Enforcement competitivo e adoção de práticas anticorrupção nas organizações brasileiras

• Autor(a) principal: Soares, Robson Fernandes
• Data de Publicação: 2018
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório do Centro Universitário Braz Cubas
• Texto Completo: https://repositorio.cruzeirodosul.edu.br/handle/123456789/2008
• topic: Administração; Corrupção - Prevenção; Corrupção - Legislação; CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO

The fight against organizational corruption has aroused interest both in academia and society as a whole. Several alternatives of intervention have been proposed to induce a responsible ethical behavior by organizations, however, many of these alternatives are focused on an enforcement based on a punitive action of governmental authorities. This type of approach has shown limited scope, since it is very sensitive to government budget availability. As a result, alternative approaches to anticorruption enforcement that are not so sensitive to budget constraints are promising avenues to be explored. In the present thesis some approaches are identified in the literature and is invested and effort in demonstrating the role of competition as an organizational enforcement mechanism capable of inducing the adoption of anticorruption practices. In order to do so, we are exploring logics of organizational action and based on theories of resource dependency, stakeholder, institutional and transaction costs are proposed theoretical relations between competition environment and adoption of anticorruption practices. The empirical verification of these propositions is carried out based on the data on the adoption of anticorruption practices of the 100 largest Brazilian companies according to the ranking of the research Valor 1000. In regression models are investigated both a direct and indirect relationship between competition metrics and adoption of anticorruption practices, considering in this process organizational characteristics. The results point to the existence of a global inverse effect between competition and the adoption of anticorruption practices. It is also empirically verified a positive relationship between the variables of government participation and organizational reputation with variables of anticorruption practices. Even, it is identified negative relationship between the indicators of competition and government participation and positive relationship between the indicators of competition and organizational reputation. These empirical results support the thesis defended in this work that the relationship between competition and anticorruption practices are influenced by two logics of action: on one hand, there is the adoption of anticorruption practices in competitive environments due to the search for a better organizational reputation; on the other hand, there is the adoption of anticorruption practices in non competitive environments due to the more expressive state involvement in companies in this sector. In the first case, there is adoption based on a logic of legitimacy; in the second case, there is a logic of reducing political costs. Companies that are guided by the second logic of action have a higher level of adoption than companies that follow the first logic. These results reinforce the thesis that competition has the capacity to act as enforcement mechanism capable of inducing the adoption of anticorruption practices.