A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Cormik, Claudio
Data de Publicação: 2020
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8659488
Resumo: In a provocative, yet scarcely discussed, argument at the end of Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa has attempted to determine what kind of evidence we possess in support of the belief that our cognitive capacities as human beings are reliable. According to Sosa, we can appeal to considerations of coherence to prove that such capacities are reliable (i.e., it would be epistemically self-defeating to think otherwise). However, Sosa also declares that such considerations are not “determinative, ultima facie” reasons−which is to say, they are to be regarded as defeasible. As we will try to point out, this overall strategy is ultimately incoherent. Furthermore, as we will argue, Sosa fails in attempting to provide us with an analogy between the case of doubting the reliability of the cognitive faculties of an individual and doubting such reliability in the case of the species.
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spelling A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well EpistemologiaSosa, ErnestArgumentos transcendentaisNaturalismoEpistemologiaSosa, ErnestArgumentos transcendentaisNaturalismoIn a provocative, yet scarcely discussed, argument at the end of Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa has attempted to determine what kind of evidence we possess in support of the belief that our cognitive capacities as human beings are reliable. According to Sosa, we can appeal to considerations of coherence to prove that such capacities are reliable (i.e., it would be epistemically self-defeating to think otherwise). However, Sosa also declares that such considerations are not “determinative, ultima facie” reasons−which is to say, they are to be regarded as defeasible. As we will try to point out, this overall strategy is ultimately incoherent. Furthermore, as we will argue, Sosa fails in attempting to provide us with an analogy between the case of doubting the reliability of the cognitive faculties of an individual and doubting such reliability in the case of the species.Em um argumento provocador, ainda que pouco discutido, no final de Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa tentou determinar que tipo de evidência possuímos para apoiar a crença de que nossas capacidades cognitivas como seres humanos são confiáveis. Segundo Sosa, podemos recorrer a considerações de coerência para provar que essas capacidades são confiáveis ​​(ou seja, seria epistemicamente derrotista pensar de outra maneira). No entanto, Sosa também declara que tais considerações não são razões "determinantes, ultima facie" - ou seja, elas devem ser consideradas viáveis. Como tentaremos ressaltar, essa estratégia geral é incoerente. Além disso, como argumentaremos,Em um argumento provocador, ainda que pouco discutido, no final de Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa tentou determinar que tipo de evidência possuímos para apoiar a crença de que nossas capacidades cognitivas como seres humanos são confiáveis. Segundo Sosa, podemos recorrer a considerações de coerência para provar que essas capacidades são confiáveis ​​(ou seja, seria epistemicamente derrotista pensar de outra maneira). No entanto, Sosa também declara que tais considerações não são razões "determinantes, ultima facie" - ou seja, elas devem ser consideradas viáveis. Como tentaremos ressaltar, essa estratégia geral é incoerente. Além disso, como argumentaremos,Universidade Estadual de Campinas2020-05-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8659488Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 1 (2020): jan./mar.; 41-72Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 1 (2020): Jan./Mar.; 41-72Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 1 (2020): jan./mar.; 41-722317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8659488/22365Global; ContemporanyGlobal; ContemporâneoGlobal; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCormik, Claudio2020-05-08T14:19:52Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8659488Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2020-05-08T14:19:52Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well
A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well
A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well
title A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well
spellingShingle A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well
Cormik, Claudio
Epistemologia
Sosa, Ernest
Argumentos transcendentais
Naturalismo
Epistemologia
Sosa, Ernest
Argumentos transcendentais
Naturalismo
title_short A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well
title_full A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well
title_fullStr A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well
title_full_unstemmed A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well
title_sort A critical assessment of Sosa’s “transcendental argument” in knowing full well
author Cormik, Claudio
author_facet Cormik, Claudio
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Cormik, Claudio
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Epistemologia
Sosa, Ernest
Argumentos transcendentais
Naturalismo
Epistemologia
Sosa, Ernest
Argumentos transcendentais
Naturalismo
topic Epistemologia
Sosa, Ernest
Argumentos transcendentais
Naturalismo
Epistemologia
Sosa, Ernest
Argumentos transcendentais
Naturalismo
description In a provocative, yet scarcely discussed, argument at the end of Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa has attempted to determine what kind of evidence we possess in support of the belief that our cognitive capacities as human beings are reliable. According to Sosa, we can appeal to considerations of coherence to prove that such capacities are reliable (i.e., it would be epistemically self-defeating to think otherwise). However, Sosa also declares that such considerations are not “determinative, ultima facie” reasons−which is to say, they are to be regarded as defeasible. As we will try to point out, this overall strategy is ultimately incoherent. Furthermore, as we will argue, Sosa fails in attempting to provide us with an analogy between the case of doubting the reliability of the cognitive faculties of an individual and doubting such reliability in the case of the species.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-05
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
Texto
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8659488
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8659488
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8659488/22365
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Global; Contemporany
Global; Contemporâneo
Global; Contemporâneo
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 1 (2020): jan./mar.; 41-72
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 1 (2020): Jan./Mar.; 41-72
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 1 (2020): jan./mar.; 41-72
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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