On the philosophical relevance of the miracle argument
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
Texto Completo: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2019.v42n4.04.p47 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/198441 |
Resumo: | In this article, we argue in favor of a sophisticated version of scientific realism, based on an analysis of what we consider to be the strategic element of its defense: the “miracle argument”. Scientific realism is the perspective applicable to our best scientific theories; that is, it applies to entities, processes, and relationships, etc., whether observable or unobservable, which are indispensable for explaining the empirical success of theories, and it applies particularly to those components of the theories that are crucial to achieving new and successful forecasts. The miracle argument is a type of abduction or inference to the best explanation, and is expressed in the famous formulation of Putnam (1975, p. 73): “[Scientific] realism is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of the science a miracle.” We analyze and refute two important modes of antirealist argument: pessimistic induction and vicious circularity of inference to the best explanation. We believe that we are justified in defending the basic intuition of scientific realism, supported by a strengthened version of the miracle argument, together with the attributes of predictive novelty and theoretical fecundity. From this perspective, science succeeds in explaining and predicting phenomena, including new phenomena, because its best theories (mature, non-ad hoc, empirically and instrumentally successful, providing new and fertile predictions, etc.) are (partially or approximately) true, and the unobservable entities postulated by these theories actually exist. We conclude that the miracle argument continues to be basic and strategic in the defense of scientific realism. |
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On the philosophical relevance of the miracle argumentSobre a relevância filosófica do argumento do milagreAnti-realismMiracle argumentPredictive noveltyScientific realismTheoretical fecundityIn this article, we argue in favor of a sophisticated version of scientific realism, based on an analysis of what we consider to be the strategic element of its defense: the “miracle argument”. Scientific realism is the perspective applicable to our best scientific theories; that is, it applies to entities, processes, and relationships, etc., whether observable or unobservable, which are indispensable for explaining the empirical success of theories, and it applies particularly to those components of the theories that are crucial to achieving new and successful forecasts. The miracle argument is a type of abduction or inference to the best explanation, and is expressed in the famous formulation of Putnam (1975, p. 73): “[Scientific] realism is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of the science a miracle.” We analyze and refute two important modes of antirealist argument: pessimistic induction and vicious circularity of inference to the best explanation. We believe that we are justified in defending the basic intuition of scientific realism, supported by a strengthened version of the miracle argument, together with the attributes of predictive novelty and theoretical fecundity. From this perspective, science succeeds in explaining and predicting phenomena, including new phenomena, because its best theories (mature, non-ad hoc, empirically and instrumentally successful, providing new and fertile predictions, etc.) are (partially or approximately) true, and the unobservable entities postulated by these theories actually exist. We conclude that the miracle argument continues to be basic and strategic in the defense of scientific realism.Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)Universidade de São PauloUniversidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp)de Souza, Edna Alves [UNESP]2020-12-12T01:12:59Z2020-12-12T01:12:59Z2019-10-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article47-80application/pdfhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2019.v42n4.04.p47Trans/Form/Acao, v. 42, n. 4, p. 47-80, 2019.0101-3173http://hdl.handle.net/11449/19844110.1590/0101-3173.2019.v42n4.04.p47S0101-317320190004000472-s2.0-85078416576S0101-31732019000400047.pdfScopusreponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPporTrans/Form/Acaoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2024-01-05T06:21:45Zoai:repositorio.unesp.br:11449/198441Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.unesp.br/oai/requestopendoar:29462024-08-05T22:09:28.154172Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
On the philosophical relevance of the miracle argument Sobre a relevância filosófica do argumento do milagre |
title |
On the philosophical relevance of the miracle argument |
spellingShingle |
On the philosophical relevance of the miracle argument de Souza, Edna Alves [UNESP] Anti-realism Miracle argument Predictive novelty Scientific realism Theoretical fecundity |
title_short |
On the philosophical relevance of the miracle argument |
title_full |
On the philosophical relevance of the miracle argument |
title_fullStr |
On the philosophical relevance of the miracle argument |
title_full_unstemmed |
On the philosophical relevance of the miracle argument |
title_sort |
On the philosophical relevance of the miracle argument |
author |
de Souza, Edna Alves [UNESP] |
author_facet |
de Souza, Edna Alves [UNESP] |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp) |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
de Souza, Edna Alves [UNESP] |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Anti-realism Miracle argument Predictive novelty Scientific realism Theoretical fecundity |
topic |
Anti-realism Miracle argument Predictive novelty Scientific realism Theoretical fecundity |
description |
In this article, we argue in favor of a sophisticated version of scientific realism, based on an analysis of what we consider to be the strategic element of its defense: the “miracle argument”. Scientific realism is the perspective applicable to our best scientific theories; that is, it applies to entities, processes, and relationships, etc., whether observable or unobservable, which are indispensable for explaining the empirical success of theories, and it applies particularly to those components of the theories that are crucial to achieving new and successful forecasts. The miracle argument is a type of abduction or inference to the best explanation, and is expressed in the famous formulation of Putnam (1975, p. 73): “[Scientific] realism is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of the science a miracle.” We analyze and refute two important modes of antirealist argument: pessimistic induction and vicious circularity of inference to the best explanation. We believe that we are justified in defending the basic intuition of scientific realism, supported by a strengthened version of the miracle argument, together with the attributes of predictive novelty and theoretical fecundity. From this perspective, science succeeds in explaining and predicting phenomena, including new phenomena, because its best theories (mature, non-ad hoc, empirically and instrumentally successful, providing new and fertile predictions, etc.) are (partially or approximately) true, and the unobservable entities postulated by these theories actually exist. We conclude that the miracle argument continues to be basic and strategic in the defense of scientific realism. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019-10-01 2020-12-12T01:12:59Z 2020-12-12T01:12:59Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2019.v42n4.04.p47 Trans/Form/Acao, v. 42, n. 4, p. 47-80, 2019. 0101-3173 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/198441 10.1590/0101-3173.2019.v42n4.04.p47 S0101-31732019000400047 2-s2.0-85078416576 S0101-31732019000400047.pdf |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2019.v42n4.04.p47 http://hdl.handle.net/11449/198441 |
identifier_str_mv |
Trans/Form/Acao, v. 42, n. 4, p. 47-80, 2019. 0101-3173 10.1590/0101-3173.2019.v42n4.04.p47 S0101-31732019000400047 2-s2.0-85078416576 S0101-31732019000400047.pdf |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Trans/Form/Acao |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
47-80 application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Scopus reponame:Repositório Institucional da UNESP instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) instacron:UNESP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
instacron_str |
UNESP |
institution |
UNESP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
collection |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
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1808129398267707392 |