Reglas, expresión y objetividad
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644711 |
Resumo: | Robert Brandom has maintained that Wittgenstein is wrong in denying the notion of interpretation any theoretical role in the task of accounting for our linguistic practices. In this paper, I intend to throw some doubts on this thesis. First of all, I argue that Brandom ́s objection is unfair: in my opinion, giving up the concept of interpretation does not amount to condemning oneself to silence on rule – governed practices. Secondly, I try to show that Brandom ́s appeal to the concept of implicit interpretation is not without problems in as far as it involves the thesis that all the participants in a certain practice may be wrong about the interpretation of its rules. This makes room for a dichotomy between what we do and what we say we do, which should be thoroughly avoided. |
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Reglas, expresión y objetividadRule-followingobjectivityinterpretationexplicitationRobert Brandom has maintained that Wittgenstein is wrong in denying the notion of interpretation any theoretical role in the task of accounting for our linguistic practices. In this paper, I intend to throw some doubts on this thesis. First of all, I argue that Brandom ́s objection is unfair: in my opinion, giving up the concept of interpretation does not amount to condemning oneself to silence on rule – governed practices. Secondly, I try to show that Brandom ́s appeal to the concept of implicit interpretation is not without problems in as far as it involves the thesis that all the participants in a certain practice may be wrong about the interpretation of its rules. This makes room for a dichotomy between what we do and what we say we do, which should be thoroughly avoided.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-04-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644711Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 115-136Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 115-136Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 115-1362317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644711/12031Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBarrio, Eduardo ALEJANDRO BARRIO2016-04-01T16:48:56Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644711Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-04-01T16:48:56Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Reglas, expresión y objetividad |
title |
Reglas, expresión y objetividad |
spellingShingle |
Reglas, expresión y objetividad Barrio, Eduardo ALEJANDRO BARRIO Rule-following objectivity interpretation explicitation |
title_short |
Reglas, expresión y objetividad |
title_full |
Reglas, expresión y objetividad |
title_fullStr |
Reglas, expresión y objetividad |
title_full_unstemmed |
Reglas, expresión y objetividad |
title_sort |
Reglas, expresión y objetividad |
author |
Barrio, Eduardo ALEJANDRO BARRIO |
author_facet |
Barrio, Eduardo ALEJANDRO BARRIO |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Barrio, Eduardo ALEJANDRO BARRIO |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Rule-following objectivity interpretation explicitation |
topic |
Rule-following objectivity interpretation explicitation |
description |
Robert Brandom has maintained that Wittgenstein is wrong in denying the notion of interpretation any theoretical role in the task of accounting for our linguistic practices. In this paper, I intend to throw some doubts on this thesis. First of all, I argue that Brandom ́s objection is unfair: in my opinion, giving up the concept of interpretation does not amount to condemning oneself to silence on rule – governed practices. Secondly, I try to show that Brandom ́s appeal to the concept of implicit interpretation is not without problems in as far as it involves the thesis that all the participants in a certain practice may be wrong about the interpretation of its rules. This makes room for a dichotomy between what we do and what we say we do, which should be thoroughly avoided. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-04-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644711 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644711 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644711/12031 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 115-136 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 115-136 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 115-136 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566582738944 |