B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral?
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2009 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
Texto Completo: | http://seer.psicologia.ufrj.br/index.php/abp/article/view/259 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/71414 |
Resumo: | Would Skinner's moral theory be dependent on his scientific theory to the point of becoming meaningless without it? The mere suggestion of such hypothesis brings the problem of naturalistic fallacy, that is, the problem of deriving statements of ought kind from statements of is kind. This issue is used here as an indication that suggests how problematic sustaining a moral and a scientific theory in the same ambit can be. The aim of this article, in this context, is to analyze if that is the case of Radical Behaviorism. Inspired by the naturalistic fallacy dilemma, the first step is to expose the structural and functional differences between statements of ought kind and statements of is kind. To do so, the strategy is to present, under the scope of language philosophy, the differences between factual and valuative assertions. The next step consists in analyzing what the nature of relations between Skinner's scientific and moral theories is. That is, if there are necessary or contingencial relations. By doing so it is expected to be plausible the presentation of a possible answer to the central question of this article. |
id |
UNSP_85ba0547e55515b47cd3c02b9bdc49ac |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/71414 |
network_acronym_str |
UNSP |
network_name_str |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
repository_id_str |
2946 |
spelling |
B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral?B. F. Skinner: Theorist of science and theorist of moral?FactsMoral theoryRadical behaviorismScientific theorySkinnerValuesWould Skinner's moral theory be dependent on his scientific theory to the point of becoming meaningless without it? The mere suggestion of such hypothesis brings the problem of naturalistic fallacy, that is, the problem of deriving statements of ought kind from statements of is kind. This issue is used here as an indication that suggests how problematic sustaining a moral and a scientific theory in the same ambit can be. The aim of this article, in this context, is to analyze if that is the case of Radical Behaviorism. Inspired by the naturalistic fallacy dilemma, the first step is to expose the structural and functional differences between statements of ought kind and statements of is kind. To do so, the strategy is to present, under the scope of language philosophy, the differences between factual and valuative assertions. The next step consists in analyzing what the nature of relations between Skinner's scientific and moral theories is. That is, if there are necessary or contingencial relations. By doing so it is expected to be plausible the presentation of a possible answer to the central question of this article.Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp), São PauloUniversidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp), São PauloUniversidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)Zilio, Diego [UNESP]Carrara, Kester [UNESP]2014-05-27T11:24:32Z2014-05-27T11:24:32Z2009-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article1-12application/pdfhttp://seer.psicologia.ufrj.br/index.php/abp/article/view/259Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia, v. 61, n. 2, p. 1-12, 2009.1809-5267http://hdl.handle.net/11449/714142-s2.0-779529474822-s2.0-77952947482.pdf4654377716651363Scopusreponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPporArquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia0,196info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2023-10-08T06:03:12Zoai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/71414Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.unesp.br/oai/requestopendoar:29462023-10-08T06:03:12Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral? B. F. Skinner: Theorist of science and theorist of moral? |
title |
B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral? |
spellingShingle |
B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral? Zilio, Diego [UNESP] Facts Moral theory Radical behaviorism Scientific theory Skinner Values |
title_short |
B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral? |
title_full |
B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral? |
title_fullStr |
B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral? |
title_full_unstemmed |
B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral? |
title_sort |
B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral? |
author |
Zilio, Diego [UNESP] |
author_facet |
Zilio, Diego [UNESP] Carrara, Kester [UNESP] |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Carrara, Kester [UNESP] |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp) |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Zilio, Diego [UNESP] Carrara, Kester [UNESP] |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Facts Moral theory Radical behaviorism Scientific theory Skinner Values |
topic |
Facts Moral theory Radical behaviorism Scientific theory Skinner Values |
description |
Would Skinner's moral theory be dependent on his scientific theory to the point of becoming meaningless without it? The mere suggestion of such hypothesis brings the problem of naturalistic fallacy, that is, the problem of deriving statements of ought kind from statements of is kind. This issue is used here as an indication that suggests how problematic sustaining a moral and a scientific theory in the same ambit can be. The aim of this article, in this context, is to analyze if that is the case of Radical Behaviorism. Inspired by the naturalistic fallacy dilemma, the first step is to expose the structural and functional differences between statements of ought kind and statements of is kind. To do so, the strategy is to present, under the scope of language philosophy, the differences between factual and valuative assertions. The next step consists in analyzing what the nature of relations between Skinner's scientific and moral theories is. That is, if there are necessary or contingencial relations. By doing so it is expected to be plausible the presentation of a possible answer to the central question of this article. |
publishDate |
2009 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2009-12-01 2014-05-27T11:24:32Z 2014-05-27T11:24:32Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://seer.psicologia.ufrj.br/index.php/abp/article/view/259 Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia, v. 61, n. 2, p. 1-12, 2009. 1809-5267 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/71414 2-s2.0-77952947482 2-s2.0-77952947482.pdf 4654377716651363 |
url |
http://seer.psicologia.ufrj.br/index.php/abp/article/view/259 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/71414 |
identifier_str_mv |
Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia, v. 61, n. 2, p. 1-12, 2009. 1809-5267 2-s2.0-77952947482 2-s2.0-77952947482.pdf 4654377716651363 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia 0,196 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
1-12 application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Scopus reponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESP instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) instacron:UNESP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
instacron_str |
UNESP |
institution |
UNESP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
collection |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799964478051188736 |