A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Rudy-Hiller, Fernando
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8670445
Resumo: Ascribing moral and legal responsibility for negligent actions and omissions has always been deeply contested because it seems to be in tension with the natural intuition that responsibility requires control. In this paper I show that we can accommodate culpability for negligence within a control-based account of responsibility if we adopt a “capacitarian” view of control, according to which agents have responsibility-relevant control whenever they have the requisite abilities and opportunity to bring about the morally desired outcome. After explaining the structure of negligent wrongdoing and motivating this conception of control, I show how it can be successfully employed to account for the culpability of negligent agents and to rebut several important arguments against the idea that negligence can be culpable in the first place. I also explain in what respects my proposal is superior to other capacitarian views found in the literature.
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spelling A capacitarian account of culpability for negligenceA capacitarian account of culpability for negligenceA capacitarian account of culpability for negligenceCulpabilityNegligenceCapacitiesResponsibilityCulpabilityNegligenceCapacitiesResponsibilityCulpabilityNegligenceCapacitiesResponsibilityAscribing moral and legal responsibility for negligent actions and omissions has always been deeply contested because it seems to be in tension with the natural intuition that responsibility requires control. In this paper I show that we can accommodate culpability for negligence within a control-based account of responsibility if we adopt a “capacitarian” view of control, according to which agents have responsibility-relevant control whenever they have the requisite abilities and opportunity to bring about the morally desired outcome. After explaining the structure of negligent wrongdoing and motivating this conception of control, I show how it can be successfully employed to account for the culpability of negligent agents and to rebut several important arguments against the idea that negligence can be culpable in the first place. I also explain in what respects my proposal is superior to other capacitarian views found in the literature.Ascribing moral and legal responsibility for negligent actions and omissions has always been deeply contested because it seems to be in tension with the natural intuition that responsibility requires control. In this paper I show that we can accommodate culpability for negligence within a control-based account of responsibility if we adopt a “capacitarian” view of control, according to which agents have responsibility-relevant control whenever they have the requisite abilities and opportunity to bring about the morally desired outcome. After explaining the structure of negligent wrongdoing and motivating this conception of control, I show how it can be successfully employed to account for the culpability of negligent agents and to rebut several important arguments against the idea that negligence can be culpable in the first place. I also explain in what respects my proposal is superior to other capacitarian views found in the literature.Ascribing moral and legal responsibility for negligent actions and omissions has always been deeply contested because it seems to be in tension with the natural intuition that responsibility requires control. In this paper I show that we can accommodate culpability for negligence within a control-based account of responsibility if we adopt a “capacitarian” view of control, according to which agents have responsibility-relevant control whenever they have the requisite abilities and opportunity to bring about the morally desired outcome. After explaining the structure of negligent wrongdoing and motivating this conception of control, I show how it can be successfully employed to account for the culpability of negligent agents and to rebut several important arguments against the idea that negligence can be culpable in the first place. I also explain in what respects my proposal is superior to other capacitarian views found in the literature.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2022-07-20info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextTextinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8670445Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 45 n. 2 (2022): abr./jun.; 118-160Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 45 No. 2 (2022): abr./jun.; 118-160Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 45 Núm. 2 (2022): abr./jun.; 118-1602317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8670445/29596Brazil; ContemporaryBrazil; ContemporaryBrazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2022 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRudy-Hiller, Fernando2022-07-20T18:06:36Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8670445Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-07-20T18:06:36Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence
A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence
A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence
title A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence
spellingShingle A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence
Rudy-Hiller, Fernando
Culpability
Negligence
Capacities
Responsibility
Culpability
Negligence
Capacities
Responsibility
Culpability
Negligence
Capacities
Responsibility
title_short A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence
title_full A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence
title_fullStr A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence
title_full_unstemmed A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence
title_sort A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence
author Rudy-Hiller, Fernando
author_facet Rudy-Hiller, Fernando
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Rudy-Hiller, Fernando
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Culpability
Negligence
Capacities
Responsibility
Culpability
Negligence
Capacities
Responsibility
Culpability
Negligence
Capacities
Responsibility
topic Culpability
Negligence
Capacities
Responsibility
Culpability
Negligence
Capacities
Responsibility
Culpability
Negligence
Capacities
Responsibility
description Ascribing moral and legal responsibility for negligent actions and omissions has always been deeply contested because it seems to be in tension with the natural intuition that responsibility requires control. In this paper I show that we can accommodate culpability for negligence within a control-based account of responsibility if we adopt a “capacitarian” view of control, according to which agents have responsibility-relevant control whenever they have the requisite abilities and opportunity to bring about the morally desired outcome. After explaining the structure of negligent wrongdoing and motivating this conception of control, I show how it can be successfully employed to account for the culpability of negligent agents and to rebut several important arguments against the idea that negligence can be culpable in the first place. I also explain in what respects my proposal is superior to other capacitarian views found in the literature.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-07-20
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Text
Text
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8670445
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8670445
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8670445/29596
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Brazil; Contemporary
Brazil; Contemporary
Brazil; Contemporary
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 45 n. 2 (2022): abr./jun.; 118-160
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 45 No. 2 (2022): abr./jun.; 118-160
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 45 Núm. 2 (2022): abr./jun.; 118-160
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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