TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCY
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Data de Publicação: | 2015 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641922 |
Resumo: | In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non-contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order to philosophically justify paraconsistency there is no need to endorse dialetheism, the thesis that there are true contradictions. Furthermore, we show that mbC, a logic of formal inconsistency based on classical logic, may be enhanced in order to express the basic ideas of an intuitive interpretation of contradictions as conflicting evidence. |
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TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCYParaconsistent logics. Logics of formal inconsistency. Philosophy of paraconsistency. Non-classical logicsIn this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non-contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order to philosophically justify paraconsistency there is no need to endorse dialetheism, the thesis that there are true contradictions. Furthermore, we show that mbC, a logic of formal inconsistency based on classical logic, may be enhanced in order to express the basic ideas of an intuitive interpretation of contradictions as conflicting evidence.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2015-11-25info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641922Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 38 n. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 155-184Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 38 No. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 155-184Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 38 Núm. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 155-1842317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641922/9420Copyright (c) 2015 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCarnielli, WalterRodrigues, Abílio2015-12-11T14:15:19Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8641922Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2015-12-11T14:15:19Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCY |
title |
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCY |
spellingShingle |
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCY Carnielli, Walter Paraconsistent logics. Logics of formal inconsistency. Philosophy of paraconsistency. Non-classical logics |
title_short |
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCY |
title_full |
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCY |
title_fullStr |
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCY |
title_full_unstemmed |
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCY |
title_sort |
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCY |
author |
Carnielli, Walter |
author_facet |
Carnielli, Walter Rodrigues, Abílio |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Rodrigues, Abílio |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Carnielli, Walter Rodrigues, Abílio |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Paraconsistent logics. Logics of formal inconsistency. Philosophy of paraconsistency. Non-classical logics |
topic |
Paraconsistent logics. Logics of formal inconsistency. Philosophy of paraconsistency. Non-classical logics |
description |
In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non-contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order to philosophically justify paraconsistency there is no need to endorse dialetheism, the thesis that there are true contradictions. Furthermore, we show that mbC, a logic of formal inconsistency based on classical logic, may be enhanced in order to express the basic ideas of an intuitive interpretation of contradictions as conflicting evidence. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-11-25 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641922 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641922 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641922/9420 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2015 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2015 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 38 n. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 155-184 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 38 No. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 155-184 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 38 Núm. 2 (2015): Jul./Dec.; 155-184 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216565212250112 |