Distorções das emendas parlamentares à alocação equitativa de recursos federais ao PAB

• Autor(a) principal: Vieira, Fabiola Sulpino
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Outros Autores: Lima, Luciana Dias de
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por; eng
• Título da fonte: Revista de Saúde Pública
• Texto Completo: https://www.revistas.usp.br/rsp/article/view/206155
• topic: Alocação de Recursos para a Atenção à Saúde, legislação & jurisprudência; Financiamento Governamental; Gastos Públicos com Saúde; Disparidades em Assistência à Saúde, economia; Sistema Único de Saúde; Health Care Rationing, legislation & jurisprudence; Unified Health System; Financing, Government; Public Expenditures on Health; Healthcare Disparities, economics

OBJECTIVE: Analyze the implications of parliamentary amendments (EP) for the model of equitable allocation of resources from the Fixed Primary Care Minimum (PAB-Fixo) to municipalities in the period from 2015 to 2019. METHODS: A descriptive and exploratory study was conducted on allocating federal resources to the PAB-Fixo and on the increment in the PAB by parliamentary amendment. The municipalities were classified into four groups according to degrees of socioeconomic vulnerability defined by the Ministry of Health for the allocation of PAB-Fixo resources. The transfers from the Ministry by parliamentary amendment were identified. The proportions of municipalities benefiting per group were analyzed by resources allocated from the PAB-Fixo and increment to the minimum by EP. RESULTS: There were reduced resources allocated to the PAB-Fixo (from R$ 6.04 billion to R$ 5.51 billion, -8.8%) and increased increment to PAB by parliamentary amendment (from R$ 95.06 million to R$ 5.58 billion, 5.767%) between 2015 and 2019. The participation of municipalities by the group of those favored by EP was similar to that in the PAB-Fixo. In the proportion of resources for amendments, the municipalities of group I (most vulnerable) had more participation, and those of group IV had less participation if compared to the allocation of the PAB-Fixo. The distribution of resources by the parliamentary amendment did not cover all municipalities, even the most vulnerable ones, i.e., belonging to groups I and II. There was great inequality of resources per capita according to the groups of municipalities. CONCLUSION: The parliamentary amendments distorted the model of equitable allocation of resources proposed by the Ministry of Health for the PAB-Fixo, by allocating resources in a much more significant proportion to the municipalities of group I and much less to those of group IV, which is in disagreement with this model. Furthermore, this distribution by amendments does not benefit all municipalities, not even the most vulnerable.