Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072 |
Resumo: | According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions. |
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Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationalityThomas KuhnPhilosophy of scienceRationalityValues.According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2019-10-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 42 n. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-46Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 42 No. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-46Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 42 Núm. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-462317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072/21426Brazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2019 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPirozelli, Paulo2019-10-11T12:56:49Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8657072Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2019-10-11T12:56:49Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality |
title |
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality |
spellingShingle |
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality Pirozelli, Paulo Thomas Kuhn Philosophy of science Rationality Values. |
title_short |
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality |
title_full |
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality |
title_fullStr |
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality |
title_full_unstemmed |
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality |
title_sort |
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality |
author |
Pirozelli, Paulo |
author_facet |
Pirozelli, Paulo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pirozelli, Paulo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Thomas Kuhn Philosophy of science Rationality Values. |
topic |
Thomas Kuhn Philosophy of science Rationality Values. |
description |
According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-10-10 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072/21426 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2019 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 42 n. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-46 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 42 No. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-46 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 42 Núm. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-46 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216567079763968 |