CAUTION AND NECESSITY

• Autor(a) principal: González Varela, José Edgar
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641970
• topic: Caution. Conventionalism. Necessity. Anti-Realism. Wright

In this paper I examine Crispin Wright’s modal anti-realism as based on the availability of a certain attitude of Caution towards judgements of necessity. I think that Wright’s account should be attractive in several ways for modal theorists with an antirealist bend. However, the attitude of Caution to which it appeals has attracted some controversy. Wright himself has later come to doubt whether Caution is ultimately coherent. Here I first address Wright’s worries concerning the coherence of Caution and show that they are unfounded. But then I argue that although the attitude of Caution is coherent, it cannot provide a suitable basis for a non-eliminativist account of necessity. I offer two different objections against Caution. (1) I argue that Wright’s appeal to Caution, if successful, would show not only that modal judgement is nonobjective but also that it is dispensable. Thus, I claim that appeal to Caution would seem to serve more as a threat against a non-eliminativist account of necessity, rather than as a potential adequate basis for it. However, (2) I argue that Wright’s appeal to Caution is unsuccessful, for there is no genuine Caution: Caution is a mere verbal attitude.