Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8674094 |
Resumo: | The “black page” in Spinoza’s Political Treatise has been much discussed and interpreted. These can be roughly divided into three groups: Approaches that see the “black page” as an extension of Spinoza’s theory of the passions and imagination; approaches that maintain that Spinoza excluded women from politics not because of their innate weaknesses but because of their social conditions; approaches that maintain that he excluded women because he saw them as weaker beings, but this contradicts his certain accounts, especially in the Ethics. In this paper, I take the latter view. My contribution is to argue that this contradiction is not unique to the Ethics. I pursue my reading along two lines, one ontological and one political. In the first, I focus on the continuity between the Ethics and the Political Treatise and show that the “black page” is also inconsistent with the ontology and methodology of the Political Treatise itself. In the second, I argue that the exclusion of women also contradicts the concept of the political absolute developed in this last work, since this concept problematizes any kind of exclusion and provides for political stability the strategic principle of increasing the number of decision-makers as much as possible. |
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Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on womenOntology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on womenOntology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on womenSpinozaWomenOntologySui jurisPolitical absoluteSpinozaWomenOntologySui jurisPolitical absoluteSpinozaWomenOntologySui jurisPolitical absoluteThe “black page” in Spinoza’s Political Treatise has been much discussed and interpreted. These can be roughly divided into three groups: Approaches that see the “black page” as an extension of Spinoza’s theory of the passions and imagination; approaches that maintain that Spinoza excluded women from politics not because of their innate weaknesses but because of their social conditions; approaches that maintain that he excluded women because he saw them as weaker beings, but this contradicts his certain accounts, especially in the Ethics. In this paper, I take the latter view. My contribution is to argue that this contradiction is not unique to the Ethics. I pursue my reading along two lines, one ontological and one political. In the first, I focus on the continuity between the Ethics and the Political Treatise and show that the “black page” is also inconsistent with the ontology and methodology of the Political Treatise itself. In the second, I argue that the exclusion of women also contradicts the concept of the political absolute developed in this last work, since this concept problematizes any kind of exclusion and provides for political stability the strategic principle of increasing the number of decision-makers as much as possible.The “black page” in Spinoza’s Political Treatise has been much discussed and interpreted. These can be roughly divided into three groups: Approaches that see the “black page” as an extension of Spinoza’s theory of the passions and imagination; approaches that maintain that Spinoza excluded women from politics not because of their innate weaknesses but because of their social conditions; approaches that maintain that he excluded women because he saw them as weaker beings, but this contradicts his certain accounts, especially in the Ethics. In this paper, I take the latter view. My contribution is to argue that this contradiction is not unique to the Ethics. I pursue my reading along two lines, one ontological and one political. In the first, I focus on the continuity between the Ethics and the Political Treatise and show that the “black page” is also inconsistent with the ontology and methodology of the Political Treatise itself. In the second, I argue that the exclusion of women also contradicts the concept of the political absolute developed in this last work, since this concept problematizes any kind of exclusion and provides for political stability the strategic principle of increasing the number of decision-makers as much as possible.The “black page” in Spinoza’s Political Treatise has been much discussed and interpreted. These can be roughly divided into three groups: Approaches that see the “black page” as an extension of Spinoza’s theory of the passions and imagination; approaches that maintain that Spinoza excluded women from politics not because of their innate weaknesses but because of their social conditions; approaches that maintain that he excluded women because he saw them as weaker beings, but this contradicts his certain accounts, especially in the Ethics. In this paper, I take the latter view. My contribution is to argue that this contradiction is not unique to the Ethics. I pursue my reading along two lines, one ontological and one political. In the first, I focus on the continuity between the Ethics and the Political Treatise and show that the “black page” is also inconsistent with the ontology and methodology of the Political Treatise itself. In the second, I argue that the exclusion of women also contradicts the concept of the political absolute developed in this last work, since this concept problematizes any kind of exclusion and provides for political stability the strategic principle of increasing the number of decision-makers as much as possible.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2023-07-28info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8674094Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 46 n. 1 (2023): Jan./Mar.; 147-196Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 46 No. 1 (2023): Jan./Mar.; 147-196Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 46 Núm. 1 (2023): Jan./Mar.; 147-1962317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8674094/32295Brazil, ContemporaryBrasil; ContemporáneoBrazil, ContemporanyCopyright (c) 2023 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCanaslan, Eylem2023-07-28T19:54:05Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8674094Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2023-07-28T19:54:05Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women |
title |
Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women |
spellingShingle |
Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women Canaslan, Eylem Spinoza Women Ontology Sui juris Political absolute Spinoza Women Ontology Sui juris Political absolute Spinoza Women Ontology Sui juris Political absolute |
title_short |
Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women |
title_full |
Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women |
title_fullStr |
Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women |
title_full_unstemmed |
Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women |
title_sort |
Ontology and the political absolute: a critical reading of Spinoza on women |
author |
Canaslan, Eylem |
author_facet |
Canaslan, Eylem |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Canaslan, Eylem |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Spinoza Women Ontology Sui juris Political absolute Spinoza Women Ontology Sui juris Political absolute Spinoza Women Ontology Sui juris Political absolute |
topic |
Spinoza Women Ontology Sui juris Political absolute Spinoza Women Ontology Sui juris Political absolute Spinoza Women Ontology Sui juris Political absolute |
description |
The “black page” in Spinoza’s Political Treatise has been much discussed and interpreted. These can be roughly divided into three groups: Approaches that see the “black page” as an extension of Spinoza’s theory of the passions and imagination; approaches that maintain that Spinoza excluded women from politics not because of their innate weaknesses but because of their social conditions; approaches that maintain that he excluded women because he saw them as weaker beings, but this contradicts his certain accounts, especially in the Ethics. In this paper, I take the latter view. My contribution is to argue that this contradiction is not unique to the Ethics. I pursue my reading along two lines, one ontological and one political. In the first, I focus on the continuity between the Ethics and the Political Treatise and show that the “black page” is also inconsistent with the ontology and methodology of the Political Treatise itself. In the second, I argue that the exclusion of women also contradicts the concept of the political absolute developed in this last work, since this concept problematizes any kind of exclusion and provides for political stability the strategic principle of increasing the number of decision-makers as much as possible. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-07-28 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Text Texto info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8674094 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8674094 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8674094/32295 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil, Contemporary Brasil; Contemporáneo Brazil, Contemporany |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 46 n. 1 (2023): Jan./Mar.; 147-196 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 46 No. 1 (2023): Jan./Mar.; 147-196 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 46 Núm. 1 (2023): Jan./Mar.; 147-196 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216568502681600 |