MORAL ‘SHOULD’S AND ‘MORALLY SHOULD’S, OR, RACHELS ON THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Trueblood, J. Jocelyn
Data de Publicação: 2016
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643647
Resumo: In 1972 James Rachels published a challenging criticism of moral-point-of-view theories. It has never been answered. This is surprising, given that the species of theory to which it applies remains alive. In this paper I reply to Rachels’ criticism. My reply refers frequently to the work of G. J. Warnock and employs three distinctions that have been overlooked in the literature on moral-point-of-view theories. These distinctions have relevance to more than Rachels’ paper. As shown in Section 6, they undermine a contemporary argument for moral subjectivism.
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spelling MORAL ‘SHOULD’S AND ‘MORALLY SHOULD’S, OR, RACHELS ON THE MORAL POINT OF VIEWRachels. Warnock. Moral judgments. Moral point of view. Moral-point-of-view theories.In 1972 James Rachels published a challenging criticism of moral-point-of-view theories. It has never been answered. This is surprising, given that the species of theory to which it applies remains alive. In this paper I reply to Rachels’ criticism. My reply refers frequently to the work of G. J. Warnock and employs three distinctions that have been overlooked in the literature on moral-point-of-view theories. These distinctions have relevance to more than Rachels’ paper. As shown in Section 6, they undermine a contemporary argument for moral subjectivism.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-03-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643647Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 29 n. 1 (2006): Jan./Jun.; 37-70Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 29 No. 1 (2006): Jan./Jun.; 37-70Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 1 (2006): Jan./Jun.; 37-702317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643647/11166Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTrueblood, J. Jocelyn2016-03-01T09:23:25Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8643647Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-03-01T09:23:25Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv MORAL ‘SHOULD’S AND ‘MORALLY SHOULD’S, OR, RACHELS ON THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
title MORAL ‘SHOULD’S AND ‘MORALLY SHOULD’S, OR, RACHELS ON THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
spellingShingle MORAL ‘SHOULD’S AND ‘MORALLY SHOULD’S, OR, RACHELS ON THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
Trueblood, J. Jocelyn
Rachels. Warnock. Moral judgments. Moral point of view. Moral-point-of-view theories.
title_short MORAL ‘SHOULD’S AND ‘MORALLY SHOULD’S, OR, RACHELS ON THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
title_full MORAL ‘SHOULD’S AND ‘MORALLY SHOULD’S, OR, RACHELS ON THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
title_fullStr MORAL ‘SHOULD’S AND ‘MORALLY SHOULD’S, OR, RACHELS ON THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
title_full_unstemmed MORAL ‘SHOULD’S AND ‘MORALLY SHOULD’S, OR, RACHELS ON THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
title_sort MORAL ‘SHOULD’S AND ‘MORALLY SHOULD’S, OR, RACHELS ON THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW
author Trueblood, J. Jocelyn
author_facet Trueblood, J. Jocelyn
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Trueblood, J. Jocelyn
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Rachels. Warnock. Moral judgments. Moral point of view. Moral-point-of-view theories.
topic Rachels. Warnock. Moral judgments. Moral point of view. Moral-point-of-view theories.
description In 1972 James Rachels published a challenging criticism of moral-point-of-view theories. It has never been answered. This is surprising, given that the species of theory to which it applies remains alive. In this paper I reply to Rachels’ criticism. My reply refers frequently to the work of G. J. Warnock and employs three distinctions that have been overlooked in the literature on moral-point-of-view theories. These distinctions have relevance to more than Rachels’ paper. As shown in Section 6, they undermine a contemporary argument for moral subjectivism.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-03-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643647
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643647
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643647/11166
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 29 n. 1 (2006): Jan./Jun.; 37-70
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 29 No. 1 (2006): Jan./Jun.; 37-70
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 1 (2006): Jan./Jun.; 37-70
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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