The sensory act as the object of the representation of a feeling
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Research, Society and Development |
Texto Completo: | https://rsdjournal.org/index.php/rsd/article/view/19581 |
Resumo: | The scientific study of the sensory act aims to make a distinction between the relation of sensations with the Series of Feelings, permanently present in consciousness, and the relation of sensations with the groups of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, which intervene intermittently in consciousness. However, we started from the description of these two concepts, specific to scientific psychology and attributed to the psychological theory of William Hamilton (1853; 1859; 1860), until considering the critical gaze of John Stuart Mill (1869). From there, we sought to analyze our object of study, which is the sensory act, and this according to this second relationship phenomenon in order to contribute to scientific studies from two perspectives, which are: a) behavior, because according to the causal relations of David Hume (1739), as for the theory of causality being the initial theoretical basis to support the study of our object, behavior is the effect of sensory acts, which are the cause of it and making the behavior happen through the actions of thinking or acting otherwise; b) the memory of immediately past psychic phenomenal, because according to the scientific description of the representation of feeling, which is the second theoretical basis of our study framed by Franz Brentano (2008), feeling has an object. The results will be the product of observations on the effects of the sensory act. The conclusions of the study will concern the relevance of the conditions under which these possibilities are realized in consciousness. |
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The sensory act as the object of the representation of a feeling El acto sensorial como objeto de la representación de un sentimiento L’acte sensoriel comme objet de la représentation d’un sentimentDescriptive PsychologyFeelingMatterMindSensation.AsuntoMentePsicología descriptivaSensaciónSentimiento.EspritMatièrePsychologie descriptiveSensationSentiment.The scientific study of the sensory act aims to make a distinction between the relation of sensations with the Series of Feelings, permanently present in consciousness, and the relation of sensations with the groups of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, which intervene intermittently in consciousness. However, we started from the description of these two concepts, specific to scientific psychology and attributed to the psychological theory of William Hamilton (1853; 1859; 1860), until considering the critical gaze of John Stuart Mill (1869). From there, we sought to analyze our object of study, which is the sensory act, and this according to this second relationship phenomenon in order to contribute to scientific studies from two perspectives, which are: a) behavior, because according to the causal relations of David Hume (1739), as for the theory of causality being the initial theoretical basis to support the study of our object, behavior is the effect of sensory acts, which are the cause of it and making the behavior happen through the actions of thinking or acting otherwise; b) the memory of immediately past psychic phenomenal, because according to the scientific description of the representation of feeling, which is the second theoretical basis of our study framed by Franz Brentano (2008), feeling has an object. The results will be the product of observations on the effects of the sensory act. The conclusions of the study will concern the relevance of the conditions under which these possibilities are realized in consciousness.El estudio científico del acto sensorial tiene como objetivo hacer una distinción entre la relación de las sensaciones con la Serie de Sentimientos, permanentemente presentes en la conciencia, y la relación de las sensaciones con los grupos de Posibilidades Permanentes de la Sensación, que intervienen de manera intermitente en la conciencia. Sin embargo, partimos de la descripción de estos dos conceptos, propios de la psicología científica y atribuidos a la teoría psicológica de William Hamilton (1853, 1859, 1860), hasta considerar la mirada crítica de John Stuart Mill (1869). A partir de ahí, se buscó analizar nuestro objeto de estudio, que es el acto sensorial, y esto de acuerdo con este segundo fenómeno de relación con el fin de contribuir a los estudios científicos desde dos perspectivas, que son: a) comportamiento, porque según las relaciones causales de David Hume (1739), en cuanto a que la teoría de la causalidad es la base teórica inicial para sustentar el estudio de nuestro objeto, la conducta es el efecto de los actos sensoriales, que son la causa de la misma y hacen que la conducta suceda a través de las acciones del pensamiento. O actuando de otra manera; b) la memoria de fenómenos psíquicos inmediatamente pasados, porque según la descripción científica de la representación del sentimiento, que es la segunda base teórica de nuestro estudio enmarcado por Franz Brentano (2008), el sentimiento tiene un objeto. Los resultados serán producto de observaciones sobre los efectos del acto sensorial. Las conclusiones del estudio se referirán a la relevancia de las condiciones bajo las cuales estas posibilidades se realizan en la conciencia.L’étude scientifique de l’acte sensoriel a pour objectif la réalisation d’une distinction entre la relation des sensations avec les Séries de Sentiments, présents de manière permanente dans la conscience, et la relation des sensations avec les groupes de Possibilités Permanentes de Sensation, lesquels interviennent de manière intermittente dans la conscience. Pour autant, nous sommes partis de la description de ces deux concepts, spécifiques à la psychologie scientifique et attribués à la théorie psychologique de William Hamilton (1853 ; 1859 ; 1860), jusqu’à considérer le regard critique de John Stuart Mill (1869). À partir de là, nous avons cherché à analyser notre objet d’étude, qui est l’acte sensoriel, et ce selon ce deuxième phénomène de relation afin de contribuer aux études scientifiques par deux perspectives, lesquelles sont : a) Le comportement, car selon les relations causales de David Hume (1739), quant à la théorie de la causalité étant la base théorique initiale pour soutenir l’étude de notre objet, le comportement est l’effet des actes