Ni cabalmente clásico, ni completamente molecular: un análisis del concepto de gen en la genética del comportamiento

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pallitto, Nahuel
Data de Publicação: 2018
Outros Autores: Folguera, Guillermo
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: spa
Título da fonte: Scientiae Studia (Online)
Texto Completo: https://www.revistas.usp.br/ss/article/view/144948
Resumo: The way in which the biological sciences conceptualize genes have been analysed by a diversity of authors working in philosophy of biology. Despite recognizing the presence of a plurality of concepts, a dualistic conceptualization prevails where a classical gene (Gene-P) and a molecular gene (Gene-D) have been identified. Besides, it has been declared that such concepts are independent and that it is impossible to find “hybrid” notions. In this article we analyse which gene concepts behaviour geneticists operate with and we show that the standard view does not fit well to what is happening in the area. In particular, we postulate that in behaviour genetics there are two different gene concepts, one of which has a “hybrid” nature. In that sense, our proposal shares the pluralistic consensus but rejects the dualistic character that has fundamentally adopted.
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spelling Ni cabalmente clásico, ni completamente molecular: un análisis del concepto de gen en la genética del comportamientoNeither wholly classical, nor completely molecular: an analysis of the gene concept in behaviour genetics.Gen-P. Gen-D. Genética del comportamiento. Dualismo. Pluralismo.Gene-P. Gene-D. Behaviour genetics. Dualism. Pluralism.The way in which the biological sciences conceptualize genes have been analysed by a diversity of authors working in philosophy of biology. Despite recognizing the presence of a plurality of concepts, a dualistic conceptualization prevails where a classical gene (Gene-P) and a molecular gene (Gene-D) have been identified. Besides, it has been declared that such concepts are independent and that it is impossible to find “hybrid” notions. In this article we analyse which gene concepts behaviour geneticists operate with and we show that the standard view does not fit well to what is happening in the area. In particular, we postulate that in behaviour genetics there are two different gene concepts, one of which has a “hybrid” nature. In that sense, our proposal shares the pluralistic consensus but rejects the dualistic character that has fundamentally adopted.El modo en que las ciencias biológicas conceptualizan a los genes ha sido analizado por diversos autores de la filosofía de la biología. Pese al reconocimiento de una pluralidad de conceptos de gen diferentes al seno de la disciplina, se ha impuesto una conceptualización de carácter principalmente dualista, identificando un concepto de gen clásico (gen-P) y otro concepto de gen molecular (gen-D). A su vez, se ha manifestado la independencia de tales conceptos y la imposibilidad de hallar nociones “híbridas”. En este artículo, analizamos con cuáles conceptos de gen opera la genética del comportamiento y mostramos que la caracterización hegemónica no se ajusta a lo que sucede en el área. En particular, postulamos que en la genética del comportamiento conviven dos distintos conceptos de gen, siendo uno de ellos de índole “híbrida”. De aquí que nuestra propuesta se enmarca en el consenso pluralista de la filosofía de la biología, pero rechaza el carácter dualista que ha fundamentalmente adoptado.Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas2018-04-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ss/article/view/14494810.11606/51678-31662017000200011Scientiae Studia; v. 15 n. 2 (2017); 439-457Scientiae Studia; Vol. 15 Núm. 2 (2017); 439-457Scientiae Studia; Vol. 15 No. 2 (2017); 439-4572316-89941678-3166reponame:Scientiae Studia (Online)instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USPspahttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ss/article/view/144948/139137Copyright (c) 2018 Scientiae Studiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPallitto, NahuelFolguera, Guillermo2018-04-03T11:36:37Zoai:revistas.usp.br:article/144948Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=1678-3166&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ss/oaiariconda@usp.br2316-89941678-3166opendoar:2018-04-03T11:36:37Scientiae Studia (Online) - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Ni cabalmente clásico, ni completamente molecular: un análisis del concepto de gen en la genética del comportamiento
Neither wholly classical, nor completely molecular: an analysis of the gene concept in behaviour genetics.
title Ni cabalmente clásico, ni completamente molecular: un análisis del concepto de gen en la genética del comportamiento
spellingShingle Ni cabalmente clásico, ni completamente molecular: un análisis del concepto de gen en la genética del comportamiento
Pallitto, Nahuel
Gen-P. Gen-D. Genética del comportamiento. Dualismo. Pluralismo.
Gene-P. Gene-D. Behaviour genetics. Dualism. Pluralism.
title_short Ni cabalmente clásico, ni completamente molecular: un análisis del concepto de gen en la genética del comportamiento
title_full Ni cabalmente clásico, ni completamente molecular: un análisis del concepto de gen en la genética del comportamiento
title_fullStr Ni cabalmente clásico, ni completamente molecular: un análisis del concepto de gen en la genética del comportamiento
title_full_unstemmed Ni cabalmente clásico, ni completamente molecular: un análisis del concepto de gen en la genética del comportamiento
title_sort Ni cabalmente clásico, ni completamente molecular: un análisis del concepto de gen en la genética del comportamiento
author Pallitto, Nahuel
author_facet Pallitto, Nahuel
Folguera, Guillermo
author_role author
author2 Folguera, Guillermo
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pallitto, Nahuel
Folguera, Guillermo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Gen-P. Gen-D. Genética del comportamiento. Dualismo. Pluralismo.
Gene-P. Gene-D. Behaviour genetics. Dualism. Pluralism.
topic Gen-P. Gen-D. Genética del comportamiento. Dualismo. Pluralismo.
Gene-P. Gene-D. Behaviour genetics. Dualism. Pluralism.
description The way in which the biological sciences conceptualize genes have been analysed by a diversity of authors working in philosophy of biology. Despite recognizing the presence of a plurality of concepts, a dualistic conceptualization prevails where a classical gene (Gene-P) and a molecular gene (Gene-D) have been identified. Besides, it has been declared that such concepts are independent and that it is impossible to find “hybrid” notions. In this article we analyse which gene concepts behaviour geneticists operate with and we show that the standard view does not fit well to what is happening in the area. In particular, we postulate that in behaviour genetics there are two different gene concepts, one of which has a “hybrid” nature. In that sense, our proposal shares the pluralistic consensus but rejects the dualistic character that has fundamentally adopted.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-04-03
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://www.revistas.usp.br/ss/article/view/144948
10.11606/51678-31662017000200011
url https://www.revistas.usp.br/ss/article/view/144948
identifier_str_mv 10.11606/51678-31662017000200011
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.revistas.usp.br/ss/article/view/144948/139137
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Scientiae Studia
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Scientiae Studia
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Scientiae Studia; v. 15 n. 2 (2017); 439-457
Scientiae Studia; Vol. 15 Núm. 2 (2017); 439-457
Scientiae Studia; Vol. 15 No. 2 (2017); 439-457
2316-8994
1678-3166
reponame:Scientiae Studia (Online)
instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron:USP
instname_str Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron_str USP
institution USP
reponame_str Scientiae Studia (Online)
collection Scientiae Studia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Scientiae Studia (Online) - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ariconda@usp.br
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