Chateaubriand on logical form and semantics

• Autor(a) principal: Haddock, Guillermo E. Rosado
• Data de Publicação: 2016
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644199
• topic: Chateaubriand. Logic. Semantics. Husserl. Frege. Tarski

In this paper on Oswaldo Chateaubriand’s book Logical Forms I, I am mostly concerned with the critical task of indicating some shortcomings and stressing my disagreements with the distinguished scholar. The most important shortcoming of the book is Chateaubriand’s unfamiliarity with Husserl’s views on logic and semantics, some of which anticipate views propounded by the former – e.g., the distinction between logical law and logical necessity-, whereas others are more subtle than Chateaubriand’s views – e.g., Husserl’s views on the referent of statements. One of the most important contributions of Chateaubriand’s book is his analysis and rejection of all forms of the so-called “slingshot argument”. On the other hand, I disagree with Chateaubriand’s rendering of some of Frege’s views, though some of these are very common among Fregean scholars. Finally, I assess Chateaubriand’s criticism of Kripke’s views as well as those of Tarski. I tend to agree with his criticism of Kripke, but disagree with his assessment of Tarskian semantics.