Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pirozelli, Paulo
Data de Publicação: 2019
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072
Resumo: According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions.
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spelling Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationalityThomas KuhnPhilosophy of scienceRationalityValues.According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2019-10-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 42 n. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-46Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 42 No. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-46Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 42 Núm. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-462317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072/21426Brazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2019 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPirozelli, Paulo2019-10-11T12:56:49Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8657072Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2019-10-11T12:56:49Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality
title Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality
spellingShingle Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality
Pirozelli, Paulo
Thomas Kuhn
Philosophy of science
Rationality
Values.
title_short Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality
title_full Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality
title_fullStr Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality
title_full_unstemmed Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality
title_sort Thomas Kuhn’s theory of rationality
author Pirozelli, Paulo
author_facet Pirozelli, Paulo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pirozelli, Paulo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Thomas Kuhn
Philosophy of science
Rationality
Values.
topic Thomas Kuhn
Philosophy of science
Rationality
Values.
description According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is considered better the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with convergence of opinions.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-10-10
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657072/21426
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2019 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2019 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Brazil; Contemporary
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 42 n. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-46
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 42 No. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-46
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 42 Núm. 3 (2019): jul./set.; 1-46
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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