Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Frey, Jennifer A.
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131
Resumo: The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason.
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spelling Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pureAutonomy. Practical reason. Aristotle. Kant. Ethics.The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2018-12-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionNot applicableapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-193Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-193Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-1932317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131/18853Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFrey, Jennifer A.2018-12-04T09:48:51Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8654131Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T09:48:51Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure
title Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure
spellingShingle Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure
Frey, Jennifer A.
Autonomy. Practical reason. Aristotle. Kant. Ethics.
title_short Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure
title_full Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure
title_fullStr Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure
title_full_unstemmed Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure
title_sort Against autonomy: why practical reason cannot be pure
author Frey, Jennifer A.
author_facet Frey, Jennifer A.
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Frey, Jennifer A.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Autonomy. Practical reason. Aristotle. Kant. Ethics.
topic Autonomy. Practical reason. Aristotle. Kant. Ethics.
description The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-12-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Not applicable
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654131/18853
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-193
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-193
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 41 Núm. 4 (2018): out./dez.; 159-193
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
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instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
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institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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