Countermeasures in the WTO law and the principle of proportionality: A developing country’s perspective
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Tipo de documento: | Capítulo de livro |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
Texto Completo: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03263-0_12 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/198887 |
Resumo: | One of the most important features of the WTO dispute settlement is the use of trade sanctions as a means of promoting compliance with the WTO decisions by Member States. Member States that were injured by the refusal of another Member State to comply with WTO decisions can be authorized to exercise countermeasures against this State. WTO rules regulate the conditions and limitations on the taking of countermeasures by an injured State. The focus of this paper is more circumvented: The role of the principle of proportionality in the WTO discipline on countermeasures. As we try to demonstrate in this paper, the principle of proportionality influences the amount and the type of the countermeasures. WTO arbitrators, however, have not applied correctly this principle. In particular, WTO arbitrators have failed to take into account the economic difficulties of developing countries. Moreover, they have adopted a very strict approach in analyzing cross-retaliation. This strict approach is not compatible with the single undertaking underlying WTO agreements. |
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Countermeasures in the WTO law and the principle of proportionality: A developing country’s perspectiveOne of the most important features of the WTO dispute settlement is the use of trade sanctions as a means of promoting compliance with the WTO decisions by Member States. Member States that were injured by the refusal of another Member State to comply with WTO decisions can be authorized to exercise countermeasures against this State. WTO rules regulate the conditions and limitations on the taking of countermeasures by an injured State. The focus of this paper is more circumvented: The role of the principle of proportionality in the WTO discipline on countermeasures. As we try to demonstrate in this paper, the principle of proportionality influences the amount and the type of the countermeasures. WTO arbitrators, however, have not applied correctly this principle. In particular, WTO arbitrators have failed to take into account the economic difficulties of developing countries. Moreover, they have adopted a very strict approach in analyzing cross-retaliation. This strict approach is not compatible with the single undertaking underlying WTO agreements.School of Human and Social Sciences of UNESP University of the State of São PauloCampus of Franca Department of Public LawSchool of Human and Social Sciences of UNESP University of the State of São PauloUniversidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)Campus of FrancaDamásio Borges, Daniel [UNESP]2020-12-12T01:24:37Z2020-12-12T01:24:37Z2019-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart177-190http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03263-0_12The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Developing Country Perspective, p. 177-190.http://hdl.handle.net/11449/19888710.1007/978-3-030-03263-0_122-s2.0-85085454685Scopusreponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPengThe WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Developing Country Perspectiveinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2021-10-22T20:49:10Zoai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/198887Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.unesp.br/oai/requestopendoar:29462024-08-05T17:04:20.762673Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Countermeasures in the WTO law and the principle of proportionality: A developing country’s perspective |
title |
Countermeasures in the WTO law and the principle of proportionality: A developing country’s perspective |
spellingShingle |
Countermeasures in the WTO law and the principle of proportionality: A developing country’s perspective Damásio Borges, Daniel [UNESP] |
title_short |
Countermeasures in the WTO law and the principle of proportionality: A developing country’s perspective |
title_full |
Countermeasures in the WTO law and the principle of proportionality: A developing country’s perspective |
title_fullStr |
Countermeasures in the WTO law and the principle of proportionality: A developing country’s perspective |
title_full_unstemmed |
Countermeasures in the WTO law and the principle of proportionality: A developing country’s perspective |
title_sort |
Countermeasures in the WTO law and the principle of proportionality: A developing country’s perspective |
author |
Damásio Borges, Daniel [UNESP] |
author_facet |
Damásio Borges, Daniel [UNESP] |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp) Campus of Franca |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Damásio Borges, Daniel [UNESP] |
description |
One of the most important features of the WTO dispute settlement is the use of trade sanctions as a means of promoting compliance with the WTO decisions by Member States. Member States that were injured by the refusal of another Member State to comply with WTO decisions can be authorized to exercise countermeasures against this State. WTO rules regulate the conditions and limitations on the taking of countermeasures by an injured State. The focus of this paper is more circumvented: The role of the principle of proportionality in the WTO discipline on countermeasures. As we try to demonstrate in this paper, the principle of proportionality influences the amount and the type of the countermeasures. WTO arbitrators, however, have not applied correctly this principle. In particular, WTO arbitrators have failed to take into account the economic difficulties of developing countries. Moreover, they have adopted a very strict approach in analyzing cross-retaliation. This strict approach is not compatible with the single undertaking underlying WTO agreements. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-01-01 2020-12-12T01:24:37Z 2020-12-12T01:24:37Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart |
format |
bookPart |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03263-0_12 The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Developing Country Perspective, p. 177-190. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/198887 10.1007/978-3-030-03263-0_12 2-s2.0-85085454685 |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03263-0_12 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/198887 |
identifier_str_mv |
The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Developing Country Perspective, p. 177-190. 10.1007/978-3-030-03263-0_12 2-s2.0-85085454685 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Developing Country Perspective |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
177-190 |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Scopus reponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESP instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) instacron:UNESP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
instacron_str |
UNESP |
institution |
UNESP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
collection |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1808128750313799680 |