Reply to “could sign-based semantics and embodied semantics benefit one another?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Duffley, Patrick
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668923
Resumo: Sign-based semantics and embodied semantics are argued to be mutually beneficial to one another. However, while the body does shape our cognitive activities to a great extent, this does not entail that cognition can be reduced to sensorimotor simulation, i.e that the mind can be reduced to the body. Language itself bears testimony to this, as the mind is construed in ordinary discourse as having the incredible capacity of being free to travel beyond the limits of present time and current spatial location. Nagel has argued famously that mind is a fundamental datum of nature that the materialist version of evolutionary biology is unable to account for, as consciousness has an essentially subjective character to it, a ‘what it is like for the conscious organism itself’ aspect, that cannot be reduced to the matter of which the organism is constituted. Two modern scientific developments refute the contention that the human mind can be explained as a purely material machine: quantum theory in physics and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem in mathematics. Just because the mind works through the body does not entail that the mind can be reduced to the body.
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spelling Reply to “could sign-based semantics and embodied semantics benefit one another?Sign-based semanticsEmbodimentCognitive linguisticsSemiological function of languageAbstractionSign-based semantics and embodied semantics are argued to be mutually beneficial to one another. However, while the body does shape our cognitive activities to a great extent, this does not entail that cognition can be reduced to sensorimotor simulation, i.e that the mind can be reduced to the body. Language itself bears testimony to this, as the mind is construed in ordinary discourse as having the incredible capacity of being free to travel beyond the limits of present time and current spatial location. Nagel has argued famously that mind is a fundamental datum of nature that the materialist version of evolutionary biology is unable to account for, as consciousness has an essentially subjective character to it, a ‘what it is like for the conscious organism itself’ aspect, that cannot be reduced to the matter of which the organism is constituted. Two modern scientific developments refute the contention that the human mind can be explained as a purely material machine: quantum theory in physics and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem in mathematics. Just because the mind works through the body does not entail that the mind can be reduced to the body.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2022-04-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668923Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 45 n. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 145-154Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 45 No. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 145-154Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 45 Núm. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 145-1542317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668923/28254Brazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2022 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDuffley, Patrick2022-04-27T17:12:00Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8668923Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-04-27T17:12Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Reply to “could sign-based semantics and embodied semantics benefit one another?
title Reply to “could sign-based semantics and embodied semantics benefit one another?
spellingShingle Reply to “could sign-based semantics and embodied semantics benefit one another?
Duffley, Patrick
Sign-based semantics
Embodiment
Cognitive linguistics
Semiological function of language
Abstraction
title_short Reply to “could sign-based semantics and embodied semantics benefit one another?
title_full Reply to “could sign-based semantics and embodied semantics benefit one another?
title_fullStr Reply to “could sign-based semantics and embodied semantics benefit one another?
title_full_unstemmed Reply to “could sign-based semantics and embodied semantics benefit one another?
title_sort Reply to “could sign-based semantics and embodied semantics benefit one another?
author Duffley, Patrick
author_facet Duffley, Patrick
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Duffley, Patrick
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Sign-based semantics
Embodiment
Cognitive linguistics
Semiological function of language
Abstraction
topic Sign-based semantics
Embodiment
Cognitive linguistics
Semiological function of language
Abstraction
description Sign-based semantics and embodied semantics are argued to be mutually beneficial to one another. However, while the body does shape our cognitive activities to a great extent, this does not entail that cognition can be reduced to sensorimotor simulation, i.e that the mind can be reduced to the body. Language itself bears testimony to this, as the mind is construed in ordinary discourse as having the incredible capacity of being free to travel beyond the limits of present time and current spatial location. Nagel has argued famously that mind is a fundamental datum of nature that the materialist version of evolutionary biology is unable to account for, as consciousness has an essentially subjective character to it, a ‘what it is like for the conscious organism itself’ aspect, that cannot be reduced to the matter of which the organism is constituted. Two modern scientific developments refute the contention that the human mind can be explained as a purely material machine: quantum theory in physics and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem in mathematics. Just because the mind works through the body does not entail that the mind can be reduced to the body.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-04-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668923
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668923
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668923/28254
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Brazil; Contemporary
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 45 n. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 145-154
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 45 No. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 145-154
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 45 Núm. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 145-154
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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