Phenomenological macrorealism and experience-fields

• Autor(a) principal: Schaeffer, Renato
• Data de Publicação: 1995
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Trans/Form/Ação (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/12407
• topic: Campo-experiência; Macronealismo fenomenológico; Percepção sensorial; Microrrealismo científico; Representacionalismo; Neurofisicalismo; Experience-field; Phenomenological macrorealism; Sensory perception; Scientific microrealism; Representationalism; Neurophysicalism

This paper criticizes the predominant, representational-neurophysicalist conception of sensory perception. It introduces the notion of "experience-field" to give a tentative ontological account of the phenomenological data of experience. The general idea is that visual experience, for instance, would be ontologically something like an experience-field extending over and between the central nervous sistem of the subject of the experience and the distal object of vision. I call this position phenomenological macrorealism, in contrast to scientific microrealism. Phenomenal qualities are not subjectively inside the brain, but objectively inside perceptual extraencephalic experience-fields, or, as we say, out there in the world. Some specific consequences of phenomenological macrorealism are presented .