little explored in Brazil. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-04-29 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1853 10.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n1a1 |
url |
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1853 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n1a1 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng por |
language |
eng por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1853/PDF_En https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/1853/PDF_Pt |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade Gestão e Governança |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade Gestão e Governança |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade Gestão e Governança; v. 23 n. 1 (2020); 1-18 1984-3925 1984-3925 reponame:Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB) instacron:UNB |
instname_str |
Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
instacron_str |
UNB |
institution |
UNB |
reponame_str |
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
collection |
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança - Universidade de Brasília (UnB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
jamg.cgg@gmail.com |
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1798315268103995392 |