Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131 |
Resumo: | The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason. |
id |
UNICAMP-17_2961fd1dbab4dbd6a8204838b59fe1d7 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8654131 |
network_acronym_str |
UNICAMP-17 |
network_name_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pureAutonomy. Practical reason. Aristotle. Kant. Ethics.The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2018-12-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionNot applicableapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-193Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-193Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-1932317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131/18853Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFrey, Jennifer A.2018-12-04T09:48:51Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8654131Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T09:48:51Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure |
title |
Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure |
spellingShingle |
Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure Frey, Jennifer A. Autonomy. Practical reason. Aristotle. Kant. Ethics. |
title_short |
Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure |
title_full |
Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure |
title_fullStr |
Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure |
title_full_unstemmed |
Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure |
title_sort |
Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure |
author |
Frey, Jennifer A. |
author_facet |
Frey, Jennifer A. |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Frey, Jennifer A. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Autonomy. Practical reason. Aristotle. Kant. Ethics. |
topic |
Autonomy. Practical reason. Aristotle. Kant. Ethics. |
description |
The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-12-04 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Not applicable |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131/18853 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-193 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-193 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-193 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216567054598144 |