The many senses of completeness

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Silva, Jairo José da
Data de Publicação: 2016
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644947
Resumo: In this paper I study the variants of the notion of completeness Husserl presented in “Ideen I” and two lectures he gave in Göttingen in 1901. Introduced primarily in connection with the problem of imaginary numbers, this notion found eventually a place in the answer Husserl provided for the philosophically more important problem of the logico-epistemological foundation of formal knowledge in science. I also try to explain why Husserl said that there was an evident correlation between his and Hilbert’s notion of completeness introduced in connection with the axiomatisation of geometry and the theory of real numbers when, as many commentators have already observed, these two notions are independent. I show in this paper that if a system of axioms is complete in Husserl’s sense, then its formal domain, the manifold of formal objects it determines, does not admit any extension. This is precisely the idea behind Hilbert’s notion of completeness in question. Therefore, the correlation Husserl noted indeed exists. But, in order to see it, we must consider the formal domain determined by a formal theory, not its models.
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spelling The many senses of completenessHusserl. Sense of completenessIn this paper I study the variants of the notion of completeness Husserl presented in “Ideen I” and two lectures he gave in Göttingen in 1901. Introduced primarily in connection with the problem of imaginary numbers, this notion found eventually a place in the answer Husserl provided for the philosophically more important problem of the logico-epistemological foundation of formal knowledge in science. I also try to explain why Husserl said that there was an evident correlation between his and Hilbert’s notion of completeness introduced in connection with the axiomatisation of geometry and the theory of real numbers when, as many commentators have already observed, these two notions are independent. I show in this paper that if a system of axioms is complete in Husserl’s sense, then its formal domain, the manifold of formal objects it determines, does not admit any extension. This is precisely the idea behind Hilbert’s notion of completeness in question. Therefore, the correlation Husserl noted indeed exists. But, in order to see it, we must consider the formal domain determined by a formal theory, not its models.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-04-13info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644947Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 23 n. 2 (2000): out.; 41-60Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 23 No. 2 (2000): Oct.; 41-60Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (2000): out.; 41-602317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644947/12379Copyright (c) 2000 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilva, Jairo José da2022-05-11T16:36:05Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644947Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-05-11T16:36:05Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The many senses of completeness
title The many senses of completeness
spellingShingle The many senses of completeness
Silva, Jairo José da
Husserl. Sense of completeness
title_short The many senses of completeness
title_full The many senses of completeness
title_fullStr The many senses of completeness
title_full_unstemmed The many senses of completeness
title_sort The many senses of completeness
author Silva, Jairo José da
author_facet Silva, Jairo José da
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Silva, Jairo José da
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Husserl. Sense of completeness
topic Husserl. Sense of completeness
description In this paper I study the variants of the notion of completeness Husserl presented in “Ideen I” and two lectures he gave in Göttingen in 1901. Introduced primarily in connection with the problem of imaginary numbers, this notion found eventually a place in the answer Husserl provided for the philosophically more important problem of the logico-epistemological foundation of formal knowledge in science. I also try to explain why Husserl said that there was an evident correlation between his and Hilbert’s notion of completeness introduced in connection with the axiomatisation of geometry and the theory of real numbers when, as many commentators have already observed, these two notions are independent. I show in this paper that if a system of axioms is complete in Husserl’s sense, then its formal domain, the manifold of formal objects it determines, does not admit any extension. This is precisely the idea behind Hilbert’s notion of completeness in question. Therefore, the correlation Husserl noted indeed exists. But, in order to see it, we must consider the formal domain determined by a formal theory, not its models.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-04-13
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644947
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644947
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644947/12379
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2000 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2000 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 23 n. 2 (2000): out.; 41-60
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 23 No. 2 (2000): Oct.; 41-60
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (2000): out.; 41-60
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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