AGAINST AUTONOMY: WHY PRACTICAL REASON CANNOT BE PURE

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: FREY,JENNIFER A.
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400159
Resumo: Abstract The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason.
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spelling AGAINST AUTONOMY: WHY PRACTICAL REASON CANNOT BE PUREAutonomyPractical reasonAristotleKantEthicsAbstract The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2018-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400159Manuscrito v.41 n.4 2018reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.jfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFREY,JENNIFER A.eng2018-12-04T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452018000400159Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv AGAINST AUTONOMY: WHY PRACTICAL REASON CANNOT BE PURE
title AGAINST AUTONOMY: WHY PRACTICAL REASON CANNOT BE PURE
spellingShingle AGAINST AUTONOMY: WHY PRACTICAL REASON CANNOT BE PURE
FREY,JENNIFER A.
Autonomy
Practical reason
Aristotle
Kant
Ethics
title_short AGAINST AUTONOMY: WHY PRACTICAL REASON CANNOT BE PURE
title_full AGAINST AUTONOMY: WHY PRACTICAL REASON CANNOT BE PURE
title_fullStr AGAINST AUTONOMY: WHY PRACTICAL REASON CANNOT BE PURE
title_full_unstemmed AGAINST AUTONOMY: WHY PRACTICAL REASON CANNOT BE PURE
title_sort AGAINST AUTONOMY: WHY PRACTICAL REASON CANNOT BE PURE
author FREY,JENNIFER A.
author_facet FREY,JENNIFER A.
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv FREY,JENNIFER A.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Autonomy
Practical reason
Aristotle
Kant
Ethics
topic Autonomy
Practical reason
Aristotle
Kant
Ethics
description Abstract The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400159
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400159
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.jf
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.41 n.4 2018
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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