Introducing sense
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644366 |
Resumo: | In this paper I present what I take to be the best argument for the introduction of the semantic category of sense. This argument, or a version of it, can be extracted from Frege’s renowned ‘On Sense and Reference’, but has not been properly understood or appreciated. I begin by discussing the Russellian objections to other versions of the argument attributed to Frege, in order to expound the argument which fends off such objections. |
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Introducing senseFrege. Millikan. Sense. Reference. Content. Cognitive valueIn this paper I present what I take to be the best argument for the introduction of the semantic category of sense. This argument, or a version of it, can be extracted from Frege’s renowned ‘On Sense and Reference’, but has not been properly understood or appreciated. I begin by discussing the Russellian objections to other versions of the argument attributed to Frege, in order to expound the argument which fends off such objections.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-03-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644366Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 26 n. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 279-312Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 279-312Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 279-3122317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644366/11782Copyright (c) 2003 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessEzcurdia, Maite2016-03-21T10:43:56Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644366Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-03-21T10:43:56Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Introducing sense |
title |
Introducing sense |
spellingShingle |
Introducing sense Ezcurdia, Maite Frege. Millikan. Sense. Reference. Content. Cognitive value |
title_short |
Introducing sense |
title_full |
Introducing sense |
title_fullStr |
Introducing sense |
title_full_unstemmed |
Introducing sense |
title_sort |
Introducing sense |
author |
Ezcurdia, Maite |
author_facet |
Ezcurdia, Maite |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Ezcurdia, Maite |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Frege. Millikan. Sense. Reference. Content. Cognitive value |
topic |
Frege. Millikan. Sense. Reference. Content. Cognitive value |
description |
In this paper I present what I take to be the best argument for the introduction of the semantic category of sense. This argument, or a version of it, can be extracted from Frege’s renowned ‘On Sense and Reference’, but has not been properly understood or appreciated. I begin by discussing the Russellian objections to other versions of the argument attributed to Frege, in order to expound the argument which fends off such objections. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-03-21 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644366 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644366 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644366/11782 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2003 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2003 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 26 n. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 279-312 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 279-312 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 279-312 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566182182912 |