Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2015 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641963 |
Resumo: | Atlas (2007) argues that semantic minimalism (as defended by Cappelen & Lepore 2005) fails because it cannot deal with semantic non-specificity. I argue that there is a plausible version of minimalism—viz., situated minimalism—which doesn’t succumb to the non-specificity charge insofar as non-specificity can be dealt with at a postsemantic level. Thus, pragmatics plays no role when it comes to determining the (minimal) proposition expressed. Instead, pragmatic and other extra-semantic considerations enter the scene in characterizing the situation vis-à-vis which the proposition is evaluated. For this reason a plausible form of minimalism must embrace a form of truth-relativism: a proposition is not universally true/false, but true/false only relative to a situation. I show how the position defended is not only (i) more cognitively plausible than either (semantic) minimalism as proposed by Cappelen & Lepore or the positions appealing to pragmatic intrusion into the proposition expressed, but is also (ii) in accordance with ordinary people’s intuitions. |
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Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalismContextsEvaluationMinimalismNon-specificityPluri-propositionalism.Atlas (2007) argues that semantic minimalism (as defended by Cappelen & Lepore 2005) fails because it cannot deal with semantic non-specificity. I argue that there is a plausible version of minimalism—viz., situated minimalism—which doesn’t succumb to the non-specificity charge insofar as non-specificity can be dealt with at a postsemantic level. Thus, pragmatics plays no role when it comes to determining the (minimal) proposition expressed. Instead, pragmatic and other extra-semantic considerations enter the scene in characterizing the situation vis-à-vis which the proposition is evaluated. For this reason a plausible form of minimalism must embrace a form of truth-relativism: a proposition is not universally true/false, but true/false only relative to a situation. I show how the position defended is not only (i) more cognitively plausible than either (semantic) minimalism as proposed by Cappelen & Lepore or the positions appealing to pragmatic intrusion into the proposition expressed, but is also (ii) in accordance with ordinary people’s intuitions.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2015-11-29info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641963Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 37 n. 1 (2014): Jan./Jun.; 5-50Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 37 No. 1 (2014): Jan./Jun.; 5-50Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 37 Núm. 1 (2014): Jan./Jun.; 5-502317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641963/9460Brazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2015 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCorazza, Eros2019-12-04T12:44:31Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8641963Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2019-12-04T12:44:31Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism |
title |
Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism |
spellingShingle |
Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism Corazza, Eros Contexts Evaluation Minimalism Non-specificity Pluri-propositionalism. |
title_short |
Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism |
title_full |
Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism |
title_fullStr |
Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism |
title_full_unstemmed |
Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism |
title_sort |
Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism |
author |
Corazza, Eros |
author_facet |
Corazza, Eros |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Corazza, Eros |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Contexts Evaluation Minimalism Non-specificity Pluri-propositionalism. |
topic |
Contexts Evaluation Minimalism Non-specificity Pluri-propositionalism. |
description |
Atlas (2007) argues that semantic minimalism (as defended by Cappelen & Lepore 2005) fails because it cannot deal with semantic non-specificity. I argue that there is a plausible version of minimalism—viz., situated minimalism—which doesn’t succumb to the non-specificity charge insofar as non-specificity can be dealt with at a postsemantic level. Thus, pragmatics plays no role when it comes to determining the (minimal) proposition expressed. Instead, pragmatic and other extra-semantic considerations enter the scene in characterizing the situation vis-à-vis which the proposition is evaluated. For this reason a plausible form of minimalism must embrace a form of truth-relativism: a proposition is not universally true/false, but true/false only relative to a situation. I show how the position defended is not only (i) more cognitively plausible than either (semantic) minimalism as proposed by Cappelen & Lepore or the positions appealing to pragmatic intrusion into the proposition expressed, but is also (ii) in accordance with ordinary people’s intuitions. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-11-29 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641963 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641963 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641963/9460 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2015 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2015 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 37 n. 1 (2014): Jan./Jun.; 5-50 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 37 No. 1 (2014): Jan./Jun.; 5-50 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 37 Núm. 1 (2014): Jan./Jun.; 5-50 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216565229027328 |