The relevance of libertarian freedom

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Latham, Noa
Data de Publicação: 1999
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543
Resumo: In this paper I undertake to characterise the popular libertarian notion of freedom. I argue that it is most obviously threatened by a combination of two theses, materialism and the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying just materialism, but materialism is highly plausible if physics is deterministic. It cannot be saved by denying just the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying both materialism and the determinacy of physics, but materialism is not made much less plausible if physics is indeterministic. Then I consider the implications of accepting that libertarian freedom is an illusion. I argue that it would be a mistake to think that it entails fatalism, and that it would be a mistake to think that it undermines all forms of moral responsibility. But it plays an important role in undermining the view that punishments and rewards can be given purely backward-looking justifications in terms of retribution and desert. Such a view applies to individual acts, institutions and emotions.
id UNICAMP-17_2a9355cc6ef82c4b3778ae2ec16f9feb
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8660543
network_acronym_str UNICAMP-17
network_name_str Manuscrito (Online)
repository_id_str
spelling The relevance of libertarian freedomLiberdade libertáriaMaterialismoIn this paper I undertake to characterise the popular libertarian notion of freedom. I argue that it is most obviously threatened by a combination of two theses, materialism and the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying just materialism, but materialism is highly plausible if physics is deterministic. It cannot be saved by denying just the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying both materialism and the determinacy of physics, but materialism is not made much less plausible if physics is indeterministic. Then I consider the implications of accepting that libertarian freedom is an illusion. I argue that it would be a mistake to think that it entails fatalism, and that it would be a mistake to think that it undermines all forms of moral responsibility. But it plays an important role in undermining the view that punishments and rewards can be given purely backward-looking justifications in terms of retribution and desert. Such a view applies to individual acts, institutions and emotions.Universidade Estadual de Campinas1999-04-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 1 (1999): abr.; 173-195Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 22 No. 1 (1999): Apr.; 173-195Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 22 Núm. 1 (1999): Abr.; 173-1952317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543/28473Estados Unidos; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 1999 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLatham, Noa 2022-05-20T14:10:36Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8660543Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-05-20T14:10:36Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The relevance of libertarian freedom
title The relevance of libertarian freedom
spellingShingle The relevance of libertarian freedom
Latham, Noa
Liberdade libertária
Materialismo
title_short The relevance of libertarian freedom
title_full The relevance of libertarian freedom
title_fullStr The relevance of libertarian freedom
title_full_unstemmed The relevance of libertarian freedom
title_sort The relevance of libertarian freedom
author Latham, Noa
author_facet Latham, Noa
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Latham, Noa
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Liberdade libertária
Materialismo
topic Liberdade libertária
Materialismo
description In this paper I undertake to characterise the popular libertarian notion of freedom. I argue that it is most obviously threatened by a combination of two theses, materialism and the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying just materialism, but materialism is highly plausible if physics is deterministic. It cannot be saved by denying just the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying both materialism and the determinacy of physics, but materialism is not made much less plausible if physics is indeterministic. Then I consider the implications of accepting that libertarian freedom is an illusion. I argue that it would be a mistake to think that it entails fatalism, and that it would be a mistake to think that it undermines all forms of moral responsibility. But it plays an important role in undermining the view that punishments and rewards can be given purely backward-looking justifications in terms of retribution and desert. Such a view applies to individual acts, institutions and emotions.
publishDate 1999
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1999-04-30
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660543/28473
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 1999 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 1999 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Estados Unidos; Contemporâneo
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 1 (1999): abr.; 173-195
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 22 No. 1 (1999): Apr.; 173-195
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 22 Núm. 1 (1999): Abr.; 173-195
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
_version_ 1800216567545331712