Temporal Experience and Metaphysics

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Peebles, Graham
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648793
Resumo: The well-known phenomenological argument draws metaphysical conclusions about time, specifically about change through time and the resulting passage or flow of time, from our temporal experience. The argument begins with the phenomenological premise that there is a class of properties which underlies our experience of time and change through time, and its conclusion is that these properties are not merely experienced but exemplified. I argue that the phenomenological argument is best served by the adoption of a representational theory of perception. I then present a representational theory of temporal experience.
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spelling Temporal Experience and MetaphysicsPerception. Temporal perception. Time. Representationalism.The well-known phenomenological argument draws metaphysical conclusions about time, specifically about change through time and the resulting passage or flow of time, from our temporal experience. The argument begins with the phenomenological premise that there is a class of properties which underlies our experience of time and change through time, and its conclusion is that these properties are not merely experienced but exemplified. I argue that the phenomenological argument is best served by the adoption of a representational theory of perception. I then present a representational theory of temporal experience.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2017-04-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPesquisa teóricaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648793Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 145-182Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 145-182Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 145-1822317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648793/15372Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPeebles, Graham2017-11-09T09:24:26Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8648793Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2017-11-09T09:24:26Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
title Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
spellingShingle Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
Peebles, Graham
Perception. Temporal perception. Time. Representationalism.
title_short Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
title_full Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
title_fullStr Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
title_full_unstemmed Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
title_sort Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
author Peebles, Graham
author_facet Peebles, Graham
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Peebles, Graham
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Perception. Temporal perception. Time. Representationalism.
topic Perception. Temporal perception. Time. Representationalism.
description The well-known phenomenological argument draws metaphysical conclusions about time, specifically about change through time and the resulting passage or flow of time, from our temporal experience. The argument begins with the phenomenological premise that there is a class of properties which underlies our experience of time and change through time, and its conclusion is that these properties are not merely experienced but exemplified. I argue that the phenomenological argument is best served by the adoption of a representational theory of perception. I then present a representational theory of temporal experience.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-04-24
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Pesquisa teórica
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648793
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648793
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648793/15372
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 145-182
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 145-182
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 145-182
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
_version_ 1800216566985392128

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