A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946 |
Resumo: | Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we cannot ground a moral conviction that p on the fact that a reliable moral adviser holds that p. There have been, however, several attempts to explain this intuition away or to discredit the intuition pumps that bring it forward. I argue that moral naturalists are not in a position to deny this intuition. Moral Naturalism embodies a conception of the minimal conditions for someone to qualify as capable of making moral judgments; among these conditions is the acknowledgment of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral; given the naturalist's conception of what it takes for someone to be capable of moral judgment, if we allow agents to outsource their moral judgments we come to situations in which the convictions of moral agents do not comply with the acknowledgment of moral supervenience. The naturalist must, therefore, deny the possibility of moral outsourcing. Moral Naturalism, then, faces the problem of making sense of the ban on moral outsourcing. |
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A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral JudgmentsMoral naturalism. Moral testimony. Moral judgment.Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we cannot ground a moral conviction that p on the fact that a reliable moral adviser holds that p. There have been, however, several attempts to explain this intuition away or to discredit the intuition pumps that bring it forward. I argue that moral naturalists are not in a position to deny this intuition. Moral Naturalism embodies a conception of the minimal conditions for someone to qualify as capable of making moral judgments; among these conditions is the acknowledgment of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral; given the naturalist's conception of what it takes for someone to be capable of moral judgment, if we allow agents to outsource their moral judgments we come to situations in which the convictions of moral agents do not comply with the acknowledgment of moral supervenience. The naturalist must, therefore, deny the possibility of moral outsourcing. Moral Naturalism, then, faces the problem of making sense of the ban on moral outsourcing.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2017-11-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPesquisa bibliográficaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-27Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-27Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-272317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946/17034Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVogelmann, Rafael2017-11-09T09:23:11Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8650946Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2017-11-09T09:23:11Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments |
title |
A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments |
spellingShingle |
A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments Vogelmann, Rafael Moral naturalism. Moral testimony. Moral judgment. |
title_short |
A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments |
title_full |
A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments |
title_fullStr |
A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments |
title_sort |
A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments |
author |
Vogelmann, Rafael |
author_facet |
Vogelmann, Rafael |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vogelmann, Rafael |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Moral naturalism. Moral testimony. Moral judgment. |
topic |
Moral naturalism. Moral testimony. Moral judgment. |
description |
Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we cannot ground a moral conviction that p on the fact that a reliable moral adviser holds that p. There have been, however, several attempts to explain this intuition away or to discredit the intuition pumps that bring it forward. I argue that moral naturalists are not in a position to deny this intuition. Moral Naturalism embodies a conception of the minimal conditions for someone to qualify as capable of making moral judgments; among these conditions is the acknowledgment of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral; given the naturalist's conception of what it takes for someone to be capable of moral judgment, if we allow agents to outsource their moral judgments we come to situations in which the convictions of moral agents do not comply with the acknowledgment of moral supervenience. The naturalist must, therefore, deny the possibility of moral outsourcing. Moral Naturalism, then, faces the problem of making sense of the ban on moral outsourcing. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-11-09 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Pesquisa bibliográfica |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8650946/17034 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-27 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-27 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 3 (2017): jul./set.; 1-27 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216567000072192 |