Processing descriptions
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643560 |
Resumo: | The first part of this paper discusses the relative merits of Russell’s and Strawson’s view on the proper treatment of descriptive phrases. I argue that Russell’s account is in principle correct, but is incomplete as it stands. The theory should be extended with an account of the intuition that gave rise to Strawson’s (and Frege’s) alternative in the first place. In the second part of this paper I present such an account in the ‘presupposition as anaphora’ framework. I show that if we treat Russellian descriptions as anaphoric expressions and when we implement such an account in a dynamic framework distinguishing between input and output contexts, his basic claim, definites should not be analysed as referring but as descriptive phrases, can be maintained while simultaneously accounting for the Frege/Strawson intuition. |
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Processing descriptionsAnaphoraDiscourse representation theoryDynamic interpretationPresuppositionTheory of descriptions.The first part of this paper discusses the relative merits of Russell’s and Strawson’s view on the proper treatment of descriptive phrases. I argue that Russell’s account is in principle correct, but is incomplete as it stands. The theory should be extended with an account of the intuition that gave rise to Strawson’s (and Frege’s) alternative in the first place. In the second part of this paper I present such an account in the ‘presupposition as anaphora’ framework. I show that if we treat Russellian descriptions as anaphoric expressions and when we implement such an account in a dynamic framework distinguishing between input and output contexts, his basic claim, definites should not be analysed as referring but as descriptive phrases, can be maintained while simultaneously accounting for the Frege/Strawson intuition.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-02-25info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643560Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 29 n. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 399-436Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 29 No. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 399-436Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 399-4362317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643560/11086Brazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2006 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVan der Sandt, Rob2019-12-04T13:48:28Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8643560Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2019-12-04T13:48:28Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Processing descriptions |
title |
Processing descriptions |
spellingShingle |
Processing descriptions Van der Sandt, Rob Anaphora Discourse representation theory Dynamic interpretation Presupposition Theory of descriptions. |
title_short |
Processing descriptions |
title_full |
Processing descriptions |
title_fullStr |
Processing descriptions |
title_full_unstemmed |
Processing descriptions |
title_sort |
Processing descriptions |
author |
Van der Sandt, Rob |
author_facet |
Van der Sandt, Rob |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Van der Sandt, Rob |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Anaphora Discourse representation theory Dynamic interpretation Presupposition Theory of descriptions. |
topic |
Anaphora Discourse representation theory Dynamic interpretation Presupposition Theory of descriptions. |
description |
The first part of this paper discusses the relative merits of Russell’s and Strawson’s view on the proper treatment of descriptive phrases. I argue that Russell’s account is in principle correct, but is incomplete as it stands. The theory should be extended with an account of the intuition that gave rise to Strawson’s (and Frege’s) alternative in the first place. In the second part of this paper I present such an account in the ‘presupposition as anaphora’ framework. I show that if we treat Russellian descriptions as anaphoric expressions and when we implement such an account in a dynamic framework distinguishing between input and output contexts, his basic claim, definites should not be analysed as referring but as descriptive phrases, can be maintained while simultaneously accounting for the Frege/Strawson intuition. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-02-25 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643560 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643560 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643560/11086 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 29 n. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 399-436 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 29 No. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 399-436 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 399-436 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216565754363904 |