Intentionality in Tomasello, Searle, Dennett and Behavioral Approaches to Human Cognition

• Autor(a) principal: Állan, Sylvio
• Data de Publicação: 2011
• Outros Autores: Souza, Carlos Barbosa Alves de
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Psicologia (Universidade de Brasília. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/revistaptp/article/view/17529
• topic: Psicologia - Psicologia Experimental; Intencionalidade; Cognição humana; Tomasello; Filosofia da mente; Psicologia comportamental; Intentionality; Human cognition; Tomasello; Philosophy of mind; Behavior psychology

The approach of Tomasello to the evolution of human cognition attempts to integrate biological, behavioral, and cultural processes within a sole explicative system. A fundamental critic towards it has been the need of a better elaboration of the concept of intentionality. The present paper aimed to: (1) analyze Tomasello’s use of the concept of intentionality, and (2) establish dialogues between this use and theories of intentionality in the philosophy of mind and functionalist approaches to human cognition in behavior psychology. The results of this paper indicate that Tomasello’s use of the concept of intentionality is compatible to these theories and approaches. Morevover, Tomasello’s approach may extend the investigation of more complex symbolic processes than the ones traditionally investigated by behavior psychology.