A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vogelmann, Rafael
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946
Resumo: Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we cannot ground a moral conviction that p on the fact that a reliable moral adviser holds that p. There have been, however, several attempts to explain this intuition away or to discredit the intuition pumps that bring it forward. I argue that moral naturalists are not in a position to deny this intuition. Moral Naturalism embodies a conception of the minimal conditions for someone to qualify as capable of making moral judgments; among these conditions is the acknowledgment of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral; given the naturalist's conception of what it takes for someone to be capable of moral judgment, if we allow agents to outsource their moral judgments we come to situations in which the convictions of moral agents do not comply with the acknowledgment of moral supervenience. The naturalist must, therefore, deny the possibility of moral outsourcing. Moral Naturalism, then, faces the problem of making sense of the ban on moral outsourcing.
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spelling A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral JudgmentsMoral naturalism. Moral testimony. Moral judgment.Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we cannot ground a moral conviction that p on the fact that a reliable moral adviser holds that p. There have been, however, several attempts to explain this intuition away or to discredit the intuition pumps that bring it forward. I argue that moral naturalists are not in a position to deny this intuition. Moral Naturalism embodies a conception of the minimal conditions for someone to qualify as capable of making moral judgments; among these conditions is the acknowledgment of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral; given the naturalist's conception of what it takes for someone to be capable of moral judgment, if we allow agents to outsource their moral judgments we come to situations in which the convictions of moral agents do not comply with the acknowledgment of moral supervenience. The naturalist must, therefore, deny the possibility of moral outsourcing. Moral Naturalism, then, faces the problem of making sense of the ban on moral outsourcing.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2017-11-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPesquisa bibliográficaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-27Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-27Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-272317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946/17034Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVogelmann, Rafael2017-11-09T09:23:11Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8650946Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2017-11-09T09:23:11Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
title A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
spellingShingle A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
Vogelmann, Rafael
Moral naturalism. Moral testimony. Moral judgment.
title_short A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
title_full A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
title_fullStr A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
title_full_unstemmed A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
title_sort A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
author Vogelmann, Rafael
author_facet Vogelmann, Rafael
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vogelmann, Rafael
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Moral naturalism. Moral testimony. Moral judgment.
topic Moral naturalism. Moral testimony. Moral judgment.
description Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we cannot ground a moral conviction that p on the fact that a reliable moral adviser holds that p. There have been, however, several attempts to explain this intuition away or to discredit the intuition pumps that bring it forward. I argue that moral naturalists are not in a position to deny this intuition. Moral Naturalism embodies a conception of the minimal conditions for someone to qualify as capable of making moral judgments; among these conditions is the acknowledgment of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral; given the naturalist's conception of what it takes for someone to be capable of moral judgment, if we allow agents to outsource their moral judgments we come to situations in which the convictions of moral agents do not comply with the acknowledgment of moral supervenience. The naturalist must, therefore, deny the possibility of moral outsourcing. Moral Naturalism, then, faces the problem of making sense of the ban on moral outsourcing.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-11-09
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Pesquisa bibliográfica
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946/17034
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-27
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-27
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-27
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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