Um jogo simplificado para analise de negociação coletiva aplicada ao contexto brasileiro

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Jorge, Marco Antonio
Data de Publicação: 1999
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Economia Aplicada
Texto Completo: https://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/218505
Resumo: This article aims to create a game to analyze the wage bargaining among workers' and enterprises' trade unions in Brazil, where there is a Work's Justice with normative power. It behavior in conceeding wage changes impacts the players expectations' and strategies' The introduction presents briefly this brazilian specifity. The next section shows the game description and solve it, using backwards induction and subgame's analysis. The results are presented in the last section; there is a trend to abbreviate the bargaining process. Low wage change concessions stimulate an equilibrium (agreement), but a refuse can surge due unfairness or due past frustrating experiences. By the other side, high wage change concessions can lead to disagreement, but assuring a minimum award to the workers.
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spelling Um jogo simplificado para analise de negociação coletiva aplicada ao contexto brasileirogame theorywage bargainingBrazilThis article aims to create a game to analyze the wage bargaining among workers' and enterprises' trade unions in Brazil, where there is a Work's Justice with normative power. It behavior in conceeding wage changes impacts the players expectations' and strategies' The introduction presents briefly this brazilian specifity. The next section shows the game description and solve it, using backwards induction and subgame's analysis. The results are presented in the last section; there is a trend to abbreviate the bargaining process. Low wage change concessions stimulate an equilibrium (agreement), but a refuse can surge due unfairness or due past frustrating experiences. By the other side, high wage change concessions can lead to disagreement, but assuring a minimum award to the workers.Universidade de São Paulo, FEA-RP/USP1999-02-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/21850510.11606/1413-8050/ea218505Economia Aplicada; Vol. 3 Núm. 1 (1999); 5-21Economia Aplicada; Vol. 3 No. 1 (1999); 5-21Economia Aplicada; v. 3 n. 1 (1999); 5-211980-53301413-8050reponame:Economia Aplicadainstname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)instacron:USPporhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/218505/199640Copyright (c) 1999 Economia Aplicadahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessJorge, Marco Antonio 2023-11-09T11:34:55Zoai:revistas.usp.br:article/218505Revistahttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoaPUBhttps://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/oai||revecap@usp.br1980-53301413-8050opendoar:2023-11-09T11:34:55Economia Aplicada - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Um jogo simplificado para analise de negociação coletiva aplicada ao contexto brasileiro
title Um jogo simplificado para analise de negociação coletiva aplicada ao contexto brasileiro
spellingShingle Um jogo simplificado para analise de negociação coletiva aplicada ao contexto brasileiro
Jorge, Marco Antonio
game theory
wage bargaining
Brazil
title_short Um jogo simplificado para analise de negociação coletiva aplicada ao contexto brasileiro
title_full Um jogo simplificado para analise de negociação coletiva aplicada ao contexto brasileiro
title_fullStr Um jogo simplificado para analise de negociação coletiva aplicada ao contexto brasileiro
title_full_unstemmed Um jogo simplificado para analise de negociação coletiva aplicada ao contexto brasileiro
title_sort Um jogo simplificado para analise de negociação coletiva aplicada ao contexto brasileiro
author Jorge, Marco Antonio
author_facet Jorge, Marco Antonio
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Jorge, Marco Antonio
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv game theory
wage bargaining
Brazil
topic game theory
wage bargaining
Brazil
description This article aims to create a game to analyze the wage bargaining among workers' and enterprises' trade unions in Brazil, where there is a Work's Justice with normative power. It behavior in conceeding wage changes impacts the players expectations' and strategies' The introduction presents briefly this brazilian specifity. The next section shows the game description and solve it, using backwards induction and subgame's analysis. The results are presented in the last section; there is a trend to abbreviate the bargaining process. Low wage change concessions stimulate an equilibrium (agreement), but a refuse can surge due unfairness or due past frustrating experiences. By the other side, high wage change concessions can lead to disagreement, but assuring a minimum award to the workers.
publishDate 1999
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1999-02-05
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/218505
10.11606/1413-8050/ea218505
url https://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/218505
identifier_str_mv 10.11606/1413-8050/ea218505
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.revistas.usp.br/ecoa/article/view/218505/199640
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 1999 Economia Aplicada
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 1999 Economia Aplicada
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo, FEA-RP/USP
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de São Paulo, FEA-RP/USP
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Economia Aplicada; Vol. 3 Núm. 1 (1999); 5-21
Economia Aplicada; Vol. 3 No. 1 (1999); 5-21
Economia Aplicada; v. 3 n. 1 (1999); 5-21
1980-5330
1413-8050
reponame:Economia Aplicada
instname:Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron:USP
instname_str Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
instacron_str USP
institution USP
reponame_str Economia Aplicada
collection Economia Aplicada
repository.name.fl_str_mv Economia Aplicada - Universidade de São Paulo (USP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||revecap@usp.br
_version_ 1800221693141057537

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