Reply to “do linguistic meanings meet linguistic form?”

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Duffley, Patrick
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668926
Resumo: In reply to the claim that syntax is not taken into account in Linguistic Meaning Meets Linguistic Form, I show that local syntactic analysis has been implemented in the treatment of aspectual verbs and verbs of positive and negative recall, where the syntactic function of the -ing form as direct object of the main verb is put into relation with the main verb’s meaning as the basis for the inferences drawn concerning the temporal relation between the main verb’s event and that expressed by the complement. I argue that I have also developed new tools of syntactic analysis for the to-infinitive, demonstrating that it is not the direct object of the main verb, but rather a goal- or result-specifier, and showing how this accounts for the fact that its event is always understood to be somehow subsequent to that of the main verb. Regarding the applicability of formal semantics to natural language, I argue that the absolute priority accorded to the truth-functional dimension of language by this type of semantics leads to the artificial separation of use-conditions from truth-conditions, with the former being treated as an additional interpretational function added on to the truth-functional one. Contra the autonomous syntax claim that our desire to express meaning is to a great extent independent of the means we use to express those meanings, it is argued that how we perceive the world in our experience is influenced by our system of linguistic representation.
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spelling Reply to “do linguistic meanings meet linguistic form?” Autonomous syntaxFormal semanticsTruth-conditionsSapir-whorf hypothesisSymbolic logicIn reply to the claim that syntax is not taken into account in Linguistic Meaning Meets Linguistic Form, I show that local syntactic analysis has been implemented in the treatment of aspectual verbs and verbs of positive and negative recall, where the syntactic function of the -ing form as direct object of the main verb is put into relation with the main verb’s meaning as the basis for the inferences drawn concerning the temporal relation between the main verb’s event and that expressed by the complement. I argue that I have also developed new tools of syntactic analysis for the to-infinitive, demonstrating that it is not the direct object of the main verb, but rather a goal- or result-specifier, and showing how this accounts for the fact that its event is always understood to be somehow subsequent to that of the main verb. Regarding the applicability of formal semantics to natural language, I argue that the absolute priority accorded to the truth-functional dimension of language by this type of semantics leads to the artificial separation of use-conditions from truth-conditions, with the former being treated as an additional interpretational function added on to the truth-functional one. Contra the autonomous syntax claim that our desire to express meaning is to a great extent independent of the means we use to express those meanings, it is argued that how we perceive the world in our experience is influenced by our system of linguistic representation.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2022-04-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668926Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 45 n. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 175-183Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 45 No. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 175-183Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 45 Núm. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 175-1832317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668926/28257Brazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2022 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDuffley, Patrick2022-04-27T17:12:00Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8668926Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-04-27T17:12Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Reply to “do linguistic meanings meet linguistic form?”
title Reply to “do linguistic meanings meet linguistic form?”
spellingShingle Reply to “do linguistic meanings meet linguistic form?”
Duffley, Patrick
Autonomous syntax
Formal semantics
Truth-conditions
Sapir-whorf hypothesis
Symbolic logic
title_short Reply to “do linguistic meanings meet linguistic form?”
title_full Reply to “do linguistic meanings meet linguistic form?”
title_fullStr Reply to “do linguistic meanings meet linguistic form?”
title_full_unstemmed Reply to “do linguistic meanings meet linguistic form?”
title_sort Reply to “do linguistic meanings meet linguistic form?”
author Duffley, Patrick
author_facet Duffley, Patrick
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Duffley, Patrick
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Autonomous syntax
Formal semantics
Truth-conditions
Sapir-whorf hypothesis
Symbolic logic
topic Autonomous syntax
Formal semantics
Truth-conditions
Sapir-whorf hypothesis
Symbolic logic
description In reply to the claim that syntax is not taken into account in Linguistic Meaning Meets Linguistic Form, I show that local syntactic analysis has been implemented in the treatment of aspectual verbs and verbs of positive and negative recall, where the syntactic function of the -ing form as direct object of the main verb is put into relation with the main verb’s meaning as the basis for the inferences drawn concerning the temporal relation between the main verb’s event and that expressed by the complement. I argue that I have also developed new tools of syntactic analysis for the to-infinitive, demonstrating that it is not the direct object of the main verb, but rather a goal- or result-specifier, and showing how this accounts for the fact that its event is always understood to be somehow subsequent to that of the main verb. Regarding the applicability of formal semantics to natural language, I argue that the absolute priority accorded to the truth-functional dimension of language by this type of semantics leads to the artificial separation of use-conditions from truth-conditions, with the former being treated as an additional interpretational function added on to the truth-functional one. Contra the autonomous syntax claim that our desire to express meaning is to a great extent independent of the means we use to express those meanings, it is argued that how we perceive the world in our experience is influenced by our system of linguistic representation.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-04-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668926
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668926
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668926/28257
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Brazil; Contemporary
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 45 n. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 175-183
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 45 No. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 175-183
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 45 Núm. 1 (2022): jan./mar.; 175-183
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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