Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8649852 |
Resumo: | John MacFarlane’s truth relativism (2005, 2007, 2011, 2014) makes use of two notions of propositional truth: a monadic assessment sensitive one taken to be our ordinary truth notion, and a non-monadic one that is meant to account for the assessment sensitivity of the former notion. Some authors (Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009, 2011; Montminy, 2009; Soames, 2011) contend that any theory introducing a technical non-monadic truth notion has to make sense of it (i.e. show that it is a truth notion) by defining or characterizing it in terms of ordinary monadic truth. First, I give some reasons why the relativist should not discard this approach to make sense of the notion of truth relative to a context of assessment. Second, I argue that an illuminating characterization of this notion must provide an answer to a dilemma Paul Boghossian (2011) poses to the relativist. Third, I single out the characterization that can answer this dilemma. Finally, I contend that the relativist still needs to show that this solution works for each case subject to a relativist treatment. |
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Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth?Truth relativism. Assessment sensitivity. Monadic truth. Non-monadic truth.John MacFarlane’s truth relativism (2005, 2007, 2011, 2014) makes use of two notions of propositional truth: a monadic assessment sensitive one taken to be our ordinary truth notion, and a non-monadic one that is meant to account for the assessment sensitivity of the former notion. Some authors (Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009, 2011; Montminy, 2009; Soames, 2011) contend that any theory introducing a technical non-monadic truth notion has to make sense of it (i.e. show that it is a truth notion) by defining or characterizing it in terms of ordinary monadic truth. First, I give some reasons why the relativist should not discard this approach to make sense of the notion of truth relative to a context of assessment. Second, I argue that an illuminating characterization of this notion must provide an answer to a dilemma Paul Boghossian (2011) poses to the relativist. Third, I single out the characterization that can answer this dilemma. Finally, I contend that the relativist still needs to show that this solution works for each case subject to a relativist treatment.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2017-07-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPesquisa teóricaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8649852Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 2 (2017): abr./jun.; 39-70Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 2 (2017): abr./jun.; 39-70Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 2 (2017): abr./jun.; 39-702317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8649852/16266Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGariazzo, Matías2017-11-09T09:23:45Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8649852Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2017-11-09T09:23:45Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
title |
Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
spellingShingle |
Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? Gariazzo, Matías Truth relativism. Assessment sensitivity. Monadic truth. Non-monadic truth. |
title_short |
Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
title_full |
Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
title_fullStr |
Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
title_sort |
Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth? |
author |
Gariazzo, Matías |
author_facet |
Gariazzo, Matías |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Gariazzo, Matías |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Truth relativism. Assessment sensitivity. Monadic truth. Non-monadic truth. |
topic |
Truth relativism. Assessment sensitivity. Monadic truth. Non-monadic truth. |
description |
John MacFarlane’s truth relativism (2005, 2007, 2011, 2014) makes use of two notions of propositional truth: a monadic assessment sensitive one taken to be our ordinary truth notion, and a non-monadic one that is meant to account for the assessment sensitivity of the former notion. Some authors (Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009, 2011; Montminy, 2009; Soames, 2011) contend that any theory introducing a technical non-monadic truth notion has to make sense of it (i.e. show that it is a truth notion) by defining or characterizing it in terms of ordinary monadic truth. First, I give some reasons why the relativist should not discard this approach to make sense of the notion of truth relative to a context of assessment. Second, I argue that an illuminating characterization of this notion must provide an answer to a dilemma Paul Boghossian (2011) poses to the relativist. Third, I single out the characterization that can answer this dilemma. Finally, I contend that the relativist still needs to show that this solution works for each case subject to a relativist treatment. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-07-11 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Pesquisa teórica |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8649852 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8649852 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8649852/16266 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 2 (2017): abr./jun.; 39-70 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 2 (2017): abr./jun.; 39-70 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 2 (2017): abr./jun.; 39-70 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566995877888 |