Attitutes in action : a causal account

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Baker, Lynne Rudder
Data de Publicação: 2002
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644627
Resumo: This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do. 
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spelling Attitutes in action : a causal accountMental causationCausal explanationIntentional propertiesSupervenienceCounterfactualsThis article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do. Universidade Estadual de Campinas2002-03-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644627Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 3 (2002): Mar.; 47-78Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 3 (2002): Mar.; 47-78Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 3 (2002): Mar.; 47-782317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644627/11986Estados Unidos; Contemporâneo Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBaker, Lynne Rudder2022-05-27T17:20:50Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644627Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-05-27T17:20:50Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Attitutes in action : a causal account
title Attitutes in action : a causal account
spellingShingle Attitutes in action : a causal account
Baker, Lynne Rudder
Mental causation
Causal explanation
Intentional properties
Supervenience
Counterfactuals
title_short Attitutes in action : a causal account
title_full Attitutes in action : a causal account
title_fullStr Attitutes in action : a causal account
title_full_unstemmed Attitutes in action : a causal account
title_sort Attitutes in action : a causal account
author Baker, Lynne Rudder
author_facet Baker, Lynne Rudder
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Baker, Lynne Rudder
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Mental causation
Causal explanation
Intentional properties
Supervenience
Counterfactuals
topic Mental causation
Causal explanation
Intentional properties
Supervenience
Counterfactuals
description This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do. 
publishDate 2002
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2002-03-31
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644627
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644627
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644627/11986
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Estados Unidos; Contemporâneo
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 3 (2002): Mar.; 47-78
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 3 (2002): Mar.; 47-78
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 3 (2002): Mar.; 47-78
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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