Culture as learnables
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644593 |
Resumo: | I want to argue that there is a task of ‘culture research’ other than what is practised in the empirical disciplines such as Social Anthropology or historical disciplines such as Literary Studies. Suppose ‘Cultures’ are looked upon as different legacies of ways of going about in the world resulting from the different pasts of different groups of people. Such ways can be either approached as a phenomena to be explained or as na embodiment of knowledge dispositions to be learnt. However, the predominant tool for approaching knowledge dispositions is to look at them as explicitly or implicitly held propositions. One consequence of this propensity is to construe understanding a culture as arriving at the beliefs held by the community characterised by that culture. I will show that there is a way of extending the Fregean distinction between ‘object’ and ‘concept’ in such a way as to make it serviceable to conceptualise non-propositional forms of knowledge, and consequently, a more adequate tool for identifying the objects of culture research. |
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Culture as learnablesCulturaldifferenceknowledgelearningattitudesI want to argue that there is a task of ‘culture research’ other than what is practised in the empirical disciplines such as Social Anthropology or historical disciplines such as Literary Studies. Suppose ‘Cultures’ are looked upon as different legacies of ways of going about in the world resulting from the different pasts of different groups of people. Such ways can be either approached as a phenomena to be explained or as na embodiment of knowledge dispositions to be learnt. However, the predominant tool for approaching knowledge dispositions is to look at them as explicitly or implicitly held propositions. One consequence of this propensity is to construe understanding a culture as arriving at the beliefs held by the community characterised by that culture. I will show that there is a way of extending the Fregean distinction between ‘object’ and ‘concept’ in such a way as to make it serviceable to conceptualise non-propositional forms of knowledge, and consequently, a more adequate tool for identifying the objects of culture research.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-03-29info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644593Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 2 (2002): Jul./Dez.; 465-488Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 2 (2002): Jul./Dez.; 465-488Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 2 (2002): Jul./Dez.; 465-4882317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644593/11979Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRao, Narahari2016-03-29T16:22:51Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644593Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-03-29T16:22:51Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Culture as learnables |
title |
Culture as learnables |
spellingShingle |
Culture as learnables Rao, Narahari Cultural difference knowledge learning attitudes |
title_short |
Culture as learnables |
title_full |
Culture as learnables |
title_fullStr |
Culture as learnables |
title_full_unstemmed |
Culture as learnables |
title_sort |
Culture as learnables |
author |
Rao, Narahari |
author_facet |
Rao, Narahari |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Rao, Narahari |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Cultural difference knowledge learning attitudes |
topic |
Cultural difference knowledge learning attitudes |
description |
I want to argue that there is a task of ‘culture research’ other than what is practised in the empirical disciplines such as Social Anthropology or historical disciplines such as Literary Studies. Suppose ‘Cultures’ are looked upon as different legacies of ways of going about in the world resulting from the different pasts of different groups of people. Such ways can be either approached as a phenomena to be explained or as na embodiment of knowledge dispositions to be learnt. However, the predominant tool for approaching knowledge dispositions is to look at them as explicitly or implicitly held propositions. One consequence of this propensity is to construe understanding a culture as arriving at the beliefs held by the community characterised by that culture. I will show that there is a way of extending the Fregean distinction between ‘object’ and ‘concept’ in such a way as to make it serviceable to conceptualise non-propositional forms of knowledge, and consequently, a more adequate tool for identifying the objects of culture research. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-03-29 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644593 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644593 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644593/11979 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 2 (2002): Jul./Dez.; 465-488 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 2 (2002): Jul./Dez.; 465-488 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 2 (2002): Jul./Dez.; 465-488 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566225174528 |