The metaphysical basis of logic
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 1999 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8666390 |
Resumo: | Logic is not metaphysically neutral. For propositional logics assumptions are needed about the nature of the world as it relates to propositions. Predicate logic assumes a metaphysics of individual things. The metaphysics is reflected in the linguistic forms chosen for investigation. The scope and limitations of the logic are determined primarily by the metaphysics. The metaphysics of predicate logic precludes analysis of inferences that depend on aspects of verbs. A logic of processes is needed, for there is much more in the world than everything. |
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The metaphysical basis of logicMetafísicaLógicaLogic is not metaphysically neutral. For propositional logics assumptions are needed about the nature of the world as it relates to propositions. Predicate logic assumes a metaphysics of individual things. The metaphysics is reflected in the linguistic forms chosen for investigation. The scope and limitations of the logic are determined primarily by the metaphysics. The metaphysics of predicate logic precludes analysis of inferences that depend on aspects of verbs. A logic of processes is needed, for there is much more in the world than everything.Universidade Estadual de Campinas1999-10-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8666390Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 2 (1999): out.; 133-148Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 22 No. 2 (1999): Oct.; 133-148Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 22 Núm. 2 (1999): out.; 133-1482317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8666390/28499Estados Unidos; Contemporâneo Copyright (c) 1999 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessEpstein , Richard L. 2022-05-20T17:48:20Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8666390Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-05-20T17:48:20Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The metaphysical basis of logic |
title |
The metaphysical basis of logic |
spellingShingle |
The metaphysical basis of logic Epstein , Richard L. Metafísica Lógica |
title_short |
The metaphysical basis of logic |
title_full |
The metaphysical basis of logic |
title_fullStr |
The metaphysical basis of logic |
title_full_unstemmed |
The metaphysical basis of logic |
title_sort |
The metaphysical basis of logic |
author |
Epstein , Richard L. |
author_facet |
Epstein , Richard L. |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Epstein , Richard L. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Metafísica Lógica |
topic |
Metafísica Lógica |
description |
Logic is not metaphysically neutral. For propositional logics assumptions are needed about the nature of the world as it relates to propositions. Predicate logic assumes a metaphysics of individual things. The metaphysics is reflected in the linguistic forms chosen for investigation. The scope and limitations of the logic are determined primarily by the metaphysics. The metaphysics of predicate logic precludes analysis of inferences that depend on aspects of verbs. A logic of processes is needed, for there is much more in the world than everything. |
publishDate |
1999 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
1999-10-31 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8666390 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8666390 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8666390/28499 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 1999 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 1999 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Estados Unidos; Contemporâneo |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 2 (1999): out.; 133-148 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 22 No. 2 (1999): Oct.; 133-148 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 22 Núm. 2 (1999): out.; 133-148 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216567997267968 |