From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657077 |
Resumo: | Do incompatibilist arguments, like some fatalist arguments, rest on modal fallacies? If Westphal (2012) is right, then one popular argument for incompatibilism van Inwagen’s “First Formal Argument” - does rest on a modal fallacy. Similarly, Warfield (2000) claims that the standard modal formulation of the master argument for incompatibilismisamodalfallacy. Here, Irefutebothclaims. Contra Westphal, I show that the mistake in van Inwagen’s "First Formal Argument" is no modal fallacy. After that, I argue that Warfield’s charge of modal fallacy can be easily avoided by using a plausible principle concerning actuality. Then, I show that this allows one to put forward a fairly simple argument for fatalism (the thesis that we aren’t able to do otherwise from what we actually do). |
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From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalismIncompatibilismFatalismNodal fallacyActualityChoice.Do incompatibilist arguments, like some fatalist arguments, rest on modal fallacies? If Westphal (2012) is right, then one popular argument for incompatibilism van Inwagen’s “First Formal Argument” - does rest on a modal fallacy. Similarly, Warfield (2000) claims that the standard modal formulation of the master argument for incompatibilismisamodalfallacy. Here, Irefutebothclaims. Contra Westphal, I show that the mistake in van Inwagen’s "First Formal Argument" is no modal fallacy. After that, I argue that Warfield’s charge of modal fallacy can be easily avoided by using a plausible principle concerning actuality. Then, I show that this allows one to put forward a fairly simple argument for fatalism (the thesis that we aren’t able to do otherwise from what we actually do).Universidade Estadual de Campinas2019-10-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657077Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 42 n. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 86-107Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 42 No. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 86-107Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 42 Núm. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 86-1072317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657077/21429Brazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2019 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMerlussi, Pedro2019-10-11T12:56:49Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8657077Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2019-10-11T12:56:49Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism |
title |
From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism |
spellingShingle |
From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism Merlussi, Pedro Incompatibilism Fatalism Nodal fallacy Actuality Choice. |
title_short |
From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism |
title_full |
From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism |
title_fullStr |
From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism |
title_full_unstemmed |
From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism |
title_sort |
From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism |
author |
Merlussi, Pedro |
author_facet |
Merlussi, Pedro |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Merlussi, Pedro |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Incompatibilism Fatalism Nodal fallacy Actuality Choice. |
topic |
Incompatibilism Fatalism Nodal fallacy Actuality Choice. |
description |
Do incompatibilist arguments, like some fatalist arguments, rest on modal fallacies? If Westphal (2012) is right, then one popular argument for incompatibilism van Inwagen’s “First Formal Argument” - does rest on a modal fallacy. Similarly, Warfield (2000) claims that the standard modal formulation of the master argument for incompatibilismisamodalfallacy. Here, Irefutebothclaims. Contra Westphal, I show that the mistake in van Inwagen’s "First Formal Argument" is no modal fallacy. After that, I argue that Warfield’s charge of modal fallacy can be easily avoided by using a plausible principle concerning actuality. Then, I show that this allows one to put forward a fairly simple argument for fatalism (the thesis that we aren’t able to do otherwise from what we actually do). |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-10-11 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657077 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657077 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657077/21429 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 42 n. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 86-107 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 42 No. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 86-107 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 42 Núm. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 86-107 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216567082909696 |