Learning from Anselm’s argument
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668930 |
Resumo: | Anselm’s original argument for the existence of God seems to pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it is not easy to see what, if anything, is wrong with it; on the other, it seems incredible that the existence of a being like God could be proved entirely a priori. This paper presents a diagnosis of what seems to be wrong with Anselm’s original reasoning. The diagnosis is general enough to be of use elsewhere, and it is this: conceptual possibilities are inferential dead-ends, not free inference tickets to prove any substantial claim. It remains to be seen if other versions of Anselm’s original insight, both contemporary and not, fall into the same conceptual possibility trap |
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Learning from Anselm’s argumentAnselmOntological argumentConceptual possibilityGodAnselm’s original argument for the existence of God seems to pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it is not easy to see what, if anything, is wrong with it; on the other, it seems incredible that the existence of a being like God could be proved entirely a priori. This paper presents a diagnosis of what seems to be wrong with Anselm’s original reasoning. The diagnosis is general enough to be of use elsewhere, and it is this: conceptual possibilities are inferential dead-ends, not free inference tickets to prove any substantial claim. It remains to be seen if other versions of Anselm’s original insight, both contemporary and not, fall into the same conceptual possibility trapUniversidade Estadual de Campinas2022-04-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668930Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 44 n. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 418-433Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 44 No. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 418-433Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 44 Núm. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 418-4332317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668930/28261Brazil; ContemporaryCopyright (c) 2021 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Murcho, Desidério2022-04-05T17:14:14Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8668930Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-04-05T17:14:14Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Learning from Anselm’s argument |
title |
Learning from Anselm’s argument |
spellingShingle |
Learning from Anselm’s argument Murcho, Desidério Anselm Ontological argument Conceptual possibility God |
title_short |
Learning from Anselm’s argument |
title_full |
Learning from Anselm’s argument |
title_fullStr |
Learning from Anselm’s argument |
title_full_unstemmed |
Learning from Anselm’s argument |
title_sort |
Learning from Anselm’s argument |
author |
Murcho, Desidério |
author_facet |
Murcho, Desidério |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Murcho, Desidério |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Anselm Ontological argument Conceptual possibility God |
topic |
Anselm Ontological argument Conceptual possibility God |
description |
Anselm’s original argument for the existence of God seems to pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it is not easy to see what, if anything, is wrong with it; on the other, it seems incredible that the existence of a being like God could be proved entirely a priori. This paper presents a diagnosis of what seems to be wrong with Anselm’s original reasoning. The diagnosis is general enough to be of use elsewhere, and it is this: conceptual possibilities are inferential dead-ends, not free inference tickets to prove any substantial claim. It remains to be seen if other versions of Anselm’s original insight, both contemporary and not, fall into the same conceptual possibility trap |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-04-05 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668930 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668930 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668930/28261 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 44 n. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 418-433 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 44 No. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 418-433 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 44 Núm. 4 (2021): out./dez.; 418-433 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216568116805632 |