O impacto da estrutura de propriedade no valor de mercado de empresas brasileiras

• Autor(a) principal: Coutinho, Eduardo Senra
• Data de Publicação: 2006
• Outros Autores: Amaral, Hudson Fernandes, Bertucci, Luiz Alberto
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Revista de Administração (São Paulo)
• Texto Completo: https://www.revistas.usp.br/rausp/article/view/44399
• topic: agency costs; corporate governance; corporate ownership; risk; return; costo de agencia; estructura de propiedad; gestión corporativa; riesgo; retorno; custos de agência; governança corporativa; estrutura de propriedade; risco; retorno

Extensive research has been carried out about the implications of the separation between the control and the ownership of firms which, in the vast majority, have been associated to the ownership concentration effects and the presence of insiders. More recently, research has been focused on identifying the impact of the presence of institutional investors on the firms' performance. The debate over the companies' administration emerges from the preoccupation of most investors regarding the firms' asset management and, consequently, the return on their investments. As the research in Brazil has been concentrated on verifying the characteristics of companies that have institutional investors as shareholders, this piece of work has tried to broaden the scope and identify if the presence of other segments controlling listed companies creates a detectable impact on their share return and risk, using the methodology proposed by Markowitz (1952). The study's results indicate a predominance of portfolios composed by companies controlled by family groups when compared to portfolios of companies controlled by institutional investors, governments, or without a well defined control structure.