The relevance of libertarian freedom
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 1999 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543 |
Resumo: | In this paper I undertake to characterise the popular libertarian notion of freedom. I argue that it is most obviously threatened by a combination of two theses, materialism and the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying just materialism, but materialism is highly plausible if physics is deterministic. It cannot be saved by denying just the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying both materialism and the determinacy of physics, but materialism is not made much less plausible if physics is indeterministic. Then I consider the implications of accepting that libertarian freedom is an illusion. I argue that it would be a mistake to think that it entails fatalism, and that it would be a mistake to think that it undermines all forms of moral responsibility. But it plays an important role in undermining the view that punishments and rewards can be given purely backward-looking justifications in terms of retribution and desert. Such a view applies to individual acts, institutions and emotions. |
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The relevance of libertarian freedomLiberdade libertáriaMaterialismoIn this paper I undertake to characterise the popular libertarian notion of freedom. I argue that it is most obviously threatened by a combination of two theses, materialism and the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying just materialism, but materialism is highly plausible if physics is deterministic. It cannot be saved by denying just the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying both materialism and the determinacy of physics, but materialism is not made much less plausible if physics is indeterministic. Then I consider the implications of accepting that libertarian freedom is an illusion. I argue that it would be a mistake to think that it entails fatalism, and that it would be a mistake to think that it undermines all forms of moral responsibility. But it plays an important role in undermining the view that punishments and rewards can be given purely backward-looking justifications in terms of retribution and desert. Such a view applies to individual acts, institutions and emotions.Universidade Estadual de Campinas1999-04-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 1 (1999): abr.; 173-195Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 22 No. 1 (1999): Apr.; 173-195Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 22 Núm. 1 (1999): Abr.; 173-1952317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543/28473Estados Unidos; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 1999 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLatham, Noa 2022-05-20T14:10:36Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8660543Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-05-20T14:10:36Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The relevance of libertarian freedom |
title |
The relevance of libertarian freedom |
spellingShingle |
The relevance of libertarian freedom Latham, Noa Liberdade libertária Materialismo |
title_short |
The relevance of libertarian freedom |
title_full |
The relevance of libertarian freedom |
title_fullStr |
The relevance of libertarian freedom |
title_full_unstemmed |
The relevance of libertarian freedom |
title_sort |
The relevance of libertarian freedom |
author |
Latham, Noa |
author_facet |
Latham, Noa |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Latham, Noa |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Liberdade libertária Materialismo |
topic |
Liberdade libertária Materialismo |
description |
In this paper I undertake to characterise the popular libertarian notion of freedom. I argue that it is most obviously threatened by a combination of two theses, materialism and the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying just materialism, but materialism is highly plausible if physics is deterministic. It cannot be saved by denying just the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying both materialism and the determinacy of physics, but materialism is not made much less plausible if physics is indeterministic. Then I consider the implications of accepting that libertarian freedom is an illusion. I argue that it would be a mistake to think that it entails fatalism, and that it would be a mistake to think that it undermines all forms of moral responsibility. But it plays an important role in undermining the view that punishments and rewards can be given purely backward-looking justifications in terms of retribution and desert. Such a view applies to individual acts, institutions and emotions. |
publishDate |
1999 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
1999-04-30 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543/28473 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 1999 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 1999 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Estados Unidos; Contemporâneo |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 1 (1999): abr.; 173-195 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 22 No. 1 (1999): Apr.; 173-195 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 22 Núm. 1 (1999): Abr.; 173-195 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
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1800216567545331712 |