sensoriels, qui sont la cause de celui-ci et faisant comme quoi le comportement se réalise par les actions de penser ou d’agir autrement ; b) La mémoire des phénomènes psychiques immédiatement passés, car d’après la description scientifique de la représentation du sentiment, qui est la deuxième base théorique de notre étude encadrée par Franz Brentano (2008), le sentiment a un objet. Les résultats seront le produit d’observations sur les effets de l’acte sensoriel. Les conclusions de l’étude concerneront la pertinence des conditions selon lesquelles cesdites possibilités se réalisent dans la conscience.Research, Society and Development2021-09-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://rsdjournal.org/index.php/rsd/article/view/1958110.33448/rsd-v10i11.19581Research, Society and Development; Vol. 10 No. 11; e485101119581Research, Society and Development; Vol. 10 Núm. 11; e485101119581Research, Society and Development; v. 10 n. 11; e4851011195812525-3409reponame:Research, Society and Developmentinstname:Universidade Federal de Itajubá (UNIFEI)instacron:UNIFEIporhttps://rsdjournal.org/index.php/rsd/article/view/19581/17752Copyright (c) 2021 Rudy Kohwer; Edvania Gomes da Silvahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessKohwer, RudySilva, Edvania Gomes da2021-10-23T19:01:11Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/19581Revistahttps://rsdjournal.org/index.php/rsd/indexPUBhttps://rsdjournal.org/index.php/rsd/oairsd.articles@gmail.com2525-34092525-3409opendoar:2024-01-17T09:39:26.424571Research, Society and Development - Universidade Federal de Itajubá (UNIFEI)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The sensory act as the object of the representation of a feeling El acto sensorial como objeto de la representación de un sentimiento L’acte sensoriel comme objet de la représentation d’un sentiment |
title |
The sensory act as the object of the representation of a feeling |
spellingShingle |
The sensory act as the object of the representation of a feeling Kohwer, Rudy Descriptive Psychology Feeling Matter Mind Sensation. Asunto Mente Psicología descriptiva Sensación Sentimiento. Esprit Matière Psychologie descriptive Sensation Sentiment. |
title_short |
The sensory act as the object of the representation of a feeling |
title_full |
The sensory act as the object of the representation of a feeling |
title_fullStr |
The sensory act as the object of the representation of a feeling |
title_full_unstemmed |
The sensory act as the object of the representation of a feeling |
title_sort |
The sensory act as the object of the representation of a feeling |
author |
Kohwer, Rudy |
author_facet |
Kohwer, Rudy Silva, Edvania Gomes da |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Silva, Edvania Gomes da |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Kohwer, Rudy Silva, Edvania Gomes da |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Descriptive Psychology Feeling Matter Mind Sensation. Asunto Mente Psicología descriptiva Sensación Sentimiento. Esprit Matière Psychologie descriptive Sensation Sentiment. |
topic |
Descriptive Psychology Feeling Matter Mind Sensation. Asunto Mente Psicología descriptiva Sensación Sentimiento. Esprit Matière Psychologie descriptive Sensation Sentiment. |
description |
The scientific study of the sensory act aims to make a distinction between the relation of sensations with the Series of Feelings, permanently present in consciousness, and the relation of sensations with the groups of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, which intervene intermittently in consciousness. However, we started from the description of these two concepts, specific to scientific psychology and attributed to the psychological theory of William Hamilton (1853; 1859; 1860), until considering the critical gaze of John Stuart Mill (1869). From there, we sought to analyze our object of study, which is the sensory act, and this according to this second relationship phenomenon in order to contribute to scientific studies from two perspectives, which are: a) behavior, because according to the causal relations of David Hume (1739), as for the theory of causality being the initial theoretical basis to support the study of our object, behavior is the effect of sensory acts, which are the cause of it and making the behavior happen through the actions of thinking or acting otherwise; b) the memory of immediately past psychic phenomenal, because according to the scientific description of the representation of feeling, which is the second theoretical basis of our study framed by Franz Brentano (2008), feeling has an object. The results will be the product of observations on the effects of the sensory act. The conclusions of the study will concern the relevance of the conditions under which these possibilities are realized in consciousness. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-09-07 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://rsdjournal.org/index.php/rsd/article/view/19581 10.33448/rsd-v10i11.19581 |
url |
https://rsdjournal.org/index.php/rsd/article/view/19581 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.33448/rsd-v10i11.19581 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://rsdjournal.org/index.php/rsd/article/view/19581/17752 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Rudy Kohwer; Edvania Gomes da Silva https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Rudy Kohwer; Edvania Gomes da Silva https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Research, Society and Development |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Research, Society and Development |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Research, Society and Development; Vol. 10 No. 11; e485101119581 Research, Society and Development; Vol. 10 Núm. 11; e485101119581 Research, Society and Development; v. 10 n. 11; e485101119581 2525-3409 reponame:Research, Society and Development instname:Universidade Federal de Itajubá (UNIFEI) instacron:UNIFEI |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Itajubá (UNIFEI) |
instacron_str |
UNIFEI |
institution |
UNIFEI |
reponame_str |
Research, Society and Development |
collection |
Research, Society and Development |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Research, Society and Development - Universidade Federal de Itajubá (UNIFEI) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
rsd.articles@gmail.com |
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1797052808253407232 |